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Editor Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D.

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go to the FPSA website:
http://www.fpsanet.org/
then at bottom page click on:
Join FPSA/Conference Registration

Any problems e-mail the Treasurer:
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Current and past issues of the Florida Political Chronicle, as well as on-line Archive of older issues are FREE for readers by clicking on the Florida Political Science Association’s Website either:
http://www.fpsanet.org/chronicle.html or http://www.fpsanet.org/archive

– ESSAYS SUBMISSIONS REQUIREMENTS –

The Florida Political Chronicle is the regional scholarly journal of the Florida Political Science Association, printed on-line twice annually to serve the academic disciplines and professors of Political Science and International Relations in a balanced, apolitical and analytical way. This scholarly journal encourages scholarly submissions from all Political Science disciplines: American Politics, Theories, Comparative Politics, International Affairs and Security, Diplomatic History, International Political Economy, Public Administration, International Law and Organizations.

Please e-mail Editor Marco Rimanelli (Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu) all essays for consideration:

1. Essays in Word not PDF.
2. Author’s Biography at paper’s very end (2-paragraphs, with years of Ph.D. and M.A.).
3. Abstract and Bibliography required.
4. Do not use the First Person (“I”); instead use the neutral “The author”, “The study” or “This work”.
5. Standard length varies, with maximum length at 10,000 ca. words and 1-inch margins. Tables in the text or as appendixes must fit a 1-inch margin (no landscape-size Tables!).
6. Footnotes preferred style (at end of each page) is the Chicago Manual of Style, but accepted are also APA, APSA or others if the author has a finished work for review. Otherwise consult the Editor.
7. All essays are selected based on a “2 Blind Reviews” process (yes, I have 2 blind mice!) and those accepted for publication will incorporate editorial modification and suggested changes by Reviewers.
8. Book-Reviews are welcome on any related topic! Submit 2-to-7+ pages-long Book-Reviews in Word.

DISCLAIMER: All interpretations, opinions or conclusions printed in the Florida Political Chronicle are solely those of the author/s and should not be attributed to or considered to be reflective of an institutional position by either the Florida Political Science Association (FPSA) and its Officers, or by Saint Leo University, its Board of Trustees, officers and staff, or any organization and individuals supporting either the FPSA or Saint Leo University as institutions.
PUBLICATIONS:

FLORIDA POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

Florida Political Chronicle

http://www.fpsanet.org/florida-political-chronicle.html

The Florida Political Chronicle is the bi-annual scholarly publication of the Florida Political Science Association, which encourages submissions from all the discipline’s sub-fields. Please contact the journal’s Editor Marco Rimanelli of Saint Leo University at marco.rimanelli@saintleo.edu for more information about submission guidelines.

The Political Scientists:
Newsletter of the Florida Political Science Association

http://www.fpsanet.org/political-scientist.html

The Political Scientists newsletter is a semi-annual publication of the Florida Political Science Association. Please contact the newsletter’s Editor Denis Rey of University of Tampa at denis.rey@ut.edu for more information about submission guidelines.

See FPSA website: www.fpsanet.org
Our Mission: The Florida Political Science Association (FPSA) is committed to promoting Political Science research, education and service throughout the State of Florida. Our board of officers represents the diverse educational opportunities available for higher education in Florida. Spanning from the University of West Florida-Pensacola, to University of Central Florida-Orlando, to Barry University, to Flagler College, to Florida International University, to University of Miami, to Saint Leo University, etc., our regional scholarly association covers the “Sunshine State” bringing together Political Scientists and International Affairs professionals from public and private institutions to network, collaborate on research and discuss innovative strategies in the classroom.

Join FPSA!

To become a member the Florida Political Science Association choose either Plan A or Plan B:


Plan A—FPSA New Annual Membership or Renewal plus Annual Conference Registration:

- Faculty/Others: $75 pre-registration (includes membership fee) vs. after 1 March on-site registration $85
- Students: $35 pre-registration (includes membership fee) vs. after 1 March on-site registration $40
- Includes annual Membership & Subscription to *Florida Political Chronicle* & *Political Scientist Newsletter*.

Plan B—FPSA Simple New Annual Membership or Renewal (not attending Annual Conference): $40

- New Membership without Conference Registration: $40 or
- Renewal of Membership without Conference Registration: $40
- Includes annual Membership & Subscription to *Florida Political Chronicle* & *Political Scientist Newsletter*.

Any problems contact FPSA Treasurer Dr. Aubrey Jewett at e-mail: Aubrey.Jewett@ucf.edu

See on pages 5-6 the Announcement for the next FPSA Annual Conference.
Florida Political Science Association Annual Meeting: Saturday, 2 March 2019
University of Tampa, Florida

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The 2019 FPSA Annual Meeting will be held at the University of Tampa in Tampa, Florida. All information on conference program, driving directions, parking and hotels will be posted on the FPSA website by January.

Pre-registration before the conference day is $75 for faculty and $35 for students. All paper presenters, panel chairs and discussants are asked to pre-register. Registration at conference is $85 for faculty and $40 for students. Registration includes conference, lunch, refreshments and subscription to the Florida Political Chronicle. To pre-register please go to the FPSA website: www.fpsanet.org

Faculty, talented undergraduates and graduate students are encouraged to submit papers. A $250 award is given to the FPSA Best Graduate Student Paper presented at the conference and a $200 award will be given to the FPSA Best Undergraduate Student Paper. Please send paper proposals to the following Section Chairs by 7 December 2018. Accepted papers will be notified by 7 January 2019. All proposals must include: name, institution, rank (Faculty, graduate student, undergraduate student, or general public), contact information, paper title and an abstract of between 150 and 250 words.

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<th>Sections</th>
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Call for Submissions to the Florida Political Chronicle journal. Scholarly articles from past FPSA conferences are welcome as well as other papers that have not been previously published. Please contact and submit to Editor Marco Rimanelli at Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu to start the peer review process.

See the FPSA website for conference information and archives of the Florida Political Chronicle and Political Scientist: www.fpsanet.org
Dear FPSA members and readers:

when meeting new people, whether at social gatherings or on airplanes, the conversation often turns to occupations. When I tell new acquaintances that I teach Political Science, they almost invariably respond: “Wow, it must be really interesting to study Political Science right now!” I dutifully agree, though in my view, it is always an interesting time to be a Political Scientist! The 2016 election of U.S. President Donald J. Trump (Republican Party) proved to be a watershed movement for the discipline of Political Science and arguably makes the current moment a uniquely interesting time to study politics. Basically, few Political Scientists predicted Trump’s victory in the 2016 Presidential Election; moreover, during his first two years in office, his policy agenda has continued to surprise (and often shock) analysts. This is especially true in my area of specialization: U.S. foreign policy and America’s role in global affairs.

Each Fall semester, I teach “Introduction to International Relations” and structure the course around the perennial debate between the two main theories of international relations (I.R.), Realism and Liberalism. Realism, often referred to as Realpolitik, takes an unsentimental perspective on global politics, viewing the international arena as anarchical, where strong countries take advantage of weak countries and conflict is endemic. As such, policy-makers who adhere to this world-view have little interest in the promotion of democracy and human rights, instead believing that the acquisition of military power and national wealth remain the main aims of statecraft.

In contrast the other I.R. theory, Liberalism (also called Idealism) sees a far more harmonious world, with numerous opportunities for countries to cooperate towards common goals, such as disarmament, free trade and economic development. In particular, policy-makers adhering to the philosophy of Liberalism actively seek to promote democracy, human rights and economic integration. The Democratic Peace Theory, a central insight of Liberalism, holds that democratic regimes are unlikely to engage in armed conflict with other democracies. By this logic, as the number of democratic countries increases, instances of armed conflict should decrease, making the official advocacy of democracy a policy goal that promotes U.S. values, as well as U.S. interests world-wide.

When engaged in world politics, the default position of most modern U.S. Presidents — at least rhetorically — has been Liberalism. U.S. Presidents as ideologically different as Ronald Reagan and Barack Obama consistently argued that the United States, as the world’s oldest democracy, had an affirmative obligation to promote also human rights and democracy abroad. Numerous U.S. Presidents promoted this goal by forming close military and economic alliances with other democracies, and also by supporting people fighting for freedom against repressive régimes. U.S. commitment to Liberalism was always uneven, as modern history is replete with examples of the United States coddling friendly dictators and declining to intervene in other humanitarian crises. However, in speeches and official National Security Strategies, all U.S. Presidents have envisioned an expansive global role for the United States, a view that was largely shared by the American public.

Instead, U.S. President Donald Trump’s “America First” foreign policy, articulated during his 2016 Presidential Campaign and implemented in his first two years in office, marks a clear break from this pattern.
In adopting a very rigid Realist world-view and representing both global politics and trade as just a “zero-sum-game”, President Trump had deviated from his predecessors in both parties. For example, he has challenged the continued value of U.S. membership in the almost 70-years-old bedrock of Western international security, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and instead has forged personal relationships with authoritarian leaders such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin and North Korea’s Kim Jong-Un. Moreover, the President has questioned if the United States truly reaps any net benefits from free-trade, setting-off trade wars with the end-goal of redrawing new trade deals on more favorable terms for the United States.

Mostly strikingly, Trump has expressed doubt about the responsibility — and in fact the wisdom — of long-standing U.S. goals of promoting democracy and human rights abroad, sometimes with military force against specific humanitarian crises. During the 2016 Presidential Campaign, then-candidate Trump was sharply critical of past U.S. military interventions and nation-building projects in far-flung places such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya; instead, he argued that the U.S. had too often involved itself in “stupid” wars with no clear national interests at stake. So far, his administration has evidenced a strong reluctance to involve the U.S. in the ongoing humanitarian crises in Yemen, Syria and Myanmar/Burma.

These contemporary developments interest me both as a teacher and a scholar of international politics. Specifically, the President’s willingness to challenge bipartisan shibboleths of U.S. foreign policy has led to robust debates in the classroom, with students holding sharply divergent views regarding whether or not the U.S. should reassess more than a half-century’s worth of global engagements and instead redefine its interests more narrowly, while focusing resources at home.

Reciprocally, as a scholar of U. S. foreign policy, the Trump administration provides fruitful new grounds for research. Does the election of Trump signal a complete repudiation of the Republican Party's recent adherence to neo-Conservative (or “neo-Con”) policies pioneered by the George W. Bush administration (which Trump as a candidate publicly ridiculed)? Has the President effectively tapped into the latent public desire for neo-Isolationism? Will Congress be able (under the Democratic Party's opposition) or be anyway interested (under the fragile post-2016 Republican leadership) to assert its prerogatives in foreign policy and challenge the President's decisive tilt towards Realpolitik?

These questions, and many more, will be analyzed and discussed at the 2019 conference of the Florida Political Science Association (FPSA), to be held at the University of Tampa on Saturday 2 March 2019. Our annual conference provides a forum for faculty, graduate and undergraduate students to share their research on all aspects of politics at the international, national, state and local levels, ultimately allowing us to better comprehend the political environment in which we live. As FPSA President and on behalf of the FPSA Executive Board, I invite you to join us in Tampa to discuss politics in these very interesting times.

Sincerely,

Kelly A. McHugh, Ph.D.

Dr. Kelly A. McHugh, Ph.D.
President FPSA &
Chair Political Sciences Department,
Florida Southern College, Lakeland
Editor’s Introduction: Steady Service to the Discipline
by Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D., Saint Leo University & Fulbright Chair College of Europe-Bruges

Dear FPSA Political Scientists and “Fellow-Travelers”,

welcome to a new edition of the Florida Political Chronicle, the regional journal of the Florida Political Science Association (FPSA) published on-line and in colour, with all issues free on the FPSA website (www.fpsanet.org) as resource for members, scholars, students and public interested in domestic and international affairs, as well as the work of the FPSA. I am very pleased to announce that EBSCO has now included the Florida Political Chronicle and all past issues as references in all library and university searches.

This new Florida Political Chronicle issue (vol.26, n.1, 2018, tot. 105 pages) welcomes our readers to an “Introduction” on p.9 from our President of the Florida Political Science Association, Dr. Kelly A. McHugh of Florida Southern College, followed by eight scholarly essays and a lengthy book-review, selected from both the 2017 FPSA Annual Conference at Valencia College in Orlando and 2018 FPSA Annual Conference at Florida Gulf Coast University in Fort Myers. This issue also showcases both the 2018 FPSA Best Graduate Paper Award by Sandor Fabian, M.A. & ABD, “Why Does David Sometimes Defeat Goliath? Effects of Military Culture on the Outcome of Asymmetric Wars” of the University of Central Florida–Orlando, and the 2018 FPSA Best Undergraduate Paper Award by Alexander Bruens and Mirella Miranda, “Redefining Post-Conflict Peacekeeping Success in Regional and International Missions” of Florida Atlantic University–Boca Raton.

The first essay on p.14-20 is: “Training to Maintain a Globally Competitive Workforce: Tampa as Case-Study, Florida” by President Robert W. Robertson, Ph.D., of the Bahamas Technical and Vocational Institute–Nassau. President Robertson explores U.S. workforce skills as an important component of competitiveness for the U.S. economy. Using the city of Tampa in Florida as a contemporary case-study this essay provides an overview of the perceived skills-gap in the U.S. labor-force and identifies ways that this gap can be closed, including using technology, such as on-line learning.

The second essay on p.21-27 is: “From Parkland to Jacksonville: Firearms Mortality and Local Preemptions” by Thomas F. Brezenski, Ph.D. of St. Thomas University in Miami. This paper discusses the always contemporary and controversial issue of firearms public policy, where the vast majority of American state legislatures preempt their own municipalities from enacting any firearm regulations. Following the latest mass-shooting massacre in a public school in Parkland, Florida. The national heated gun control debate is routinely stymied by the National Rifle Association (NRA) in cooperation with the significant support in the U.S. Congress and most state legislatures, preventing any national or local legislation regulating firearms from purchase to concealed carry permits. This essay concludes that such policy contributes to higher mortality rates by firearms in the U.S. until the time when any federal law is ever enacted stripping states of preemption power in this area and restoring their home-rule over gun control regulation.

The third essay on p.28-47 is: “Immigration Federalism and Partisan Sorting: the Importance of State-level Actions” by Donald L. Davison, Ph.D. of Rollins College in Winter Park. This research studies the policies adopted by states in response to local immigration and demographic change influencing political reactions of White and Latino voters, where research employ national surveys, which infer their results to the state-level. Most research finds that immigration sensitive White voters move to the Republican Party, while Latino voters in reaction to hostile immigration policy positions advocated by state Republican Parties turn to the Democratic Party. Dr. Davison’s study uses exit-surveys from three states (Arizona, Florida and Colorado) following different policy approaches to immigration during the period 1996-to-2012 to examine whether patterns of partisan change are uniform. The most dramatic reactions are in Arizona, based on aggressive local pursuit of restrictive anti-illegal immigration policies, while Florida and Colorado show more modulated patterns that reflect an ambivalent policy approach where a significant group of Latino voters identify as Independents. This suggests to Dr. Davison that state politics can be another source of partisan change.
The fourth essay on p.48-67 is the 2018 FPSA Best Graduate Paper Award: “Why Does David Sometimes Defeat Goliath? Effects of Military Culture on the Outcome of Asymmetric Wars” by Sandor Fabian, M.A. & ABD, from the University of Central Florida–Orlando. This graduate research paper compares as case-study asymmetric wars and their outcomes where the weak sometimes defeat the strong. Many research projects seek to define asymmetric war and its outcomes, but still fall short of providing convincing answers. As a retired Hungarian military officer, Sandor Fabian’s research first argues that the best definition of asymmetric war is an armed conflict or intra-state war waged within the borders of any state between the local government vs. one or more non-state actors. Secondly, he introduces a novel measure of countries’ military culture using the logistic regression model to analyze intra-state conflicts in 1944-1997 to find that whenever a country’s military institutionalizes third-generation warfare principles this lowered the probability of weak actor’s victory. Contrary to previous research, these models suggest that conflict duration, democracy and army size do not have significant effects on the outcome of intra-state wars. While difficult terrain and small government forces are always negative factors in strengthening the hand of weak non-state actors in asymmetrical warfare, instead winning such wars in countries with high level of ethnic diversity seems to be easier for strong government actors and/or in case of decisive outside military intervention on behalf of the local government.

The fifth essay on p.68-82 is the 2018 FPSA Best Undergraduate Paper Award: “Redefining Post-Conflict Peacekeeping Success in Regional and International Missions” by Alexander Bruens & Mirella Miranda, from Florida Atlantic University–Boca Raton. This undergraduate research paper compares the scholarly literature on post-conflict intervention, where in the post-conflict environment, however, many states ignore or are incapable of providing more practical externalities of peace or civilian access to basic needs. Post-conflict mediation with provisions that provide civilians access to basic needs are more likely to create a positive and durable peace. The authors conceptualize post-conflict success as a measure of civilian access to food, clean water, healthcare and electricity, which is often unavailable during many civil wars. The authors use quantitative analysis because regional mediators and states have a shared cultural background and history, similar experiences and geographical connections between them, which facilitates vested interest. The authors admit these first research results are mixed and further research is necessary, while hoping that this type of research might compel third-party actors to give equal emphasis to reestablishing civilian access to basic needs, rather than simply focusing on negative peace after civil wars.

The sixth essay on p. 83-93 is the Alternate 2018 FPSA Best Graduate Paper: “Potential Nuclear Proliferators: Determinants of Nuclear Capability Among Latent Countries” by Doreen Horschig, M.A. & ABD, from the University of Central Florida–Orlando. This graduate research paper compares nuclear latency in which a state has the technical capability to produce nuclear weapons, but has not yet acquired any. However, states with the capability to produce nuclear arms often stop at this stage of nuclear development. That provides a puzzle for scholarly analysis because it can lead to new insights on non-proliferation and new insights to understand proliferation. However, a first puzzle that must be explored is the path to nuclear latent capability. Given that improved manufacturing technology and construction of enrichment, or reprocessing facilities transforms states into near-nuclear states, why do states manage to become so advanced in their nuclear capabilities? This essay argues that national power, military expenditures and military personnel are three key variables that explain why some states develop a nuclear latency capability and others do not. Understanding why some proliferant states are further along in the stages of developing a nuclear weapon has implications for non-proliferation and counter-proliferation policy. This quantitative study uses as statistical method a cross-sectional time series regression model of annual country data.
Lastly, the Book Review on p.94-104 by Professor Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D., of Saint Leo University and Fulbright Chair E.U. College of Europe provides a compelling review of the latest geo-political analysis by Chair and Professor Hall Gardner, Ph.D. from the Department of International and Comparative Politics of the American University of Paris in France on: *World War Trump: Risks of America’s New Nationalism* (2018). Professor Gardner provides a thorough panorama of recent and current international events portraying the rise in anti-Western challenges sprouting in multiple regional areas of conflict where local actors clash against each other in undermining the weak post-Cold War world order. From an economically-militarily weak Russia (compared to the SuperPower status of her earlier historical incarnation as the USSR), but still aggressive and strategically-astute in undermining U.S. and NATO international security interests, to the equally dangerous silent economically-militarily rise of China in seeking to replace by crook, steel or force the U.S. as the world’s leading Power, to the equally destabilizing and naked aggression by Islamic Iran in the Middle East to support Syria’s murderous régime as its regional ally and Russia as protector against Israel, Saudi Arabia and U.S., to the ubiquitous dangerous threat of Islamic terrorism (Al-Qaeda, ISIL or Taliban) from Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and globally. Additionally, Dr. Gardner bemoans the rapid erosion since 2011 of *Pax Americana* as a calming global influence for good (“peace”) and economic growth (“free-trade”). Gardner blames for this equally the rise of these new regional threats against America’s Uni-Multipolar hegemony in the Post-Cold War, and due to sharp domestic polarization between Democrats and Republicans from politics, to cultural wars, to legal issues, to economics and even more worrisome in the loss of broad bi-partisan support for any active globalist military intervention policies, which undermined the effective long-term reach of U.S. Presidents George W. Bush “Jr.”, Barack Obama and Donald Trump, while weakening especially in the current tumultuous Trump years both TransAtlantic security (NATO) and U.S.-led trade cooperation (U.S.-European Union, NAFTA, Asia).

As in past years, the Information & Policy Analysis Center (IPAC) of the University of Central Florida—Orlando led by President Houman Sadri, Ph.D. (also ex-FPSA President in 2012-2013) has generously funded the FPSA Best Undergraduate Paper Award to a meritorious candidate in 2015, 2017 and 2018. IPAC President Sadri confirmed that IPAC will continue to sponsor future FPSA Best Undergraduate Paper Awards and the FPSA looks forward to continuing this selection process after each Annual FPSA Conference. See IPAC at p.105.

**Our Mission:** since 1989, the *Florida Political Chronicle* is the regional, scholarly journal of the Florida Political Science Association, serving the academic disciplines and professors of Political Science and International Relations in a balanced, apolitical, analytical, intellectual and non-discriminatory way that fully embodies both our regional association’s and U.S. Department of Education’s requirements for public policy in universities. The *Florida Political Chronicle* is registered on EBSCO and encourages submissions of scholarly academic essays and Book-Reviews from all Political Sciences-related Disciplines: American Government & Politics; Political Theory & Philosophy; Comparative Politics; International Affairs & Security; Diplomatic History; International Political Economy; Public Administration; and International Law & Organizations (submissions requirements on p.6 above). Our FPSA regional scholarly journal supports submissions from both standing and past FPSA members, as well as from domestic and foreign scholars who have either presented their work at any FPSA Annual Conference or support our organization’s mission.

Thank you for your enduring trust in the *Florida Political Chronicle*, and best wishes to all for preparing very productive FPSA Annual Conferences. Most sincerely,

**Marco Rimanelli Ph.D.**

Editor of *Florida Political Chronicle*, FPSA’s regional scholarly journal, Professor of Politics & International Studies at Saint Leo University—Florida, U.S.A.
Training to Maintain a Globally Competitive Workforce: Tampa as Case-Study, Florida

by Robert W. Robertson, Ph.D., President Bahamas Technical & Vocational Institute-Nassau

ABSTRACT: This paper explores the issues of workforce skills in the U.S. as an important component of the competitiveness of the American economy. Specifically, the paper provides an overview of the perceived skills-gap in the U.S. labor-force and identifies ways that this gap can be closed, including using technology, such as on-line learning, in the case-study of the city of Tampa, Florida.

The Competitive Global Economy

During the past 30 years, many Developing countries have continued to industrialization and urbanization. This period has witnessed the gradual development of a global labor market, as well as an increase in the competition between nations to enhance their productivity and economic growth. These changes are depicted in the annual, *The Global Competitiveness Report, 2014-2015* (Schwab, 2014), that assesses the competitiveness landscape of 144 economies. Specifically, it outlines the key drivers behind the productivity and prosperity of these countries. Competitiveness is defined as “the set of institutions, policies and factors that determine the level of productivity of a country. The level of productivity, in turn, sets the level of prosperity that can be earned by an economy” (Schwab, 2014, p.4). Fundamentally, the World Economic Forum (Schwab, 2014) suggests that a high competitiveness ranking indicates an economy that develops, attracts, retains educated and informed talent, which is more likely to innovate and introduce new and higher value-added products and services. As Developing nations began to enter the marketplace and compete in global markets, the workforce expanded. “As more than one billion people entered the labor-force, a massive movement from ‘farm to factory’ sharply accelerated growth of productivity and per-capita GDP [Gross Domestic Product] in China and other traditionally rural nations, helping to bring hundreds of millions of people out of poverty” (Dobbs, 2012). In addition, with the entry of new nations and firms into the marketplace, competition increased necessitating firms to continue to look for ways to increase productivity and profitability. In particular, many companies in the Western industrialized developed economies used technology and outsourcing to reduce labor costs, as well as boost their “return on investments” (ROI). The reduction in labor costs by out-sourcing took jobs off-shore, which increased the firms’ bottom-line, as well as the economy of Developing nations. Today, the success of “off-shoring jobs” contributes to simultaneous benefit and strain the global labor-force.

The benefit includes the rapid development that results from the movement of technology and practices from the Western developed world to the Developing one. The strain includes the demand for high-skill labor growing faster than supply, while demand for low-skill labor remains weak. But the strain is not a problem only for developed nations. The McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) finds these trends gathering force and spreading to China and other Developing economies, as the global labor-force approaches 3.5 billion in 2030 (Dobbs, 2012).

Based on current trends in population, education and labor demand, the report projects that by 2020 the global economy could face the following hurdles:

- “38 million to 40 million fewer workers with tertiary education (college or post-graduate degrees) than employers will need, or 13% of the demand for such workers;
• 45 million too few workers with secondary education in Developing economies, or 15% of the demand for such workers;
• 90-to-95 million more low-skill workers (those without college training in advanced economies or without even secondary education in developing economies) than employers will need, or 11% oversupply of such workers” (Dobbs, 2012).

When considering these predictions, firms are responding to trade liberalization, globalization and ever improving technology within a more competitive economic environment. Firms are reacting by looking for solutions to manage these changes. Some of the solutions include matching employee skills to the growing demand for specific skill sets and educational attainment in specific areas both geographically and in terms of specific industries.

U.S. Labor-Force

In the United States, there are already signs that these emerging global issues are impacting the national economy. In many sectors, there are concerns about competitiveness and a growing employee skill gap (Gurdjian & Triebel, 2009). In part, the skill gap has been cited as a reason for the continuing slow economic recovery from the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, although there is considerable debate as to the causality (Büning, Cantrell, Marshall & Smith, 2011; Bybee, 2013). Instead, the International Labor Organization (ILO) suggests in its 2014 *Global Employment Trends Report* that despite the number of countries where economies are recovering, the number of unemployed is not decreasing. Indeed, many economists have dubbed the economy as the “jobless recovery.” There is some support for this assertion. The National Center for Education Statistics notes that:

“in 2013, the unemployment rate for those with at least a bachelor's degree was lower than the rates for those with lower levels of educational attainment. During the most recent economic recession (2008 through 2010), the unemployment rate increased less for those who had at least a Bachelor's degree than for those who had less than a Bachelor's degree” (National Center for Education Statistics, 2014).

These data suggest a fundamental shift from the historical norms of the workplace. In the past 50 years or more the workforce skills required of employees had remained relatively stable. It is only since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis that we have seen dramatic shifts in the skill sets being required of employees.

In addition, there are many sectors reporting a gap in the skills needed to remain globally competitive. For example, “American manufacturers are increasingly finding that prospective workers do not have the skill set required to perform necessary job functions, such as basic math and computer abilities. The so-called ‘skills-gap’ if unresolved, could compromise manufacturers’ ability to stay competitive, according to some industry leaders” (Peralta, 2014). Indeed, in a 2011 survey of 1,123 manufacturing companies, the Manufacturing Institute reports that:

• 67% reported "a moderate to severe shortage of available, qualified workers,"
• 5% of current jobs are unfilled, due to lack of capable candidates (Manufacturing Institute, 2011, p.1).

Further, they report that 600,000 well-paying jobs will remain unfilled in the face of staggering unemployment rates (Manufacturing Institute, 2011, p.2), demonstrating an unemployment paradox that is created by the surplus of jobs that require specifically trained skill-sets for which the population is not trained or educated to fulfill.

In addition, Peralta notes that “the cause of the gap is multifaceted. Manufacturing activity has increased in the U.S. for nearly a year and with it grows businesses’ need for skilled workers. Exacerbating the shortage is the wave of retiring baby-boomers, those Americans born between 1946 and 1964” (Peralta, 2014). To address this gap there are calls for increased and fast-tracked immigration to allow
foreign workers the opportunity to work in the U.S.A. Also, there are many firms aggressively adding training as important in developing their own workforce. Increasingly, the development of this type of training has included the development and use of innovative delivery systems, such as on-line education options.

One outcome of the emerging skills gap is the increased competition between political jurisdictions to attract and retain both companies and employees.

Research Methodology

The research for this paper includes an outline of the economic development structures in place for Tampa, FL, a description of the existing mandate(s) to improve workforce training; the review of a key recent, public record report on workforce skills; and, the development and circulation of a survey to key stakeholders to better understand the actual delivery of workforce training. Initially, a public record document report titled *Clarus Corporation* (2013) the Hillsborough Community College: Workforce Development Scan was reviewed to provide context and preliminary data to guide the research. A second phase was to develop and circulate a survey to eighteen key stakeholders in Hillsborough County. Nine of these stakeholders represented the education sector. These were purposefully selected from the Tampa Bay Higher Education Alliance (TBHEA), which represents approximately thirty regionally accredited academic institutions in the Tampa community (TBHEA, n.d.). In addition, another nine respondents were selected by purposeful selection representing employers who had experience with workforce training and development initiatives.

Florida

Like most sub-national jurisdictions around the world, U.S. states, including Florida, have designed and adopted economic development structures and programs that are designed to facilitate investment and job creation. In the case of Florida, the organization Enterprise Florida (EFI) is a public private partnership. In part, EFI promotes the size and capacity of the workforce within the State. Specifically, EFI notes that “Florida’s talented and diverse 9.5+ million workers can exceed the expectations of even the most demanding employers. Not surprisingly, Florida’s talent pipeline is consistently ranked among the best in the nation. Much credit for the excellent skills of the Florida workforce can be given to the state’s excellent educational institutions and unique workforce training programs” (Enterprise Florida, 2014).

In addition, within Florida, “CareerSource Florida is the state-wide workforce policy and investment board which partners with the Department of Economic Opportunity; 24 local workforce development boards and 100 career centers throughout Florida; and the Department of Education Divisions of Blind Services, Career and Adult Education, and Vocational Rehabilitation. CareerSource helps connect businesses with the talented workforce and training needed to succeed and grow” (CareerSource, n.d.).

Tampa as Case-Study

As one of the larger urban areas in the State of Florida, Tampa (population 4,500,000 according to Tampa Bay Partnership) will serve as the primary case study for the research. Economic development is a key function of local governments. Many local governments develop partnerships with businesses and with other local governments. This type of partnership is commonly used in Tampa. The Tampa Hillsborough Economic Development Corporation (THEDC) was established in 2009 as a public private partnership and it “is the lead economic development agency for Hillsborough County and the cities of Tampa, Plant City and Temple Terrace, and an official partner of Enterprise Florida, Inc.” (Tampa Hillsborough Economic Development Corporation, n.d.). The mandate of the Corporation is to “work with
corporate executives, site selection consultants, real estate professionals, and other influential decision-makers, to provide customized, confidential relocation and expansion services to domestic and international companies interested in growing their business in Hillsborough County; and, assist existing businesses access the tools and resources they need to succeed” (THEDC, n.d.).

In addition, the Tampa Bay Workforce Alliance (TBWFA) “provides a robust menu of workforce services to the residents and employers of Hillsborough County as a public-private partnership which supports and promotes economic growth through workforce development. TBWFA, with significant representation from the business community, is largely responsible for implementing workforce development programs in Hillsborough County” (TBWFA, n.d.). In particular, the TBWFA is responsible for “…focusing on those skill-gaps identified by the needs of its employers, and this (State priority) will continue to be a high priority for the TBWFA” (TBWFA, n.d.).

In terms of the research, a review of existing documentary materials was completed with a view to understanding the current situation. In that regard, a key document is a recent report released by the Clarus Corporation (2013). The report (Hillsborough Community College: Workforce Development Scan) included a survey of approximately 400 employers in the county designed to assess:

- “Whether there is currently a qualified workforce in Hillsborough County and the skills-sets, which may be missing from current job candidates.
- The future employee needs of the employers in the region.
- Current and future training needs of the employers and preferences for delivery of that training.
- Employers’ support for education for their current employees.
- Current usage of Hillsborough Community College.
- Opportunities for partnerships between Hillsborough Community College and the employers in the County” (Clarus Corporation, 2013).

Overall, the key results of the Clarus Corporation report include analysis of the quality of local workforce and needed requirements for future employee in the key areas of training and education.

**Quality of the Workforce**

Many employers (44%) note that there is an existing shortage of candidates with the prerequisite job skills in Hillsborough County. Also, many employers note a concern with respect to the work ethic, with 38% identifying this concern evidenced by attendance problems and providing complete day’s work. Employers (36%) also noted a lack of professionalism including proper dress, etiquette and interpersonal skills. A further 33% of employers suggest that employees do not have the required critical thinking skills; 29% lack technical skills; and 21% do not have basic skills such as math. On a more fundamental level, employers note the inability of many applicants to pass required pre-employment background checks (24%) and drug tests (18%) (Clarus Corporation, 2013).

Many (33%) employers are of the view that there will likely be a shortage of qualified applicants within the next three-to-five years. The poor economy, in the past three-to-five years, resulted in many employers having overqualified candidates for many vacant positions. However, as the economy continues to improve, the many employers are concerned that the candidate pool will gradually diminish in size and quality making it harder to find qualified employees. Also, many employers note an increase in more candidates looking for employment with less education and no employment experience (Clarus Corporation, 2013).
Future Employee Requirements
In terms of future requirements, fully 90% of employers plan to hire more than 10 personnel, with 713 employees planning this within the next six-to-24 months. The majority of these positions will be created by turn-over and many of these positions (43%) require no education and 24% will only require a diploma from high school.

On the other hand, 23% of projected job openings will be due to job growth and these positions will require a Bachelor’s degree. These job openings for Bachelor degree holders will include “teachers (50%), engineers, nurses, occupational therapists, medical assistants, reservation coordinators, store managers and information technology specialists (Clarus Corporation, 2013).

A small percentage (2%) of the projected jobs will require associate degrees in areas such as: “nursing and medical specialties, such as occupational therapy assistants, physical therapy assistants, speech therapy assistants and surgical technicians, as well as sales, administrative support, clerical, legal secretary, paralegal, receptionists, engineers for software, and information technology” (Clarus Corporation, 2013). In addition, 4% of interviewees report the need for “certifications, and one percent or less a technical certificate, a Master’s degree, or a professional degree” (Clarus Corporation, 2013).

By comparison, 36% of employers reported that an advanced degree or a certification is required for employees in over half of their positions. In addition, 61% of those surveyed requiring advanced degrees identified the requirement for a Bachelor’s degree and a similar percentage (60%) require certifications. In terms of additional training for current employees, 21% identified the need for degrees including “Bachelor’s degrees (72%) and Associate degrees (52%), with 42% indicating a need for Master’s degrees and 15% Doctoral degrees, and the primary subject area needed is business” (Clarus Corporation, 2013).

Training Requirements
Many employers surveyed (93%) do provide employee training which largely was conducted in house (88%). The key areas in which training was conducted included: “safety, customer service, sales, management, CPR, first aid, OSHA, software, leadership, forklift, server training, new hire training, computers, housekeeping, supervisory, harassment, diversity and orientation” (Clarus Corporation, 2013). In the next year there are plans for training including customer service (64%), leadership (63%), management supervision (62%), conflict-resolution (53%), computers (54%), diversity (53%) and sales (53%).

Education Support for Employees
Many employers (72%) support employee education by providing flexible schedules to attend classes; in addition, 47% support tuition for credit earning classes. Also, employers do support training for certifications and testing (45%) and CEUs (37%).

In summary, the report by the Clarus Corporation (2013) is very useful in establishing benchmark data. The report illustrates some concern with respect to the overall. Indeed, almost one half of respondents identify the quality of the workforce as a concern and one-third consider that there will be a shortage of qualified applicants within the next three-to-five years.

Conclusion
In conclusion, there is no doubt that we live in turbulent times. The economy is global and based increasingly on knowledge and technology. To compete in these changing times requires that we develop and maintain a skilled and competent workforce that is a prerequisite for any company. Nations, states and local governments are more active in structuring workforce development support mechanisms and specific training opportunities to assist employees and businesses. All levels of government highlight the fact that they have skilled, competitive employees to assist in recruiting new companies to consider locating in their respective jurisdictions and in retaining companies. Obviously, it is critical that this type of assertion can be backed-up.
Tampa, Florida is used in this case study to better understand the imperative of building local workforce skills to compete in the global economy. Specifically, there are State and local structures in place to promote economic development and enhance employee skills. In addition, there is a recent and topical report which provides useful baseline data. The report from the Clarus Corporation completed in 2013 suggests that many employers do have concerns about the quality and supply of qualified candidates for employment. The more recent survey conducted for this paper confirms concerns by both employers and educators with respect to the existing and the future skill-sets of employees. In particular, respondents note that basic skills such as communication and technical skills need more attention. Also, the survey respondents confirm technical service certification in key sectors of the economy including the technology sector. Although a small sample, this survey is an important addition to the understanding of the skills-gaps issues within the Tampa region.

Fundamentally, educators and employers need to develop and implement strategies and action plans to ensure that the skills gap be identified correctly and properly addressed. These initiatives must be developed with broad stakeholder input and these initiatives must be viewed as dynamic reflecting changing circumstances.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Robert W. Robertson, Ph.D., is President of the Bahamas Technical & Vocational Institute in Nassau. Previously, he was Director (Vice-President) of Academic Affairs at the University of Phoenix-Central Florida and Senior Research Fellow at its Center for Workforce Development Studies; and earlier was Vice-President for Academic Affairs at Argosy University-Central Florida. Dr. Robertson holds 8 degrees: a Doctor of Philosophy (2000) in Management & Organization from Stirling University in Scotland, Great Britain; a Post-Doctoral Professional Certificate (2015) in Global Business & Leadership from Argosy University-Graduate School of Business & Management; a Post-Graduate Diploma (2013) from the University of London-School of Oriental & African Studies, Great Britain; an Executive Certificate (2011) in Strategy & Innovation from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology-Sloan School of Management; a Master of Studies in Law, Cum Laude (1985) in Public Policy/Administrative Law from Vermont Law School; a Master of Public Administration (1984) in Public Policy Evaluation/Management from Dalhousie University, Canada; a Master of Arts (1978) in Planning & Community Development from Eastern Kentucky University; and a Bachelor of Science (1974) in Social Sciences from East Tennessee State University.
From Parkland to Jacksonville: Firearms Mortality and Local Preemptions
by Thomas F. Brezenski, Ph.D., St. Thomas University, Miami

ABSTRACT: One of the best kept secrets and one of the least explored in the firearms public policy field is that the vast majority of American state legislatures through the policy of preemption prevent municipalities from enacting any firearm regulations whatsoever, including in Parkland, Florida, where the latest mass public shooting has plunged the country (once again) into a heated gun control debate. Led by the National Rifle Association (NRA), most state legislatures have nearly complete control over anything related to firearms from purchase to concealed carry permits. The research here concludes that this policy contributes to higher mortality rates by firearm and that a federal law should be enacted stripping states of preemption power in this area and restoring home-rule.

Introduction

Chances are, if you happen to be a smoker, you are indulging your habit outdoors, due to a local ordinance put in place in the interest of public health. It is common knowledge that second-hand smoke is a danger to every person’s health, and the municipality, as a creature of the state, has a vested interest through the police powers of the 10th Amendment to protect its citizens. It would be nearly unthinkable in the 21st Century that the state itself would actively prevent a locality from protecting its citizenry from an obvious health hazard or potentially dangerous situation, but that is exactly what is happening across the country with something equally or even more perilous to the public health: the regulation of firearms. This is done through a process known as preemption, where the state, through the legislature, takes over complete control over a given policy area, leaving cities and town governments virtually powerless. Preemption as a political tool is nothing new and is commonly used as a lever of control by the state to ensure uniformity in policy, such as establishing a minimum age to purchase alcohol. The state legislates what is known as express preemption, which bars all local governments from legislative intrusion in that particular policy area. This is all well and good in instances such as those that demand uniformity, but is nothing less than a method of suffocation of municipalities in all others. Home rule, or the ability of local governments to be more or less left alone to govern themselves from a federalism standpoint with minimal interference is more or less erased in that policy arena. In the area of firearms control, preemption is a nothing, short of public health hazard that contributes to the sort of tragedies that play themselves out in places like Sandy Hook and Parkland, and will be proven empirically in this work.

Feudalism in the States: the Gun Lobby, Preemption and State Legislatures

State legislatures have become virtual fiefdoms of the National Rifle Association (NRA), and they practically bully states into enacting preemption laws, which now include nearly the entire country. Cook and Pollack described the phenomenon as ‘persuasion’, but the reality is very different. Florida is a classic example. Brezenski, in writing about the aftermath of the Parkland school shootings, describes the NRA

as having a stranglehold on the Florida legislature so tight, not even weeping survivors of the shooting present at vote on a proposed assault weapons ban could push them to move on the measure.¹

The Florida exemption law, Chapter 790.33(1), is perhaps the most insidious example as it explicitly states that the Legislature covers the entire field of firearms and ammunition and is legally airtight with respect to municipalities;² a city cannot even keep firearms out of venues that sells alcohol or houses of worship if it so desires without its mayors or city councils being subject to fines or even removal from office. Although Florida is an extreme example, the problem of the NRA existing as legislative overlords with respect to all firearms policy in most states presents a grave threat to public health. The NRA, through its mere presence, has consistently wrung the life out of any reasonable gun-control proposal before it ever could see the light of day. The policy model presented in this paper will show conclusively that this suffocation of efforts of local governments’ authority by state legislatures through preemption of gun-control initiatives is positively related to higher firearm mortality rates.

Preemption as Public Health

State preemption has been identified in the literature as a clear but under-the-radar threat to public health in areas ranging from nutrition and today, firearms policy.³ The Sandy Hook massacre and now the Parkland shootings have once again put the spotlight back on the danger of gun violence to our most vulnerable group, America’s children. This is hardly news as Wintemute⁴ makes it plain where the guns come from and how they get it into the hands of the country’s youth, for example, with tragic and alarming results, with assistance from local preemption. Minority youth, mostly due to concentration in high-crime urban centers, are the group most likely affected⁵ lending additional credence to modern movements such as Black Lives Matter. Municipalities have long realized that preemption is a serious impediment to tackling any public health issue,⁶ especially gun control that has been traditionally the province of localities since the Colonial era.⁷

When given the chance, localities dealing with gun crimes will almost always tighten restrictions, as many local governments in California did two decades ago when faced with an epidemic of firearm violence.⁸

Modeling the Effects of Local Preemption

To test the hypothesis of whether local preemption by state legislatures in the area of firearms is harmful, a multi-variate regression model was constructed, which also included other policies germane to the current gun-control debate. The dependent variable in the model is firearms mortality rate per U.S. state for the year 2014. This particular year was selected because it was the most recent year that provided complete data for all variables with no missing values. Data for the dependent variable may be found at the Centers for Disease Control Center for Health Statistics.

² The 2017 Florida Statutes. See: http://leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&URL=0700-0799/0790/Sections/0790.33.html
Explanatory Variables

1. Presence of State Local Firearm Preemption Laws

As implied by the discussion in the previous paragraphs, this variable is expected to be positively related to firearms mortality rates in the states. The lack of local governments’ ability to tighten lax state laws regarding firearm bans, ownership, sale, transfer and other matters makes it far easier for guns to fall into the hands of those who should not have them, be they violent convicted felons or the adjudicated ineligible mentally ill who have become a danger to themselves or others. This variable is a dummy variable coded as one if the state has preemptive local firearms laws in place and zero otherwise.

2. Mental Health Care Access Level

Since nearly 60% of the mortality rate attributed to firearms come from suicides, it would be irresponsible not to consider the presence (or lack thereof) of sufficient resources within the states to serve those who are at the highest risk of suicide, those diagnosed with severe mental illnesses (SMIs), or severe depression. This variable is an interactive variable combining the mentally ill population of the state and the availability of the resources to them, ranked by state. It is hypothesized that there will be marked negative relationship between Care Access and firearms mortality. Data for this variable is available at the Centers for Disease Control and Mental Health America.

3. NICS State Rate of Reporting per Capita

When anyone attempts to purchase a firearm from a licensed dealer, they are all subject to a background check through NICS, the National Instant Criminal Background Check system. NICS is designed to weed out ineligible buyers but it also gives researchers an idea of the sheer volume of transactions involving firearms across the states. Granted, many states do not require private sellers who sell from their own collections to conduct any type of background check (the infamous ‘gun-show loophole’) but the amount of checks conducted by NICS presents the opportunity to make at least an estimation of the amount of firearms changing hands. Despite the ‘most are law-abiding responsible gun owners’ mantra of the NRA, more guns in the public square will result in more firearm related fatalities. Therefore, the hypothesized relationship of this variable to the dependent variable will be positive. Data for this variable may be obtained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

4. Speed of Mental Health Reports to NICS

Since the mentally ill present the greatest risk of suicide among the general population and those that are the most ill are those that are formally adjudicated incompetent by the state, it is imperative that such information be reported to be included in the NICS database, thus making them ineligible for legal firearm purchases. The central problem with this is that there exists no Federal law specifying how fast a state must furnish the information. The states have unlimited flexibility on how fast to report the data and some are far better than others. The rates range from ‘immediately’ to ‘in a timely fashion’ according to the Gifford’s Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence. This variable is scale variable ranging from one to ten, with the fastest states, such those that report ‘immediately’ or within 24 hours receiving scores close to ten, while states that have indeterminate amounts or take several days or more receive scores closer to one. Logic dictates that the faster the reporting, the more accurate the database will be and the less likely an ineligible

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2 Brezenski, ibid.
individual will ‘fall through the cracks’ with unnecessary deaths being averted, thus lowering the mortality rate. Hypothesized direction is therefore expected to be negative.

Discussion

All the variables in the model (see Table 1) performed as expected in terms of hypothesized direction. The most important take-away from the research is the Presence of State Local Preemption Laws, which was highly significant at p<.05 and positively related to firearms mortality. Unlike other areas of preemption such as family leave and paid sick days, this is literally a matter of life and death. Mass public shootings have been on the increase not just since Newtown, but for over 40 years with the Marjory Stoneman Douglas shootings being just the latest in a long line of Sandy Hooks and Columbines.¹ This should and hopefully will embolden local governments across the nation to file suit against their states to regain home rule and implement the common sense gun legislation that their constituents might demand such as military-style semi-automatic assault weapons bans, large capacity (LCM) magazine bans, universal background checks at gun shows, ammunition purchase background checks, gun-free safety zones and other measures that minimize the exposure to gun violence. The findings presented here are a definitive step in that direction.

Table 1: Multivariate Regression Results–Presence of State Local Preemption Laws

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Gun Death Rate by State (2014)</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Beta Weight</th>
<th>T-Value</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>12.983</td>
<td>7.764</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of State Local Preemption Laws</td>
<td>2.781</td>
<td>.248**</td>
<td>2.074</td>
<td>.044</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mental Health Care Access Level</td>
<td>-.008</td>
<td>-.515***</td>
<td>-4.358</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NICS State Rate of Reporting Per Capita</td>
<td>8.995</td>
<td>.209*</td>
<td>1.758</td>
<td>.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed of State Mental Health Reports to NICS</td>
<td>-.235</td>
<td>-.191</td>
<td>-1.599</td>
<td>.117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R-Square = .375

Durbin Watson Test = 2.279
p<.10*
p<.05**
p<.001***
N = 50

Suggestions for Future Research

It is obvious from this research that the vise grip that the gun lobby has on state legislatures must be broken with reference to local firearm preemption laws. It is also plain to see that mental health remains a major issue that needs to be addressed judging by the Beta weight and significance of the Mental Health Access Care variable. Mental health care at the community level in America has been in a state of disarray since its de-institutionalization, a classic case of the road being paved with best intentions ending-up in a place we never expected to be: community mental health centers (CMHCs) understaffed, where patients have to wait weeks for consultation and vital medication, de-compensating all the while,

lack of access to psychiatric care that results in nearly 40% of patients with SMIs not receiving any treatment at all,1 and an almost complete disconnect between community mental healthcare and the public school system that could possibly identify, interdict and avert tragedies like at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School. This is truly a complex and expensive problem, but one that sorely needs to be addressed in the interests of not only the community of mental healthcare consumers, but society at large.

The issues relating to the NICS variables are relatively easy to address. Require universal background checks at all gun shows through NICS whether the dealer is licensed or not, so gun shows end being a firearms bazaar for:

1) convicted violent felons,
2) persons adjudicated to be mentally ill and/or having been institutionalized and posing an immediate threat to themselves or others, or
3) persons on the terrorist watch list.

In addition to weeding out additional threats, there would be a more accurate count of how many firearms are entering the marketplace through these venues providing better data for future policy decision-making. Federal law should also make it mandatory that all states pass onto NICS immediately or within a maximum of 24 hours any data dealing with ineligibility to purchase a firearm based on adjudicated mental illness, incompetence or institutionalization. This would do away with the current crazy-quilt pattern of reporting speeds and lessen the chance a person dangerous to themselves or others would acquire a firearm illegally.

Conclusions

The lessons of Parkland should not be forgotten. Fingers have been pointed at law enforcement and others who should have seen ‘red flags’ indicating that shooter Nicolas Cruz was mentally ill, dangerous to himself and others and was a veritable ticking time bomb. Still, there is no overlooking the fact that he was able to end the lives of seventeen people in just over six minutes. Local restrictions on possession or sale of semi-automatic weapons or large capacity magazines might not have saved everyone, but might have reduced the number of grieving families.

Likewise, many will try and use the tragedy of the shootings at Jacksonville Landing as an excuse to prevent municipalities from enacting gun-free zones in places that sell alcohol, concert venues or places of worship, trotting out the tired “good guys with guns stop bad guys with guns” mantra. The truth of the matter is, according to Table 2 below, that the mere presence of more firearms leads to a higher firearms mortality rate. Even NRA Board Member Ted Nugent begrudgingly acknowledges this as his concert venues do not permit firearms, concealed carry permits or not.

The neutron-star-like Beta weight for the Gun Owners variable, as well as its level of significance and positive direction with regards to firearms mortality rate is a giant red flag towards introducing more weapons into public venues. We as a society should not be as concerned by the fact that the tragedy happened in a gun-free area, but be more concerned by the amount of rounds the shooter was able to fire without reloading and be thankful the death toll was not higher.

As a firearms policy analyst, the author of this study grieves for the families of all the lost and continue to strive to build better models to help legislators make sound policy decisions that protect U.S. citizens and yet preserve their Constitutional rights. The author also firmly believes that a majority of those policy decisions should be made at the local level by a familiar face, a neighbor, or a friend.

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1 Substance Abuse & Mental Health Services Administration, Mental Health United States, 2010, HHS Publication No. (SMA) 12-4681 (Rockville, MD: Substance Abuse & Mental Health Services Administration, 2010).
Table 2: Multivariate Regression Results—Gun Owners Model

Dependent Variable: Gun Death Rate by State (2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Beta Weight</th>
<th>T-Value</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>6.132</td>
<td></td>
<td>16.105</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Owners</td>
<td>.204</td>
<td>.656**</td>
<td>7.071</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHCareAccessLevel</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>-.312**</td>
<td>3.445</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NICS State of Reporting per Capita</td>
<td>2.086</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>.557</td>
<td>.580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed of Mental Health Reports to NICS</td>
<td>-.058</td>
<td>-.047</td>
<td>-.543</td>
<td>.590</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R-Square = .676
Durbin Watson Test = 1.948

N = 50

Nobody should have to live in a country where even children are frightened to go to school or teachers are afraid for their safety. In fact, this should apply to any local venue, be it a place of worship, restaurant or movie theatre. Localities know the wants and needs of their constituents best and it is their local elected officials, the ones they shop or worship with, not those hundreds of miles away, who should make the decisions that affect the average citizen on the most basic, fundamental level, the most important of which is life. In addition, when policies fail, as all inevitably do at some point like at Jacksonville Landing, it is important not to let national-level groups such as the NRA impose their morality on local governments by dismissively and unilaterally declaring policies, such as gun-free zones total failures. That would be the epitome of pitching the baby out with the bathwater. Knee-jerk policy radicalism should not be allowed to rule the day.

It is therefore imperative that state legislatures be prohibited from enacting local preemption laws in the area of firearms policy not only in the interest of the 17 grieving families of Stoneman Douglas, but in the spirit of the Preamble to the Constitution, and give tangible meaning to ‘general welfare’ and ‘domestic tranquility.’ Gun violence is a plague upon the United States and we must use every level of government at our disposal to mitigate it. Handcuffing our local governments to serve the interests of a pressure group at the expense of the common good is anathema to common sense and 21st Century morals and values. Truly, the needs of the many outweigh the wants of the few and literally, lives depend upon our making the right decision.
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AUTHOR

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Immigration Federalism and Partisan Sorting: the Importance of State-level Actions
by Donald L. Davison, Ph.D., Rollins College, Winter Park

ABSTRACT: Do the approach and policies adopted by states in response to demographic change influence the political reactions of White and Latino voters? Much research investigating the politics of immigration and demographic change employ national surveys, which infer their results to the state-level. Generally, this research finds that immigration sensitive White voters move to the Republican Party, while Latino voters in reaction to hostile immigration policy positions advocated by state Republican Parties turn to the Democratic Party. This study uses exit-surveys from three states, which followed different policy approaches to immigration in the period 1996-to-2012 to examine whether patterns of partisan change are uniform. This study finds that the most dramatic reactions are in Arizona, which corresponds to their aggressive pursuit of restrictive policies. Florida and Colorado though exhibit more modulated patterns and reflect their ambivalent policy approach. In these states a significant group of Latino voters identify as Independents suggesting that state politics, among other factors, can be one source of partisan change.

Introduction

A vast literature investigates the political significance of America’s growing Latino community. Generally, scholars locate political reactions to demographic change through the lens of contact or conflict theory. The first argues that greater integration—or contact—between majority and minority racial or ethnic groups fosters understanding, which reduces pejorative stereotypes. These experiences in-turn encourage greater cooperation in politics and social life. A larger literature concludes that demographic change produces a strong conflictual reaction. As the size of the minority community grows fear and perceived competition over scarce resources breed resentment among the majority [White] population, which then leads to a “backlash.” This results in immigration-sensitive Whites defecting to the Republican Party vs. Latino voters supporting Democratic candidates.

An understudied dimension of immigration politics, however, is the effect of state policies on the reaction to the growing Latino community. In one of few studies, Bowler, Nicholson and Segura find that the hostile tone and policy positions of the Republican Party and its élites, helped realign California to Democratic dominance (2005). An emerging literature explores the influence of factors such as élite activism and priming, local context and the size of the Latino electorate on whether states adopt restrictive or welcoming immigration policies (Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan 2015; Hopkins 2010). But there is little investigation whether different state policy environments affect the political behavior of its Latino and White citizens.

This essay argues that examining Latino political behavior at the state level improves our understanding of demographic change and immigration politics. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona vs. United States (2012) reaffirmed the plenary power of the federal government to regulate immigration. At the same time, states still possess considerable discretion. States and local police may enter into agreements with the Department of Homeland Security that delegate law-enforcement powers
regarding the presence of unauthorized individuals in their communities. States and local jurisdictions can regulate health and safety, determine access and eligibility to social welfare services and benefits, and decide whether they will pursue restrictive or inclusive policies directed at immigrants. In other words, states claim considerable control over the content and tone of their official responses to demographic change. Latino citizens may see states and local governments as more central to their everyday lives than the national government.

States also differ along dimensions that can impact both Latino and White perceptions about demographic change. States have different political cultures, levels of economic prosperity and competitiveness between the political parties. Latino political influence varies in different state legislatures as well as their electoral strength. Further, many studies treat Latinos as a homogeneous category, rather than appreciating critical within-group differences. And importantly, this study believes that immigrants’ experiences with the state—national and subnational—shapes their political behavior.

Do the approach and policies adopted by states in response to demographic change influence the political reactions of White and Latino voters? Or is immigration and the growing Latino community now a nationalized issue where behavioral patterns are similar across states regardless of their tone and policy content? The majority of studies use national-level surveys, which prevents evaluating state context. In contrast, this study uses exit-poll results for Arizona, Colorado and Florida from 1996-2012 to investigate whether the patterns of partisan identification and voting are similar across our selected states or is there variation corresponding to different state policy approaches. Arizona, Colorado, and Florida have experienced significant growth in their Latino populations, but adopted legislation varying in hostility and restrictiveness, have different sorts of issue entrepreneurs and have Latino communities with different levels of electoral influence and legislative representation.

This study’s research results indicate that state-level policy responses to demographic change and political context are consequential for partisan identification. Changing the level of analysis to specific states suggests that rapid demographic change does not inevitably lead to increased partisan polarization. The choices presented to Latino voters by the American two-party system might motivate them to vote for Democratic candidates in general elections, but their partisan identification suggests that many consider themselves to be unaffiliated with either party.

Immigration Federalism and Political Change

1. Studying Latino Politics in States

Traditional applications of conflict theory argue that significant demographic change often produces anxiety by the majority white population. As the Latino community grows a heightened sense of threat is experienced by many White voters who move to the Republican Party (Hajnal & Abrajano 2015; Hajnal & Rivera 2014; Barreto & Segura 2014; Teixeira, Frey & Griffin 2015). The feeling of threat can be ignited by local élites who serve as issue entrepreneurs. For example, Governor Pete Wilson’s advocacy of Proposition 187 in California rallied some White voters to the perceived threat posed by immigration (Bowler, Nicholson & Segura 2006). State Senator Russell Pearce and former Sheriff Joe Arpaio play similar roles in Arizona. In response to the heightened fear in combination with other factors states often adopt restrictive immigration policies. The increased White mobilization and perceived hostile legislation in turn raises the sense of threat by the Latino community who are assumed to move as a bloc to the Democratic Party.

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1 Memorandums of Understanding can be entered between the state or local community and either the Department of Homeland Security or the Attorney General that extends law enforcement responsibilities to state or local police forces, as provided by Section 133 of the Illegal Immigration Reform & Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996.
But what happens in states that lack opportunistic issue entrepreneurs, like Arpaio and Pearce? What if the state legislature does not enact overtly hostile policies directed at the Latino community and instead offers opportunities for Latino inclusion? Colorado and Florida adopted measured policies in response to their large Latino populations. Not only do Colorado and Florida lack issue entrepreneurs comparable to Arpaio and Pearce, but they have Latino political officials who can calm the sense of threat that seems palpable in other state contexts. Under these circumstances is the political reaction by white and Latino voters similar to Arizona or California? This study finds that state context influences the political dynamic between Latinos and Whites. Specifically, the policy posture adopted by states along with factors such as the presence of opportunistic issue entrepreneurs, Latino political influence, and socio-economic characteristics can either inflame or calm the anxiety and polarization that is often exhibited nationally.

The author also believes that moving the focus to states reveals the importance of how immigrants’ experiences within each state can shape their subsequent political behavior. Many immigrants do not possess a partisan inheritance that predisposes them to one of the political parties. Yet their experiences with their state and local governments can exert a profound influence on their attitudes and participation patterns. For example, Texas has a substantial Hispanic population, yet remains a Republican-dominant state, while Florida’s diverse Hispanic population is competitive between the parties. Policy-makers and voters might respond differently to immigration (Filindra & Kovacs 2012; Filindra, Blanding & Coll 2011). Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan (2015) challenge the traditional view that increased unauthorized migration and federal government inaction necessarily leads to restrictive policies in states. Instead, they contend factors such as the partisan composition of the state electorate, whether the Republican Party controls the legislature, the presence or absence of issue entrepreneurs, and the size of the Latino electorate interacting with the polarization of national politics should also be included when explaining states’ policy responses.

This study’s research results also re-evaluates the view that an increasing Latino community inevitably will produce a new Democratic Party majority. Many Latino voters appear to respond to the actions taken by their states by keeping their partisan options open. Partisan identification may matter less than specific policy positions offered by candidates in their states. Latinos are ‘bread and butter’ voters who reward parties offering policy positions on the issues most important to them. Finally, it is important to remember that Latinos—like most groups—are heterogeneous. Within-group differences exist and can become significant at the state level.

2. Partisan Change and the Latino Community

The value of state-level actions for Latino and White political behavior can be viewed through theories of partisan identification and vote choice. The significance of partisan identification for organizing citizens’ attitudes about politics is beyond question (Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes 1964; Miller & Shanks 1996). One’s partisan identity typically is inherited at an early age, strengthens over time and exhibits considerable stability. In addition, citizens’ social and economic attributes contribute to their partisan affiliation and influence their political predispositions. Because partisan loyalty is inherited at a young age it exists prior to political experiences. In turn, partisanship shapes how policy issues and problems, political information, messages, and parties and its candidates are perceived by citizens. Later scholars find that the macro-partisan level may display continuity but a host of events such as foreign policy crises, economic conditions and other salient political incidents can produce flux in individuals’ partisan loyalty at particular moments (MacKuen, Erikson & Stimson 1989; Fiorina 1981; Kiewiet 1983). Nevertheless, the partisan change identified by recent scholarship is small; wholesale partisan realignments of the electorate are rare. Citizens’ vote choices may change in particular elections, due to

1 This description was made by the Executive Director of a non-profit voter registration organization active in such states.
candidate-centered campaigns, salient issues, or other short-term forces, but their partisan identity tends to remain consistent.

The partisan preferences among Hispanics possibly are distinct from those of Whites and Blacks, even when social and economic factors are controlled (Claussen 2004). People with different life experiences and national origins express different political views (Alvarez & Beddola 2003). Unlike the classicists who argue that partisanship and socio-economic variables condition how one interprets political reality, the process may be different for immigrants. Different political principles and social identities explain the particular political opinions of minorities (Kinder & White 2000). In other words, partisan inheritance for many Latinos can be contextually influenced by their experiences in states and local communities after arriving in the United States. Therefore, the policy reaction and tone adopted by states experiencing significant demographic change has the potential to influence the partisan identity of Latinos. This leads some to believe Latinos can be recruited to the Republican Party because they have not yet formed strong partisan attachments (Gonzalez 2014). Other scholars find that policy positions affect Latino partisan identification more than ideology or demographic factors such as educational level or income. Partisanship changes when the ability of the party to respond to issues of primary concern changes for adherents (Nicholson & Segura 2005; Uhlaner & Garcia 2005). Hence, different state policy responses to immigration might well shape Latino partisanship.

It is within this framework that competition for Hispanic loyalty becomes politically consequential. Recent immigrants lack a partisan inheritance to pass down. Thus, Hispanics do not possess as strong a relationship with the Democratic Party as do African-Americans, although they are clearly predisposed towards it (Alvarez & Bedolla 2003). Since their partisan inheritance is relatively weak their political experiences within their states and/or communities may exert a significant influence on their choices. Accordingly, the tone and content of state-level responses to immigration, the presence of issue entrepreneurs and partisan reactions can shape Hispanic party preference. Hispanic voters might be repelled away from the party sponsoring hostile legislation or alternatively identify with the party offering a welcoming posture independently from national politics. If accurate then Hispanics should progressively move towards the Democratic Party in states, such as Arizona where the Republican Party sponsored restrictive immigration-related policies but be more ambivalent in Colorado and Florida.

State level actions and context also can influence White political behavior. One view is that immigration and demographic change motivate many White voters to identify with the Republican Party (Abrajano & Hajnal 2016). Alternatively, tolerant state environments might reduce Whites’ perception of threat. This condition may make some Whites less likely to move to the Republican Party, as well as diminish the reaction by Latinos to identify with the Democratic Party.

Research Design and Method

California Proposition 187 is considered a spark for many states adopting restrictive immigration legislation. Offered in 1994 by Republican Governor Pete Wilson, Proposition 187 excludes undocumented residents from many social services. The public debate it inspired separated the political parties with the Republican Party clearly identified as favoring the limits and the Democratic Party opposed. Most scholars agree that Proposition 187 led to Democratic Party dominance in California. A significant implication of the Proposition 187 experience is that state level policy actions precedes the nationalization of immigration and can be the catalyst for partisan realignment.

A few scholars have studied how immigration is felt across different geographic contexts at the state and local levels (Rivera 2014). Hopkins (2010) finds that the salience of immigration and rapid demographic change result in restrictive local ordinances. Whites’ sense of threat and opposition to immigration also is seen as a function of the size of the Hispanic population within a county (Newman 2013; Hawley 2011).
Recently naturalized immigrants living in California had high rates of participation in response to Proposition 187, but those in Texas and New York had low participation (Ramakrishnan 2001).

The behavioral outcomes of immigration federalism are examined in three states experiencing rapid growth in their Latino communities: Arizona, Colorado and Florida. Hispanics comprise 31%, 21% and 24% of their state populations, respectively. At one extreme, Arizona adopts a series of restrictive policies beginning in the mid-1990s and culminating in S.B.-1070 in 2010, while Colorado and Florida pursue mixed policy approaches. The same analysis is replicated for the entire United States as a comparison baseline. Also the selected states display a different chorus of policy entrepreneurs. Thus, the political effects of different state-level policy responses to immigration and the size of their minority populations can be tested. This study uses the National Election Pool for Presidential election years in 1996–2012 to estimate the likelihood that Latino and White voters identify with either political party.\(^1\) The retrieved probabilities are obtained by estimating a multinomial logistic regression equation with partisan identification used as the unordered categorical outcome (see the technical appendix for a description of this method).

The 16-year time sequence allows for an analysis of partisan trends beginning prior to the emergence of immigration as a prominent issue on the national agenda. Also, 1996 marks the beginning of new levels of state legislative activities regulating immigration following adoption of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA). Conducting the analysis over time is preferred to cross-sectional analysis in a single year or even pooled years because evidence of year-over-year change in partisanship and vote preference can be detected. The survey results are supplemented with several interviews with Latino élites and community organizers from these states. Finally, beginning the analysis in 1996 is helpful because it is the first Presidential election following Proposition 187 in California. Thus, it establishes a starting point to see if there is contagion from California to other states, or whether selected states manifest their own particular patterns.

**Immigration Federalism and Partisan Change**

National attention to immigration rises and falls over the last 30 years. Generally national consideration declines after 1996 and does not begin to increase again until 2004 when measured by inclusion in the party platforms of the Democrat and Republican parties or by the number of hearings held in Congress (Comparative Policy Agendas Project). Yet while national focus on immigration wanes during this interval some states devote increasing energy toward regulating demographic change. States possess different ideological and political cultures. Also states possess different proportions of Latinos in the state electorate and elected to the legislature. In addition, states may or may not have issue entrepreneurs who exploit demographic change for political objectives. For all these reasons it seems possible citizens might react differently to immigration and demographic change.

During this period Arizona pursued some of the most restrictive immigration policies in the United States. The importance of policy entrepreneurs favoring restrictive legislation is illustrated by Arizona state Senator Russell Pearce and former-Sheriff Joe Arpaio. The policy champion has the capacity to both advance policies inside political institutions and strategically mobilize concerned citizens around their measures. Following in the footsteps of Governor Wilson’s advocacy for California Proposition 187, in 1994 Arizona began enacting policies that restricted social services available to unauthorized residents, required employers to verify job applicants’ citizenship, imposed strict voter identification rules, adopted English only

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\(^1\) The exit surveys from the NEP provide an adequate number of Latino voters in each state thus permitting individual-level analysis of both White and Latino voters in each selection. A criticism of exit-poll data is that the minority samples are unrepresentative of their larger state-wide populations (Segura 2012). Yet, exit-polls sample the voting population in each election and not those who self-report or identify as likely voters; exit-polls do a fairly good job of telling us who is voting and why (McDonald 2007; Cohen 2016). Further, NEP data have been effectively used to examine Latino voting behavior (Abrajano, Alvarez & Nagler 2008; Abramowitz & Saunders 2006; Campbell, Wong & Citrin 2006).
language requirements for ballots, schools and contracts, as well as limited health care and educational services to unauthorized residents. Former-Sheriff Joe Arpaio of Phoenix’s Maricopa County in Arizona, was a visible symbol for hardline immigration enforcement practices. Most notorious is Senate Bill 1070 introduced by Russell Pearce and adopted by the Arizona legislature in 2010. S.B.-1070 authorizes local law enforcement officers to stop anyone even appearing to be in Arizona illegally and required those suspects to produce documentation establishing their citizenship status. While the Supreme Court found most provisions of S.B.-1070 unconstitutional intrusion into federal authority it upheld the state’s ability to examine the immigration status of an individual stopped by police if reasonable suspicion exists that that person is in the U.S. illegally. In short, S.B.-1070 is the culmination of more than a decade of highly visible anti-immigrant policies adopted by the Arizona legislature (National Conference of State Legislatures).

Colorado, too, had its own anti-immigration entrepreneur at the national level. Tom Tancredo introduced multiple bills, while serving in Congress from 1999-2009. He opposed guest worker programs, favored English as the official language and saw multi-culturalism as undermining America. Tancredo unsuccessfully ran for Governor of Colorado in 2010. Importantly, many of the most restrictive bills introduced in the Colorado legislature never became law. Unlike Arizona, highly visible Latino elected officials potentially communicated a reassuring image to White voters. Whites are willing to support Black candidates when they have experienced leadership (Hajnal 2001). This illustrates the critical importance of the type of information communicated to citizens when studying minority politics. Federico Pena was elected to the legislature, became Mayor of Denver, and eventually served in the Obama cabinet. Juxtaposed to Tancredo in Congress though is after 2004 the Colorado legislature adopts a more mixed policy approach.

On one hand, the Colorado legislature continues to pursue some policies seen as hostile by Latino residents. But in 2007 Colorado reinstated SSI and Medicaid eligibility for certain legal immigrants through H.B.-05-1086 (National Conference of State Legislatures). In 2008 Colorado adopted a resolution honoring Cesar Chavez and Dolores Huerta, Hispanic-American citizens who devoted their lives to improving the living and working conditions, safety and dignity of agricultural workers, including migrants. Colorado also now allows students without lawful immigration status to be considered in-state residents for tuition purposes and exempts persons receiving higher education services, or benefits from documenting their lawful presence in the United States.

On the other, Florida is different from Arizona. In 2007 Florida required all applicants for driver licenses to be U.S. citizens and provide documentation that proves they are of a “non-immigrant classification” (Florida S.B.-2114), but in the same year agreed to provide child welfare services without regard to citizenship (S.B.-498). In 2010 Florida established public education funding formulas and guidelines that included funding for the transportation of migrant students (National Conference of State Legislatures). Nor does Florida have policy entrepreneurs comparable to Russell Pearce and Joe Arpaio. In contrast, Florida can boast the prominence of Mel Martinez who fled Cuba in 1962, eventually won elective offices as Mayor of Orange County, Florida and later U.S. Senator. Martinez also served as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development in the George W. Bush administration and briefly chaired the Republican National Committee.

Further, the Florida Hispanic Caucus in the state legislature is influential, and its members are in both the Republican and Democratic Parties. This arguably moderates Florida’s policy response to immigration and makes it more difficult to clearly identify the Republican Party as responsible for hostile legislation. In short, Colorado and Florida follow mixed legislative patterns, while Arizona enacts more uniformly “anti-immigrant” policies through this time frame. Next this study deconstructs the partisan and vote choices by White and Latino residents against the backdrop of these differing state contexts.
1. White Patterns

Much research using national surveys finds that Whites in states with large Latino populations are more likely to think of themselves as Republicans and vote for the Republican Presidential candidates. Conventional interpretations of partisan sorting over the last 20 years says that conservatives increasingly locate themselves in the Republican Party whereas liberals identify with the Democratic Party. Additionally, Whites increasingly move to the Republican Party in reaction to growing ethnic diversity while Latinos occupy the Democratic Party. Therefore, this study examines whether there is evidence of partisan change among Whites by their self-reported ideology. Our results illustrate that Whites do not uniformly move to Republican Party identification across the states. Unsurprisingly, White liberals in Arizona, Colorado and Florida are more likely to think of themselves as Democrats and White conservatives favor the Republican Party although there is a slight tendency for White liberals to consider themselves as independents in Florida and Arizona over the time series. The pattern for the United States shows moderately increasing polarization where White liberals are somewhat more Democratic and White conservatives are Republican. However, beginning in 2004 White conservatives in Arizona, Florida and Colorado are slightly less likely to consider themselves Republicans with a corresponding modest increase towards Independent. This contrasts with national-level results, which show substantial stability for White conservatives across the time series (see Figures 1 below).

Figures 1

The most striking change is White moderates increasingly identify as Independent after 2004 in Arizona and Colorado. The probability that an average White moderate identifies as an Independent in Arizona increases from 0.26 in 1996 to 0.45 in (2012)—a 73% rise. Similarly, moderate White voters change from a 0.3 likelihood of thinking of themselves as an Independent in 2000 to 0.5 in 2012 in Colorado or an increase of 66%. Florida reflects a similar movement though less dramatic. White moderates in Florida change from a likelihood of 0.28 in 1996 to 0.39 in 2012, or an increase of 39%.
contrast, there is very little change in the identity of White moderates nationally. The movement of White conservatives and moderates suggests that state-level dynamics exhibits greater partisan differentiation than is captured through national-level surveys (see Figures 2 & 3 below).

**Figures 2**

![Composition of White Moderates](chart1)

![Composition of White Moderates](chart2)

![Composition of White Moderates](chart3)

**Figures 3**

It is noteworthy that Florida illustrates the weakest pattern. Recall that Florida pursues a more calculated policy approach towards immigration. In addition, the electoral strength of Florida’s large and diverse Latino population combined with their influence in the legislature likely helps temper state legislation, unlike Arizona. There is virtually no change in the likelihood of Florida’s White conservatives to identify with the Republican Party. Instead, the modest increase in the likelihood of conservatives to consider themselves Independents appears to occur through the slight decrease in their identification with the Democratic Party. Further, there is a gradual though small decline among all ideological
classifications away from the Democrats which corresponds with the gradual increase in the likelihood of being an Independent.

The party identification results for White voters in our states, especially Arizona and Colorado, displays an increase in the number of voters who see themselves as not aligned with either political party. This contrasts with the ‘threat’ narrative which argues White voters move to the Republican Party in reaction to the growing Hispanic community in their states. Partisan change is not uniform and not solely toward the Republican Party; there is state-level variation. There are some White voters in Arizona and Colorado who identify as unaffiliated instead of the Republican Party. Citizens’ Republican vote choice may be a result of the options presented to them by candidates in general elections, however, their partisan identification suggests a pool of White voters who think of themselves as Independents and might be available for mobilization by strategic candidates (see Figures 4 below).

**Figures 4**

2. Latino Patterns
   The second part of the backlash theory is that Latino voters move into the Democrat Party. This creates a dynamic where politically active Latinos drive white voters to the Republican Party, and then as the Republican Party pursues anti-immigrant policies the Latino community mobilizes behind the Democrat Party. Indeed, the Democratic Party enjoys a sizable advantage among Latino voters over the last several election cycles. Predictably, liberal Latinos increasingly identify with the Democratic Party although it declines in both Presidential elections for George W. Bush. At the same time as Latino liberals identify with

the Democratic Party there is a decline in their identification as Independents; liberal Latinos increasingly identify with the Democratic Party as the Republican Party becomes associated with hostile policy positions (see Figures 4 above).

Latino moderates and conservatives display greater variation. Moderate Latinos are less likely to identify as Democrats and modestly move to Independent in Arizona and the U.S. However, their movement away from Democratic Party identification and toward Independent is dramatic in Colorado and Florida—states that pursued a mixed immigration agenda and had respected Latino elected officials. In Colorado the likelihood that a Latino moderate is identified as an Independent increased from 0.09 in 1996 to 0.46 in 2012—a 411% change. Similarly, Florida’s moderate Latinos are 157% more likely to consider themselves as Independents during the time interval. Thus, Latino movement to Democratic Party identification seems to partially reflect the hostility of the state political and policy environment towards them. Further, the large increase in unaffiliated identification suggests that the actions within states can shape the degree of political polarization in society. In Arizona the Republican Party is likely not seen as a meaningful alternative. Instead, Arizona’s hostile posture can be easily connected with the Republican Party, which polarizes the minority community’s partisan preferences. Conversely, the more moderate situations in Colorado and Florida appear to reduce the separate partisan identities of many Latinos (see Figures 5 below).

Figures 5

Examining conservative Latino voters offers the strictest test of whether immigration is producing a partisan realignment because those voters should be the most open to Republican Party appeals. The results exhibit both greater change and variation in partisan identification by conservative Latinos compared to Whites. In Arizona and Colorado, conservative Latinos begin leaving the Republican Party in 2000—just as anti-immigrant positions are being advanced by state legislators. The defection rate is highest in Colorado where the probability that a conservative Latino identifies with the Republican Party decreases from 0.44 in 1996 to 0.19 by 2012—a 57% decrease. Similarly, in Arizona the probability that
conservative Latinos identify Republican drops from 0.68 in 2000 to 0.39 in 2012—a roughly 43% decline. The changes in Arizona are distinctively steeper and more rapid compared to the United States. Nationally, conservative Hispanics depart from the Republican Party more gradually and by much smaller increments. Since 2000 the change in conservative Hispanic identification with the Republican Party decreases from 0.52 to 0.42, or a decline of about 19% (see Figures 6 below).

There are several differences that are important. First, there is a substantial difference in magnitude between Arizona and Colorado, as well as the United States. Conservative Latinos in Arizona are consistently about 20 points more likely to identify with the Republican Party compared to Colorado. Conservative Latinos in Colorado are never as likely to identify as Republican compared to Arizona. Further, Latino partisanship actually reverses in Colorado so that conservatives now are more likely to consider themselves Democrats. The changes in partisan identification suggest that sub-national immigration policies, differing political cultures, and the actions of policy élites directly affect the partisan preferences of Latino voters.

Non-Cuban Hispanics in Florida are about as likely to think of themselves as Republican in 2012 as they were in 2000.¹ While Florida illustrates some decay in identification with the Republican Party among conservative Latinos the interesting difference is they still are more likely to maintain their Republican attachment when compared with their counterparts in Arizona and Colorado. Recall that Latino elected

¹ Beginning in 2000 the NEP separates non-Cuban Hispanic from Cuban voters in Florida. Still the sample size for Cuban voters is small in Florida and therefore analyses are only conducted for non-Cuban Hispanic voters.
officials are in both the Republican and Democratic Parties in Florida, which perhaps partly is responsible for Latino conservatives maintaining their Republican identification.

Where do Latino voters go? The dominant view is they defect to the Democratic Party, and indeed the results show a rising likelihood that some conservative Latino voters identify with the Democratic Party. However, there is a distinctive increase by moderate and conservative Latino voters who now classify themselves as Independent. The change in the likelihood that conservative Latino voters in Arizona think of themselves as politically unaffiliated grows from 0.11 to 0.26 during the time series, an increase of more than 136%. The change in Colorado is even more dramatic. Conservative Latinos who consider themselves Independents did increase five-folds from 1996 to 2012. Thus, the most significant changes among Latino voters in Arizona and Colorado are two-fold. Consistent with the findings of other scholars some Latino voters increasingly affiliate with the Democratic Party. Certainly, this partially is in reaction to the hostile immigration policies enacted by the state and national Republican parties. The second change is the movement of many Latino voters away from both parties. Rather than a national partisan realignment being driven by demographic change, our evidence suggests there is a sizeable bloc of Latino voters, which looks more like a potential swing constituency, rather than a solidly Democratic cohort that varies in magnitude and intensity by state. This is not to say that continued hostile policy positions taken by the Republican Party and visibly by President Trump will not move the non-aligned Latino voters more firmly into the Democratic Party, but demographic change alone is not producing an inevitable Democratic Party majority. Instead, our results suggest Latinos are classic ‘bread and butter’ policy voters who evaluate their prospects within each state context and election.

Finally, the results also indicate that state context and policy posture do exert greater influence on the minority [Latino] community than on the White majority. Moderate state positions in Colorado and Florida are associated with significant increases in the number of Latinos who consider themselves to be Independents. This is consistent with the view of several Latino elites who said their community is primarily concerned with policies related to their tangible needs such as jobs and education. Conversely, Arizona’s hostile posture seems to maintain partisan polarization for both moderate Latino and White voters.

Presidential Vote Choice

The results show that some moderate White voters, as well as many moderate and conservative Latino voters consider themselves independents and behave as swing voters. Substantial variation exists across selected states; minimally, state politics and culture appear important for how partisan alignments unfold. Arizona pursued the most restrictive immigration policy agenda, and after 2004 moderate White voters and conservative Latinos both begin thinking of themselves as ‘Independents.’ Colorado exhibits a similar trend though stronger, but the pattern in Florida is weaker. Party affiliation aside, it is important to determine if the vote decisions of White and Latino voters match their partisan identities or whether they still consistently vote for the candidates of a particular party? The voting literature suggests that many individuals claiming to be independents actually hold a relatively consistent partisan voting preference. Only a small portion of the electorate are truly ‘neutral.’ Furthermore, those who are true independents are likely conflicted thereby alternating between parties from election to election. Also, partisan attachment is considered long-lasting even though voters may support candidates from different parties due to the dynamics of a particular candidate or election. This study now examines the Presidential vote choice of conservatives and moderates—for the voters who demonstrate the greatest change in partisan identification—in order to compare whether their partisan identification corresponds to their voting decisions.

Generally, White moderates are about equally likely to vote Democrat or Republican in Presidential elections. In Arizona—the most restrictive state in our study—moderate Whites increasingly identify as ‘Independent’ but they consistently split their vote. Florida shows similar stability among White
moderates. The exception is Colorado where White moderates clearly move toward Democratic Presidential candidates (see Figures 7 below).

**Figures 7**

Latino moderates exhibit greater variation compared to whites. In Arizona, Latino moderates increasingly vote for Democratic Presidential candidates after 2004 whereas Colorado demonstrates a small fluctuation between parties. Florida illustrates a rather consistent pattern where Latino moderates are slightly more likely to prefer Democratic candidates. All three state-level patterns are different compared to the national trend of greater support for the Democratic Party.

Conservatives follow a different pattern. In Arizona conservative Latinos increasingly vote Democratic beginning in 2004, but in Colorado they alternate between the parties—just as the voting literature predicts. Even in Florida conservative Latinos trend toward Democratic candidates. Recall that this study uses conservative Latinos as the strictest experiment to see if they manifest a change in Republican sympathy as immigration becomes increasingly salient. White conservatives consistently vote Republican even though many identified as Independent. Immigration, the tone and type of state-level policy, the actions of state-level élites, and White reaction to demographic diversity appear to contribute to a truly non-aligned pool of Latino voters in Colorado but less so in Arizona—at least for now (see Figures 8 below).
Discussion

This research enhances our understanding of Latino studies in several ways. First and foremost, it illustrates the importance of immigrants’ [Latinos’] experiences with the state for their political identity. Immigration federalism means that Latinos can experience the policy responses of both the national and subnational governments. The levels of government may operate in complimentary or conflicting ways. For example, both the Bush Jr. and Obama administrations favored immigration policies in opposition to Arizona’s legislature and other hardline officials preferring restrictive approaches. Also states adopt different policies and assume postures that range from welcoming to hostile. The policy stance adopted by states matters for both Latino and White partisan affiliation. Arizona—the most hostile state in this study and perhaps in the country—exhibited some White and Latino conservative movement to partisan independence. In other words, extreme policy positions appear to alienate some voters from both groups. Also the presence of issue entrepreneurs is very important for the political reaction by voters. These actors have the ability to communicate cues that either excites citizens’ fears or soothes their anxieties. State level policy making and elite leadership matter during periods of dramatic change. When anxiety is exploited as in Arizona there is evidence of greater polarization, but when states exhibit restraint then moderation is possible.

Second, this analysis improves our understanding of partisan realignment due to demographic change. Some of our results are consistent with those of other authors who attribute partisan realignment to demographic change. Conservative Latinos are less likely to think of themselves as Republicans as states adopt policies hostile to the immigrant community. The Republican Party, often controlling these state legislatures, can be easily identified as the primary sponsor of these proposals, and Latino voters respond accordingly. Further, some conservative White voters become more Republican in these states. But the backlash theory of
immigration politics in the United States can be improved by inspecting state-level behavior. Political behavior varies by state and matches the policy approaches adopted by the different jurisdictions across time.

Greater sophistication of theories of partisan change are revealed by decomposing the partisan preferences of both the white and Latino communities inside their state contexts. Within-group analyses demonstrate a weaker relationship between partisan identification and ultimate vote choice. Moderate White voters move to partisan independence but consistently vote Republican. This pattern is unique to our selected states and is decidedly not the trend revealed for the United States. Latino voters display more complexity. Like Whites, some conservative Latino voters identify as Independent, yet their vote shows more variation, suggesting they are not yet fully aligned with either party. Hence, in an era of high polarization ideological self-identification is important for partisan identification, but does not seem absolute for immigrants. Many Latino conservatives consider themselves independent because of their experiences with the state.

A common view is that White voters in states with growing Latino communities move to the Republican Party, while Latino voters move to the Democratic Party. This perspective holds that demographic change produces a partisan realignment which also contributes to polarization. Our results, however, indicate the emergence of a pool of Latino voters who both identify and act as true political independents, casting Presidential votes that reflect their ambivalence. This outcome is strongest in states that resisted aggressive political responses. Hence, Latino partisan identification appears to be neither inherited nor fixed over the long-term as the party identification literature predicts. Instead, partisan attachment for many Latinos appears to be influenced by the politics, policies and socio-economic context in their respective states. This is not the case for moderate White voters many of whom classify themselves as Independents, but begin casting ballots supporting Republican Party Presidential candidates.

These results suggest that demographic change, generally and immigration in particular, creates a group of classic swing voters. The choices presented to Latino voters by the Republican Party in elections may give the appearance of an emerging Democratic bloc, but their partisan identification suggests a group of voters concerned with immediate policy concerns. Indeed, several Latino community organizers and élites in these states describe Latinos as “bread and butter” voters. They are primarily concerned with which candidate [party] responds to their immediate needs including jobs, education, and health care. In fact, these leaders concur that many Latinos see the Democratic Party as “élitist” and inadequately responsive to their policy demands. In this way the Latino community is different from African American voters who overwhelmingly identify with the Democratic Party. Instead, this study finds a part of the Latino constituency is available for mobilization by candidates from either party proposing an appealing set of positions. At a minimum, this study believes it is a realignment still waiting to occur.

Caveats

An important proviso is the inflammatory rhetoric used in the 2016 Presidential election and President Trump’s position toward Mexico and the Latino immigrant community are possibly powerful enough to realign voters irrespective of state politics. The 2016 election marked by hyper-partisanship, which may well move Latinos to consider themselves as Democrats. Second, additional factors surely operate that influence the political behavior of White and Latino voters. However, this study finds that state-level considerations are important even for the Presidential vote. Élite responses to demographic change, state political cultures and pre-existing demographic coalitions influence both mobilization and change in partisan identification. Also different state level policy responses to growth by the Latino community appear to exert some influence on the political identities and behavior of Latino and white voters. These results call for the need for greater investigation at the state level to better capture the
complex patterns of political identification. This also calls for the need to develop better data sources at the state level to support within-group analyses.

**Addendum**

The recent controversies resulting from Republican President Donald Trump’s immigration enforcement policy of zero-tolerance highlights the argument that immigration policy produces varied political outcomes across states. For example, Republican Governor Doug Ducey of Arizona offered an equivocating reaction, saying he did not want to see children separated from their families, but fault lies with irresponsible parents who illegally bring children into the United States. By contrast, and consistent with the argument of this paper, Republican Governor Rick Scott of Florida publicly stated he does not support President Trump’s policy of child separation.

Governor Scott, whose term is ending, is now running for the U.S. Senate. In addition to opposing child separation he adopted a welcoming posture toward Puerto Rican migrants seeking shelter in Florida after Hurricane Maria. In fact, both Governor Scott and incumbent U.S. Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL) traveled to Puerto Rico to offer their empathy and support for the hurricane victims. Yet Governor Ducey, who also is seeking re-election, has not adopted Scott’s nuanced approach, illustrating the salient and polarizing features of the immigration debate in Arizona compared to Florida.

What will be the effect of President Trump’s incendiary rhetoric and hostile policy posture for midterm election outcomes? Certainly, the Republican Party’s perceived hostile position towards immigration does not help recruit Hispanic votes. The Hispanic vote, however, is less consequential for Congressional elections than state-wide elections because Latino voters tend to be packed within districts. Hence, a larger Hispanic turn-out for a Democratic candidate does not produce more Democratic seats—just a larger margin of victory in these same districts. Additionally, immigration is not the only salient issue for Hispanic voters; they also are concerned about issues of opportunity such as access to quality education, health care and jobs.

Therefore, local candidates can partially offset national Republican hostility towards Hispanics and the family separation controversy with platforms that are comparatively more tolerant. They can separate themselves from President Trump’s aggressive language and respond to Hispanics’ immediate policy concerns. Candidates for state-wide offices perhaps cannot win a majority of the Hispanic vote but they might limit the magnitude of the Democratic vote share. Rick Scott received only 38% of the Hispanic vote in 2014 and still won re-election by 1% to a second-term as Governor; he won 50% of the Hispanic vote when running for his first-term as Governor in 2010. Scott does not need to win a majority of Hispanic voters, particularly to the extent new White voters remain mobilized.

Indeed, the political significance for the movement of Latino voters toward Democratic identification should be viewed in combination with many White voters now aligning with the Republican Party. President Trump’s strategy of polarizing the electorate along racial and ethnic divisions contributes to partisan sorting of White voters into the Republican Party and members of racial and ethnic minorities into the Democratic Party. Rapid demographic change also contributes to partisan sorting—as the size of the minority community increases in a community some White voters in reaction move to the Republican Party. Governor Ducey’s response to immigration and border issues accordingly responds to this dynamic with an appeal to potential new Republican voters. These differences between Florida and Arizona reinforce the contention that state level politics matter and vary; so too they seem to predict that the United States will continue to experience a protracted period of polarized politics.
Technical Appendix

The basic model estimated is a multinomial logistic regression equation with partisan identification used as the unordered categorical outcome effect. Typical factors explaining partisanship—education, income, age, or self-reported ideology—are used as independent variables. This approach offers several advantages. Independent influences of interest can be specified as indicator variables in the equation, thus allowing the retrieval of their respective probabilities, while simultaneously controlling for the effects of the other factors. Specifying, for instance, ideology as an indicator variable enables us to decompose the likelihood that different types of White and Latino voters support one of the parties. Voters’ view of their ideology is closely related with their partisan affiliation. The response of White and Latino liberals, moderates, and conservatives may be distinct but is missed using ordinary regression techniques with national surveys. Finally, this also permits analysis of whether partisan realignment is underway, as many argue, or alternatively are there distinct pools of White and Latino voters being created by the immigration issue. Accordingly, the following multinomial logistic equation is estimated for each state and the U.S.A. as:

Equation 1:

\[ \text{Party}_{(1,2,3)} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Age} + \beta_2 \text{Education} + \beta_3 \text{Income} + \beta_4 \text{Ideology} + e, \]

when, \( \text{Party} = \) respondents’ partisan identification (Democrats, Republicans, Independents), \( \text{Age} = \) respondents’ age, \( \text{Education} = \) respondents’ educational level, \( \text{Income} = \) respondents’ income level, and \( \text{Ideology} = \) indicator variable for respondents’ self-reported ideology (liberals, moderates, conservatives).

One might fear that equation 1 is under-identified with only four independent variables. Exit-polls include different questions for each state. Furthermore, exit-surveys conducted in later election years include a larger battery of questions and demographic factors. However, in order to maintain consistency across all five elections the model is restricted to only those four important independent variables.

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Why Does David Sometimes Defeat Goliath? Effects of Military Culture on the Outcome of Asymmetric Wars

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ABSTRACT: Why the weak sometimes defeat the strong? Asymmetric wars and their outcomes have been enjoying much attention from both scholars and policy-makers. Many research projects have been published with the aim to define asymmetric war and explain its outcomes, however, none of those have been able to provide convincing answers. This research provides several valuable contributions to the ongoing discussion. First, it argues that the best definition of asymmetric war is an armed conflict waged within the borders of a given state where one of the actors is the government, while the other actor is one or a number of non-state actors, simply put intrastate war. Second, by utilizing this definition, introducing a novel measure of countries` military culture and employing logistic regression model this research analyzes intrastate conflicts from 1944 to 1997 and finds that the more the principles of the third-generation warfare are institutionalized in a country’s military the lower the probability of weak actor’s victory is. In addition, contrary to the findings of previous research, the models suggest that conflict duration, democracy and army size do not have significant effects on the outcome of intrastate wars. While difficult terrain supports the weak side, winning the wars fought in countries with high level of ethnic diversity seems to be easier for the strong actors. The weak side appears to have a decreased probability of winning wars in case of outside intervention on the side of the government.

Introduction

Human history has provided many examples both in interstate and intrastate conflicts where against all odds the weak actors indeed defeated their stronger adversaries. Although common sense suggests that such asymmetric conflicts between the strong and the weak should never take place, due to the small chances of victory for the weak they have still occurred many times and are happening with increasing frequency nowadays. The question why and under what conditions can a weak actor defeat a stronger adversary has attracted much scholarly attention over many years and resulted in a large number of studies. While the existing research has made some promising progress towards convincingly explaining the causation behind the outcomes of asymmetric conflicts there is still room for better and more convincing explanations. This research paper presents such an explanation in six parts.

It starts with a review and analysis of the existing literature of the definition of asymmetric warfare with the aim to establish a strong theoretical foundation for the follow-on empirical analysis. The paper proceeds with a thorough analysis of the existing explanations of asymmetric war outcomes, which will be followed by the development of a theoretical argument focusing on the role of military culture in the outcomes of asymmetric wars. Next, the paper will outline the research design, discuss the data sources, measurements, and empirical strategy. Then, it presents the empirical analysis and discuss the main findings. In the conclusion, criticism, policy implications and ideas for further research will be discussed.

Asymmetric Warfare

The literature on asymmetric warfare is so extensive that a comprehensive review would take a length of a book. For the purposes of this research the author provides a short review of the most representative concepts to establish the proper foundation for the follow-on analysis. The term
asymmetry first appeared in U.S. Joint Doctrine in 1995. The concept was initially used in a very simplistic and limited sense. According to Metz and Johnson (2001) “The doctrine defined asymmetric engagements as those between dissimilar forces, specifically air versus land, air versus sea, and so forth” (Metz & Johnson, p.2). Two years after the initial appearance of the concept asymmetric warfare received some attention. In 1997, the U.S. National Defense Panel (hereafter, NDP), a senior level group commissioned by Congress, reported: “We can assume that our enemies and future adversaries have learned from the Gulf War. They are unlikely to confront us conventionally with mass armor formations, air superiority forces, and deep-water naval fleets of their own, all areas of overwhelming U.S. strength today. Instead, they may find new ways to attack our interests, our forces, and our citizens” (Metz & Johnson, p.3). Wurzel et al (1998) argue that following this realization, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) introduced its doctrinal definition for asymmetric warfare as, “attempts to circumvent or undermine an opponent’s strengths, while exploiting his weaknesses using methods that differ significantly from the opponent's usual mode of operation” (Wurzel et al, p.2-3).

In addition to the DOD’s definition the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which has been heavily involved in recent conflicts, also defined asymmetric warfare as “the use of innovative strategies, tactics, and technologies by a ‘weaker' state or sub-state adversary that are intended to avoid the strengths and exploit the potential vulnerabilities of larger and technologically superior opponents” (Wurzel et al, p.3). Most recently RAND Corporation researchers also added their own definition of asymmetric warfare to the already existing literature arguing the it should be understood as a conflict between nations or groups that possess unequal military capabilities and employ disparate strategies (RAND, 2017). Besides the multiple policy definitions scholars have also developed their own understanding of asymmetric warfare. Their definitions seem to be mainly focusing on the material-based power ratio of the adversaries as either 1:2 (Paul, 1994) or 1:5 and higher (Arreguin-Toft, 2001). This very short review of asymmetric warfare definitions already suggests that the term means different things to different people and with that studying the causes of its outcomes is a complex challenge. This problem is complicated by all those who believe that the term should not be used at all.

Wilkinson (2001) argues that any debate about the term asymmetric warfare is useless, because from the beginning of human history all conflicts have been asymmetric and no such thing as symmetry exist. Along those lines a report commissioned by the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute suggests that there is no concrete understanding and consensus about the term in the military and with that it became meaningless (Buffaloe, 2006). Furthermore, Plant (2008) noted, that “establishing a doctrinal definition for asymmetric warfare would likely prove ambiguous at best and confusing at worst” (Plant, p.8). Sir General (ret.) Smith (2005) argues that “Asymmetric Warfare, a phrase I dislike...the practice of war, indeed its art, is to achieve asymmetry over the opponent. Labelling wars as asymmetric is something of a euphemism to avoid acknowledging that my opponent is not playing to my strengths and I am not wining” (Smith, p.5). Finally, Renz (2015) states that “the idea of creating a doctrine for asymmetric warfare is problematic. Asymmetric warfare is a broad and generic concept with a wide spectrum of interpretations. Asymmetry cannot be understood as a specific mode of warfare. At the end of the day, the whole point is that asymmetric warfare is based on unpredictability and surprise, which is not easy to reconcile with doctrine” (Renz, p.2).

Recognizing this ongoing debate about terminology and the difficulties of reaching an agreement on what asymmetric war is and whether should the term be used this research paper defines asymmetric war as a conflict waged within the borders of a given state where one of the actors is the state (government) who is fighting one or a number of non-state actors. Simply put this research defines asymmetric war as an intrastate civil war. In this case the asymmetry is given by the fact that the state
possesses most of the resources, including an organized, trained and equipped military force while the non-state actor either completely lacks those resources or possesses significantly less of them.

DeRouen and Sobek (2004) argue that intrastate conflicts can have multiple outcomes: ongoing war, government victory, rebel victory, some type of settlement including treaty or truce. Since this research intends to answer the question why the weak sometimes defeat the strong the following analysis will only examine the causes of rebel victory. To present a rigorous and well-supported argument and to consider possible alternative explanations the paper will next review and analyze the existing literature on intrastate war outcomes.

**Intrastate War Outcomes**

The literature identifies numerous factors that are being argued to be the key explanatory variables of the outcomes of asymmetric wars. These factors can be divided into two main categories: external and internal factors. The external factors include: conflict duration, availability of outside support and sanctuaries, physical terrain. The internal factors include: structure of the weak actor, the level of mechanization of the government forces, strategic interaction, state capacity including regime-type, level of bureaucracy and the size of the military. In this analysis reviews these factors identify possible limitations.

This analysis starts with the revision and analysis of the external factors. According to many scholars the duration of the conflict has a positive effect on the probability of weak side victory. Hammes (2006), DeRouen and Sobek (2004), Galula (2006) and Kilcullen (2009) all argue that longevity favors the weak. However, Guille (1973) finds that the longer the conflict is the more difficult for the weak side to maintain popular support and because of that longevity supports a draw rather than weak victory. One of the most famous guerilla theoretician and practitioner Mao Tse-tung argued that without available sanctuaries and outside support a rebel movement cannot win against the government (Mao, 1961). O’Neill (1990) and Galula (2006) also support this assertion and argue that sanctuaries are the stepping-stone for the weak to proceed from one phase to another and without those sanctuaries the weak side cannot defeat the state. On the other hand, Debray (1967) argues that for the weak to win they must remain mobile and detached from safe and fixed locations. Mao (1956) and McCuen (1966) argue that international support is a must for the weak due to their limited resources. O’Neill (1990) suggest that “unless governments are utterly incompetent, devoid of political will, and lacking resources, insurgent organizations normally must obtain outside assistance if they are to succeed” (O’Neill, 1990). Galula (2006) takes this even further by identifying concrete requirements as “moral, political, technical, financial, and military support” and argues that non-state actor should receive those from outside supporters in order to increase the chance of victory (Galula, 2006). On the other hand, Marcum (1976) argues that although external support is important and a lack of it might restrict the non-state actors’ capabilities, it is not a crucial influencing factor considering the outcome of the conflict.

Several scholars argue that the more difficult the physical terrain where the intrastate war is being waged the higher the chance is for weak side victory (Griffith, 2000; Joes, 2000; Cassidy, 2003). Somewhat contrary to these findings DeRouen and Sobek (2004) argue that no clear inference can be made about the effects of the terrain since according to their findings while mountain cover favors the weak side the forest cover has an opposite effect.

Let us turn now to the internal factors. The first is the structure of the weak actor. Galula (2006) and Chernick (2007) argue that the more “non-hierarchical” is a rebel organization the more chance it has for victory. They suggest that instead of a traditional military type organization all non-state actor must develop a flexible structure to avoid quick destruction by the government forces. On the other hand, Debray (1967) and O’Neill (1990) argue for a more hierarchical organization to ensure rebel victory. Lyall and Wilson (2009) argue that high level of mechanization of the government’s military is a good predictor of weak side victory. They suggest that while the armor and firepower provided by high level of
mechanization offer some advantages for the government it seriously limits the troop`s interaction with the local population, which prevents them to acquire much needed intelligence about the rebels leading to inability to effectively combat them.

Ivan Arreguin-Toft (2001) suggests that the outcome of asymmetric conflicts can be explained by the interaction of strategies employed by the strong and the weak actors. Arreguin-Toft suggests that both side have a choice to employ either direct or indirect strategies. “Direct approaches target an adversary’s armed forces in order to destroy that adversary’s capacity to fight. Indirect approaches seek to destroy an adversary’s will to fight” (Arreguin-Toft, 2001). The theory suggests that whenever different strategic approaches (indirect versus direct or direct versus indirect) are employed there is a higher chance for the weak side’s victory compared to the case when same strategies are being utilized (Arreguin-Toft, 2001). However, this elegant and well-supported argument seems to have a lot of merit it carries a number of shortcomings as well.

- First, the conflict utilized by the study combine both inter and intrastate conflicts, which creates some concerns regarding unit homogeneity.
- Second, the theory seems to ignore the fact that the strategy utilized by the actors can change during the conflict or individual actors can employ multiple strategies at the same time.
- Last, but not least Arreguin-Toft seems to assume that the actors have the freedom to choose their strategies, however that does not seem to be the case in intrastate conflict.

Due to its lack of resources the weak side does not have a choice, but to utilize indirect strategy. The strong actor, which possesses the established military organization is prone to utilize direct strategy, while the weak actor due to the lack of formal military organization has no other choice, but to always utilize indirect strategy. If one applies Arreguin-Toft’s theory to intrastate wars, then the weak side should win most of the time, due to its use of indirect strategy against the state’s direct strategy. However, this is not the case since most of the time indeed the strong actor wins.

The last internal factor that is being argued to have significant effects on the intrastate war outcomes is state capacity, which is measured through regime type, the level of bureaucracy and force ratios. Scholars argue that authoritarian regimes will fight more effectively than democratic regimes due to the latter’s political vulnerability and the former’s low moral restrain and strong determination (Lemay, 1968). Although this argument might explain some extent of the outcomes, by itself it is insufficient, because there is a strong limitation in relation to this explanation. There is a large variation in the fighting capability of each regime-types. There have been many authoritarian regimes with great fighting capabilities, while others made history as famously bad fighters. The same is true for democratic regimes (Arreguin-Toft, 2001). DeRouen and Sobek (2004) finds that while effective state control due to strong bureaucracy decreases the probability of non-state actor victory while a large army not necessary increases the chance of state success. The army size and its effects are being discussed in the literature in two ways. First, it is considered as the actual ratio of force-on-force comparing the size of the state army with the size of the non-state forces.

The other consideration is troop size compared to the population of the given country. Record (2007) argues that in a force-on-force comparison 10-to-1 numerical advantage must be maintained over the rebel forces in order to ensure state victory. On the other hand, Clutterbuck (1966) suggests that any attempts to speculate a right troop to rebel ratio are both nonsense and a dangerous illusion (Clutterbuck, 1966). Considering troop to population ratio, Quinlivan (1995) argues for a 20-to-1,000 to secure state victory. Along the same lines McGrath (2006) calls for 13.26-to-1,000 ratios, which according to him is the proper proportion to prevent rebel victory. Other scholars, including Kilcullen (2009) argues that “the idea of troop ratios is overblown and irrelevant” (Kilcullen, 2009). He suggests that the key explanatory factor is not the size of the available forces rather the ways those troops are being employed. The author’s theory
argues along similar lines and suggests that military culture is the fundamental framework determining the ways troops are being employed and because of that it is the difference in military culture that explains intrastate asymmetric war outcomes.

Theory

To provide a convincing explanation of the cause of weak actor victory in intrastate conflicts this section outlines the theoretical argument as to why the difference in military culture is the key factor in outcome. Military culture is defined as the ways military organizations think about themselves and about the concept of war. It describes the unique character of a nation’s armed forces (Keegan, 1994; Cassidy, 2006; Kitzen, 2012). It can be argued that prior literature measure military culture in three different ways: the level of mechanization (Sechser & Saunders, 2010), operational proficiency or effectiveness of the military organization (Biddle & Long, 2004; Treverton & Jones, 2005; Talmadge, 2016) and simply as Western and non-Western (Cassidy, 2006).

This analysis argues that although all these measurements carry certain merit there might be a more comprehensive measure which enable scholars to better compare the different countries military cultures and their effects. To establish such a measure this paper utilizes the “Generations of Warfare” theory initially advanced by Lind et al in 1989 and later further developed by McKenzie (1993) and van Creveld (2010). The theory argues that warfare has been developing in a sequence of generations since the Peace Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The first generation was based on the tactics, techniques, procedures and technologies used during the Thirty Years War including the tactics of line and column, and the smoothbore musket. The second generation emerged around the 1850s and was based on industrial mass-production and attrition-based on fire. These characteristics were utilized in the 1866 Austro-Prussian War and 1870 Franco-German War. The third generation was developed by the Germans after World War I. based on an effort to try to gain operational freedom to static fronts. This generation usually called Blitzkrieg, focuses on decisive maneuver over quantitative fire. According to the generations theorists these first three generations were characterized by the Clausewitzian trinitarian world view while the fourth generation is being characterized by “tribal, racial and even familial organizations now dispense violence once reserved for nation-states. Sovereignty, expressed geographically, is no longer a useful index of war-making. The fourth-generation world is a return to a pre-modern (i.e. pre-1648) politico-military environment” (McKenzie, 1993).

Generations theorists seem to argue that while the birth of the first three generation was primarily technological advancement driven the fourth generation was born of political utility and technology is not playing a role in its existence. In fact, it demonstrates a reverse effect since those military technologies effective in previous generations will be completely useless against gangs, cartels, terrorist organizations and other network type enemies (McKenzie, 1993). Although the author sees the point of the argument advanced by these theorists this analysis argues that when one is looking for the best measure to compare nation state’s military culture the best foundation is still the third generation. Although some might argue that China’s “Unrestricted Warfare”1 approach and Russia’s “Hybrid Warfare”2 already show some resemblance with those elements associated with the fourth generation this analysis argues that nation states’ military organizations still think about themselves and about the concept of war based on the principles of the third generation. For the follow-on analysis the paper will assume that nation states`
military organizations still rely on the principles of the third-generation warfare. This analysis argues that the development level of a country’s military culture can be directly measured by the level of institutionalized knowledge of the principles of third generation warfare and it influences the outcome of the intrastate wars. Based on this argument the study advances the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 1:** The likelihood of non-state actors’ victory decreases when they are fighting against a state actor with a more developed military culture.

**Research Design**

This section discusses the operationalization of the key variables, introduces the data source and explain my empirical strategy—a large-N statistical analysis to assess if military culture is truly the decisive factor in the fight of David and Goliath. To test this hypotheses, the author analyzes intrastate wars fought between 1944 and 1997 by merging the datasets used by DeRouen and Sobek (2004) (originally Doyle & Sambanis, 2000) and Lyall and Wilson (2009). The data sets contain 113 intrastate wars in 53 countries. This research paper has complete data for 81 of these conflicts. The data sets coding differs from the Correlates of War (COW) coding in two ways: battle-death threshold and termination coding. While COW requires that battle-death threshold must be maintained every year of the conflict, DeRouen and Sobek considers a conflict intrastate war if it breaks the 1,000 battle-death requirements in one year. In addition, since DeRouen and Sobek code hostilities occurring within two years after the end of the previous conflict as a new war they have slightly more cases than COW.

An intrastate war can have five outcomes: ongoing war, government victory, rebel victory, a treaty or a truce (ceasefire). This analysis utilizes DeRouen and Sobek’s rebel victory (vrebel) variable as my dependent variable coded 0 for government victory and 1 for rebel victory. The key explanatory variable in my models of outcome is military culture (mculture2). The variable is coded 0 for military culture with low level of institutionalization of the principles of the third-generation warfare and 1 for military culture with high level of institutionalization. Whether a given country’s military culture is considered having a low or high level of institutionalization was decided based on archival research whether there was any military academy in existence in the given country at least five years prior the intrastate conflict.

Fearon (2004), and DeRouen and Sobek (2004) suggest that there is no consensus on which variables should be used to model intrastate war outcomes. This research paper will utilize 14 control variables derived from the literature review of intrastate war outcomes. First, military capabilities of the government will be utilized to assess their effects on the outcome of asymmetric conflicts. To measure the size of the government forces this analysis uses DeRouen and Sobek’s (2004) size of the military per 1000 citizen variable (army1000). Additionally, Lyall and Wilson’s (2009) mechanization level (mech) variable will be used to assess the effects of military structure and doctrine on the outcome. This variable is calculated as a scaled index recording the war onset soldier-to-mechanized vehicle ratio in the country’s military. The values of this index were collapsed into four categories at the 25% quartiles. Mechanization is coded as 1 if there were more than 834 soldiers per vehicle, 2 if there were between 288 and 833 soldiers per vehicle, 3 if there were between 109 and 287 soldiers per vehicle, and 4 if there were between 11 and 108 soldiers per vehicle.

The final measure for government forces’ capability is assessing their mobility (heli) and derived from DeRouen and Sobek’s (2004). This variable is coded 0 is the government forces did not use helicopters during the asymmetric war and 1 if they used them. Duration (duration) of the conflict is measured in months and directly taken from DeRouen and Sobek (2004). Following Mason, Weingarten and Fett (1999) this research paper utilizes the square of duration (durationsq) to control for possible curvilinear effects of duration. The effects of regime-type are being measured by the democracy variable (democracy) taken from Polity III data (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002a) and represents the value of democracy.
minus autocracy. Government control is measured through bureaucracy (bureau) taken from DeRouen and Sobek (2004). The bureaucracy data was originally downloaded from the State Failure Task-Force Data Page and it is measured on a 0-6 scale. The effects of rough terrain are assessed through mountain (mountain) and forest cover (forest). These variables measure the percentage of a given country covered either mountains or forests (Gerrard, 2000 as provided in Collier, Hoeffler & Soderbom, 2004). The availability of sanctuaries is measured by the number of country borders (border) along which the war is being waged (Regan, 1996). Based on Lyall and Wilson’s (2009) outside support (support) is coded as 0 if rebels received neither economic nor military support, 1 if they received one of those supports, and 2 if they received both types of support. Table I contains all countries with military educational institutions.

**Table I. Military Educational Institutions by Country with Their Establishment Year**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Name of the Academy</th>
<th>Year Established</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>National Military College</td>
<td>1869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>Defense Service Academy</td>
<td>1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>National University of Defense Technology</td>
<td>1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Hellenic Army Academy</td>
<td>1828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Indian Military Academy</td>
<td>1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Military Academy</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Korea Military Academy</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Heroic Military College</td>
<td>1823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Nigerian Defense Academy</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Royal Military Academy Sandhurst</td>
<td>1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Pakistan Military Academy</td>
<td>1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Philippine Military Academy</td>
<td>1905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>National Defense University</td>
<td>1889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>M.V. Frunze Military Academy</td>
<td>1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>South African Military Academy</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy</td>
<td>1887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Turkish Military Academy</td>
<td>1834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>Serbian Military Academy</td>
<td>1850</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The literature suggests additional control variables. Some scholars argue that the ethnic diversity of the country where intrastate war is being fought has significant effects on the outcome. The ethnicity
variable is an additive index taken from Doyle and Sambanis (2000); and it represents linguistic, religious and racial divisions. DeRouen and Sobek (2004) argue that “U.N. intervention has the potential to quickly end a war, but it is often associated with longer and more intractable wars” (DeRouen & Sobek, 2004). As such it is also included in the models (U.N.) and coded 0 for no intervention and 1 in case of U.N. involvement. Since Collier and Hoeffler (2002b) argue that Africa is the only continent where intrastate wars are on the rise it has a special ethnic and religious structure and is also included in the analysis. Lastly, economic inequality (Gini) is used as a possible proxy measure for grievances (DeRouen & Sobek, 2004).

Method

Since my dependent variable, weak side victory (vrebel) is a nominal variable this analysis employs as logit models. The interpretation of the models with nominal dependent variables is being discussed in detail in Long (1997). The author employed eight models in this analysis to test the effect of explanatory variables and to test some of the previous explanations derived from the above discussed literature.

- The first model includes only the author’s own key explanatory variable (mculture2) and the control variables Africa (Africa), Ethnic diversity (ethnicity), United Nations (U.N.) intervention, economic inequality (Gini), military expenditure (milex) and size of the total population (tpop). This model assesses the independent effects of military culture on the outcome of asymmetric conflicts.
- From Model #2 to Model #7 the author kept the same control variables and my explanatory variable, but add several other variables utilized from the previously discussed literature in order to assess the effects of my independent variable, while controlling for the other effects. Model #2 includes variables measuring the government’s military capability, such as the size of the military force per 1000 citizen (army1000), the level of mechanization of government forces (mech) and mobility of those forces (heli).
- Model #3 addresses regime-type (democracy), while Model #4 assesses the effects of government control (bureaucracy) on the outcome of asymmetric wars.
- Model #5 includes measurements for outside support in the form of support (outside support) and available sanctuaries (border).
- Model #6 assesses the effects of difficult terrain measured to the percentage of mountain (mountain) and forest cover (forest).
- Model #7 takes the effects of duration (duration & durationsq) into account.
- Model #8 includes all variables to assess their combined effects on outcomes of asymmetric wars.

The summary results of the models are described in Tables II and III. The complete, individual result tables per model and the summary statistics of the variables can be reviewed in the appendix. All results calculated with robust errors.

Discussion

Table II and III present the results of the logit analyses. All the models show that if one utilizes these control variables then the military culture variable is highly significant across all models and show that as H1 predicted when one moves from a state with less institutionalized military culture to a more institutionalized military culture than the relative odds of non-state actor victory decreases. Model #2 demonstrates that while the military culture variable has a significant negative effect on the weak side victory, none of the measures of the state’s military forces’ capability is statistically significant. Model #3 shows that besides the negative effects of higher level military culture democracy also has a statistically significant negative effect on the odds of weak side victory.

According to Model #4 increasing government control increases the probability of strong side victory. Model #5 demonstrates that neither outside support nor the availability of sanctuaries have significant
effects on the outcome of asymmetric wars. Surprisingly, Model #6 shows that both proxies measuring difficult terrain have a negative effect on the odds of weak side victory, but only the forest cover seems to have statistically significant effects. According to Model #7 duration does not have a significant effect on the outcome of asymmetric wars. Model #8 demonstrates that when all variables included the significance and the direction of the effects of the military culture variable remain the same.

Table II.
Logit: Non-State Actor Victory, 1944-1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model#1 Military Culture</th>
<th>Model#2 Force and Mobility</th>
<th>Model#3 Regime-Type</th>
<th>Model#4 Bureaucracy</th>
<th>Model#5 Support/ Sanctions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Culture</td>
<td>-2.2366** .8849</td>
<td>-2.2193** 1.0663</td>
<td>-2.2724** .9126</td>
<td>-2.2967* 1.2688</td>
<td>-1.99** .9237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Size</td>
<td>.0124 .0204</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanization</td>
<td>.0219 .2473</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobility</td>
<td>.0902 .7708</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.0319 .048</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.837** .3645</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.1039 .4038</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.1691 .1452</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durationsq</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>-1.5472** .6422</td>
<td>-1.7399** .7138</td>
<td>-1.6656** .6761</td>
<td>-.9669 .9018</td>
<td>-1.9933** .8238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>.0048 .0096</td>
<td>.0068 .0101</td>
<td>.0052 .0097</td>
<td>-.0143 .0138</td>
<td>.0054 .0093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>-2.0231*** .7058</td>
<td>-2.1017*** .7271</td>
<td>-1.9538*** .7137</td>
<td>-1.96** .81</td>
<td>-2.0333*** .7788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini</td>
<td>-.0592** .0273</td>
<td>-.09** .0451</td>
<td>-.0612** .0274</td>
<td>-.049 .0398</td>
<td>-.0838** .0388</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Military Expenditure & -8.85e-09  
& 2.16e-08 
& -1.15e-08  
& 2.05e-08 
& -7.58e-09  
& 2.18e-08 
& -2.44e-09  
& 2.33e-08 
& -9.85e-09  
& 2.09e-08 

Total Population & 4.01e-07  
& 2.55e-06 
& 6.93e-08  
& 2.81e-06 
& 3.51e-07  
& 2.45e-06 
& 2.31e-06  
& 3.14e-06 
& -1.66e-06  
& 2.69e-06 

Constant & 2.2524**  
& 1.1338 
& 3.2265**  
& 1.6241 
& 2.6425**  
& 1.2141 
& 4.0771**  
& 2.0816 
& 2.5545*  
& 1.548 

Number of Observations & 105  
& 97 
& 105  
& 87 
& 97  

Wald chi-squared (36) & 20.21 
& 22.04 
& 21.20 
& 15.54 
& 24.10 

Prob.> chi-squared & 0.0051 
& 0.0149 
& 0.0066 
& 0.0494 
& 0.0042 

Log likelihood & -44.1531 
& -40.4316 
& -43.940456 
& -33.3662 
& -39.7495 

Pseudo R² & 0.2001 
& 0.2215 
& 0.2040 
& 0.2477 
& 0.2346 

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Government Victory is the comparison group.
Numbers below coefficients are robust standard errors.

**Table III. Logit: Non-State Actor Victory, 1944-1997**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model #6 Terrain</th>
<th>Model #7 Duration</th>
<th>Model #8 Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Culture</td>
<td>-2.0294** .8536</td>
<td>-2.3273** .9599</td>
<td>-4.1118* 2.1766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.0325 .0401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanization</td>
<td>-.9589* .5765</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobility</td>
<td>2.0106 1.3393</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-.0203 .0768</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy</td>
<td>-.7677* .4457</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Support</td>
<td>-.4997 .8344</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>.0733 .2021</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain</td>
<td>-.0067 .0106</td>
<td>.0785*** .0248</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest</td>
<td>-.0281** .0138</td>
<td>-.0633** .0276</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>.0147 .01482</td>
<td>.0193 .0262</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durationsq</td>
<td>-.0001</td>
<td>.0001</td>
<td>.0000 .0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>-1.5765** .6719</td>
<td>-1.8188** .7073</td>
<td>2.7463** 1.3221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>.0044 .0097</td>
<td>.0033 .0105</td>
<td>-.0421** .0183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>-2.0989*** .7148</td>
<td>-2.2848*** .7895</td>
<td>-2.9279** 1.1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini</td>
<td>-.0619** .0271</td>
<td>-.0623** .0281</td>
<td>-.0433 .0595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditure</td>
<td>-8.94e-09 2.49e-08</td>
<td>-1.47e-08 2.19e-08</td>
<td>2.12e-08 5.76e-08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>1.53e-08 2.54e-06</td>
<td>2.68e-07 2.53e-06</td>
<td>-1.57e-06 5.47e-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.1641** 1.3922</td>
<td>2.5466** 1.1884</td>
<td>7.2397* 4.0549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald chi-squared (36)</td>
<td>26.12</td>
<td>18.49</td>
<td>24.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob.&gt; chi-squared</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.0299</td>
<td>0.1446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-41.8639</td>
<td>-42.3933</td>
<td>-21.6161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.2199</td>
<td>0.2320</td>
<td>0.4539</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
Government Victory is the comparison group.
Numbers below coefficients are robust standard errors.

Additionally, according to this analysis several other factors that have been theorized in the literature did not have significant effects on the outcome of asymmetric conflicts. The results of my models demonstrate that contrary to the arguments of Hammes (2006), DeRouen and Sobek (2004), Galula (2006), and Kilcullen (2009) duration is not a significant factor in explaining intrastate war outcomes. Similarly, the results refute in worst case or do not support in the best case the previous arguments regarding the effects of military capabilities, outside support and difficult terrain. Furthermore, the results suggest that democracy has a significant negative effect on the odds of weak side victory which cast some doubts on Lemay’s (1968) argument of authoritarian régimes will fight more effectively than democratic regimes, due to the latter’s political vulnerability and the former’s low moral restrain and strong determination.

On the other hand, in support of previous analysis my analysis finds that government control via strong bureaucracy have significant effects on the outcome of asymmetric wars across the models. These results seem to confirm DeRouen and Sobek’s (2004) findings that stronger government bureaucracy indeed leads to decreasing odds of non-state actor victory. Additionally, the models seem to demonstrate that intrastate wars in Africa show mixed results, but mostly decrease the probability of rebel victory. This might be the case because African governments are usually not constrained in the use of their tools to defeat their opposition.
While ethnic diversity shows mixed results, it seems that both U.N. intervention and economic inequality have a statistically significant negative effect on the odds of non-state actor victory.

Finally, Figure I graphs show the substantive effects, that is, the first difference estimates on the basis of my models. A first difference estimate captures the change in the predicted probability (in the form of percentage points) of observing rebel victory (in contrast to not observing any rebel victory) as a given explanatory variable changes values from its minimum to its maximum, while all other explanatory variables are held constant at their median (King et al. 2000).

**Figure 1.**
Coefficient Plots for Each Model of all Variables on Rebel Victory
Conclusion

Although common sense suggests that asymmetric wars between the strong and the weak should never take place due to the small chances of victory for the weak, they still seem to have been an inherent part of human conflict throughout history. Not only the large number of historical examples make it important to better understand what effects of the outcome of such conflicts but the fact that the United States has been engaged in the Second Afghanistan War since 2001 for the longest time in its history without any sign of potential conclusion in the foreseeable future. However, the phenomenon and the possible causes of its different outcomes have been studied extensively in international relations literature neither the definition of asymmetric war nor the causes of the different outcomes seem to be well established. This study makes several contributions to help solving these issues.

First, this analysis suggests that the best way to define asymmetric wars as an armed conflict waged within the borders of a given state where one of the actors is the government while the other actor is one or several non-state actors, simply put intrastate war. The asymmetry is given by the fact that the state possesses most of the resources, including an organized, trained and equipped military force while the non-state actor either completely lacks those resources or possesses significantly less of them. No other explanation can so clearly identify the notion of asymmetry since all other definitions seem to awake the problem, identified by Wilkinson (2001) that all conflict from the beginning of mankind were asymmetric in one way or the other.
Second, this paper introduces a novel measurement for military culture by utilizing the level of institutionalization of the principles of the third-generation warfare. Military culture is defined as the ways military organizations think about themselves and about the concept of war and describes the unique character of a nation’s armed forces. This analysis argues that the best measure to compare nation state’s military culture is the third generation since the nation states’ military organizations still think about themselves and about the concept of war based on the principles of this generation. Based on this assumption the development level of a country’s military culture can be best measured by the level of institutionalized knowledge of the principles of third generation warfare.

Third, it analysis finds that the development level of military culture is a significant factor in the outcome of intrastate wars and states with lower level of institutionalization of the principles of the third-generation warfare have less chance of victory when fighting against non-state actors.

Lastly, the analysis shows that some factors theorized by previous research including duration, military capabilities, outside support, difficult terrain and democracy either do not have significant effects on intrastate war outcomes or their effects are contrary to the findings of earlier analysis.

Based on the results of this analysis several policy implications arise. First, the results suggest that instead of focusing policy efforts on building “western-type,” large security forces more attention should be dedicated to the institutionalization of military knowledge and skills and through that the development of professional military culture in countries with intrastate wars. Second, it seems that the policy of building democratic institutions and developing strong bureaucracies have a negative effect on the probability of rebel victory, which suggest that improving those factors should remain one of the focus of the government policies. Third, since the analysis suggests that U.N. involvement is associated with increased probability of government victory governments should consider implementing policies that generate incentives for the United Nations to get involved in the conflict.

Due to the high frequency of occurrence of the asymmetric conflicts and the lack of universal and convincing explanations of the causes of the outcomes researchers should maintain their interest in this topic. Further and more accurate investigation of the effects of military culture is not only needed, but potentially offers some interesting additional findings as well.

Appendix

Summary Statistics:

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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
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<th>Max</th>
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</table>
STATATA Commands by Model:

Model #1: logit vrebel mculture2 Africa ethnicity U.N. Gini milex tpop, robust
Model #2: logit vrebel mculture2 army1000 mech heli Africa ethnicity U.N. Gini milex tpop, robust
Model #3: logit vrebel mculture2 democracy Africa ethnicity U.N. Gini milex tpop, robust
Model #4: logit vrebel mculture2 democracy bureau Africa ethnicity U.N. Gini milex tpop, robust
Model #5: logit vrebel mculture2 support border Africa ethnicity U.N. Gini milex tpop, robust
Model #6: logit vrebel mculture2 mountain forest Africa ethnicity U.N. Gini milex tpop, robust
Model #7: logit vrebel mculture2 duration durationsq Africa ethnicity U.N. Gini milex tpop, robust
Model #8: logit vrebel mculture2 army1000 mech heli democracy bureau support border mountain forest duration durationsq Africa ethnicity U.N. Gini milex tpop, robust

Regression Results by Model:

Model #1:

Iteration 0:  log pseudolikelihood =  -55.198492
Iteration 1:  log pseudolikelihood =  -45.367867
Iteration 2:  log pseudolikelihood =  -44.169545
Iteration 3:  log pseudolikelihood =  -44.153101
Iteration 4:  log pseudolikelihood =  -44.153083
Iteration 5:  log pseudolikelihood =  -44.153083

|              | Coef.   | Std. Err. | z      | P>|z|    | [95% Conf. Interval]|
|--------------|---------|-----------|--------|--------|---------------------|
| vrebel       | mculture2 | -2.236565 | .884958 | -2.53  | 0.011               | -3.971051 -5.020792 |
|              | africa   | -1.547211 | .642163 | -2.41  | 0.016               | -2.805828 -2.2885942|
|              | ethnicity | .0048101  | .0095948| 0.50   | 0.616               | -0.0139954 .0236157|
|              | UN       | -2.023094 | .7058197| -2.87  | 0.004               | -3.406475 -1.6397132|
|              | gini     | -.0591548 | .0273137| -2.17  | 0.030               | -1.126887 -.0056209|
|              | milex    | -8.85e-09 | 2.16e-08| -4.04  | 0.000               | -5.12e-08 3.36e-08  |
|              | tpop     | 4.01e-07  | 2.55e-06| 0.16   | 0.875               | -4.60e-06 5.40e-06  |
|              | _cons    | 2.252431  | 1.133779| 1.99   | 0.047               | .0302653 4.474597   |
Model #2:

Logistic regression

| Robust         | Coef.     | Std. Err. | z      | P>|z|  | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|----------------|-----------|-----------|--------|------|----------------------|
| vrebel         |           |           |        |      |                      |
| mculture2      | -2.219273 | 1.066316  | -2.08  | 0.037| -4.309214            | -1.293318 |
| army1000       | 0.124102  | 0.020369  | 0.61   | 0.542| -0.0275137           | 0.0523341 |
| mech           | 0.021871  | 0.247324  | 0.09   | 0.930| -0.462876            | 0.5066181 |
| heli           | 0.0901796 | 0.770756  | 0.12   | 0.907| -1.420475            | 1.600834  |
| africa         | -1.739975 | 0.7138078 | -2.44  | 0.015| -3.139012            | -3.409371 |
| ethnicity      | 0.0067549 | 0.0101131 | 0.67   | 0.504| -0.0130664           | 0.0255761 |
| UN             | -2.101735 | 0.720479  | -2.89  | 0.004| 3.526723             | -6.767473 |
| gini           | -0.0900279 | 0.0451201 | -2.00  | 0.046| 1.784618             | -0.001594 |
| milex         | -1.15e-08 | 2.05e-08  | -0.056 | 0.577| -5.17e-08            | 2.88e-08  |
| tpop           | 6.93e-08  | 2.81e-06  | 0.02   | 0.980| 5.44e-06             | 5.58e-06  |
| _cons          | 3.226469  | 1.624083  | 1.99   | 0.047| 0.0433249            | 6.409613  |

Number of obs = 97
Wald chi2(10) = 22.04
Prob > chi2 = 0.0149
Log pseudolikelihood = -40.431589
Pseudo R2 = 0.2215

Model #3:

Logistic regression

| Robust         | Coef.     | Std. Err. | z      | P>|z|  | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|----------------|-----------|-----------|--------|------|----------------------|
| vrebel         |           |           |        |      |                      |
| mculture2      | -2.272352 | .9126158  | -2.49  | 0.013| -4.061046            | -.4836581 |
| democracy      | -0.0319201| .0480201  | -0.66  | 0.506| 1.260378             | 0.621976  |
| africa         | -1.665546 | .6768648  | -2.46  | 0.014| 2.990651             | -3.404405 |
| ethnicity      | 0.0051935 | .009735   | 0.53   | 0.594| 0.013886             | 0.0242738 |
| UN             | -1.953819 | .7137431  | -2.74  | 0.006| 3.35273             | -5.549082 |
| gini           | -0.0611821| .0274386  | -2.23  | 0.026| 1.149608             | -0.074034 |
| milex         | -7.58e-09 | 2.18e-08  | -0.35  | 0.728| 5.03e-08             | 3.52e-08  |
| tpop           | 3.51e-07  | 2.45e-06  | 0.14   | 0.886| 4.44e-06             | 5.15e-06  |
| _cons          | 2.642456  | 1.214069  | 2.18   | 0.030| 0.262925            | 5.021986  |

Number of obs = 105
Wald chi2(8) = 21.20
Prob > chi2 = 0.0066
Log pseudolikelihood = -43.940456
Pseudo R2 = 0.2040
### Model #4:

| vrebel   | Coef.  | Robust Std. Err. | z      | P>|z|  | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|----------|--------|------------------|--------|-------|----------------------|
| mculture2 | -2.296664 | 1.268802       | -1.81  | 0.070 | -4.783469            | .190142       |
| bureau   | -.8370096 | .3645785      | -2.30  | 0.022 | -1.55157             | -.122489      |
| africa   | -.9668678 | .9018221      | -1.07  | 0.284 | -2.734407            | .800671       |
| ethnicity | -.0143294 | .0137988      | -1.04  | 0.299 | -.0413746            | .0127157      |
| UN       | -1.960034  | .8100105      | -2.42  | 0.016 | -3.547625            | -.372423      |
| gini     | -.0489655  | .0397873      | -1.23  | 0.218 | -.1269472            | .0290163      |
| milex    | -2.44e-09  | 2.33e-08      | -0.10  | 0.917 | -4.82e-08            | 4.33e-08      |
| tpop     | 2.31e-06   | 3.14e-06      | 0.74   | 0.461 | -3.84e-06            | 8.47e-06      |
| _cons    | 4.077129   | 2.081613      | 1.96   | 0.050 | -.0027579            | 8.157017      |

### Model #5:

| vrebel   | Coef.  | Robust Std. Err. | z      | P>|z|  | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|----------|--------|------------------|--------|-------|----------------------|
| mculture2 | -1.990077 | .923663        | -2.15  | 0.031 | -3.800423            | -.1797307     |
| support  | .1038813  | .4038086       | 0.26   | 0.797 | -.687569             | .8953315      |
| border   | .169132   | .1451846       | 1.16   | 0.244 | -.1154245            | .4536885      |
| africa   | -1.993308  | .8238439      | -2.42  | 0.016 | -3.608012            | -.3786034     |
| ethnicity | .0053974   | .0092656       | 0.58   | 0.560 | -.0127629            | .0235576      |
| UN       | -2.033266  | .7788284      | -2.61  | 0.009 | -3.559742            | -.5067902     |
| gini     | -.8037886  | .0388171      | -2.16  | 0.031 | -.1598688            | -.0077084     |
| milex    | -.985e-09  | 2.09e-08      | -0.47  | 0.637 | -5.07e-08            | 3.11e-08      |
| tpop     | -1.66e-06  | 2.69e-06      | -0.62  | 0.536 | -6.93e-06            | 3.60e-06      |
| _cons    | 2.554533   | 1.548007      | 1.65   | 0.099 | -.4795055            | 5.588572      |
Model #6:

Iteration 0:
log pseudolikelihood = -53.662741

Iteration 1:
log pseudolikelihood = -43.313116

Iteration 2:
log pseudolikelihood = -41.879267

Iteration 3:
log pseudolikelihood = -41.863934

Iteration 4:
log pseudolikelihood = -41.863934

Logistic regression
Number of obs = 104
Wald chi²(9) = 26.12
Prob > chi² = 0.0020
Pseudo R² = 0.2199

Log pseudolikelihood = -41.863934

| vrebel   | Coef.    | Std. Err. | z       | P>|z| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|----------|----------|-----------|---------|------|----------------------|
| mculture2| -2.029362| .85361    | -2.38   | 0.017| -3.702407            |
|          |          |           |         |      | -3.56317             |
| mountain | -.0066503| .0106228  | -0.63   | 0.531| -.0274707            |
|          |          |           |         |      | .0141701             |
| forest   | -.0281245| .0138288  | -2.03   | 0.042| -.0552866            |
|          |          |           |         |      | -.0010205            |
| africa   | -1.576445| .671936   | -2.35   | 0.019| -2.893415            |
|          |          |           |         |      | -.2594744            |
| ethnicity| .0044309 | .0097333  | 0.46    | 0.649| -.014661             |
|          |          |           |         |      | .0235079             |
| UN       | -2.098866| .7147942  | -2.94   | 0.003| -3.499837            |
|          |          |           |         |      | -.6978955            |
| gini     | -.0618943| .0270653  | -2.29   | 0.022| -.114913             |
|          |          |           |         |      | -.0088474            |
| milex    | -8.94e-09| 2.49e-08  | -0.36   | 0.720| -.577e-08            |
|          |          |           |         |      | 3.99e-08             |
| ttop     | 1.53e-08 | 2.54e-06  | 0.01    | 0.995| -4.96e-06            |
|          |          |           |         |      | 4.99e-06             |
| _cons    | 3.164112 | 1.392164  | 2.27    | 0.023| .435522              |
|          |          |           |         |      | 5.892703             |

Model #7:

Iteration 0:
log pseudolikelihood = -55.198492

Iteration 1:
log pseudolikelihood = -44.521989

Iteration 2:
log pseudolikelihood = -42.471575

Iteration 3:
log pseudolikelihood = -42.393723

Iteration 4:
log pseudolikelihood = -42.393255

Iteration 5:
log pseudolikelihood = -42.393255

Logistic regression
Number of obs = 105
Wald chi²(9) = 18.49
Prob > chi² = 0.0299
Pseudo R² = 0.2320

Log pseudolikelihood = -42.393255

| vrebel   | Coef.    | Std. Err. | z       | P>|z| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|----------|----------|-----------|---------|------|----------------------|
| mculture2| -2.32728 | .9598646  | -2.42   | 0.015| -4.20858             |
|          |          |           |         |      | -.4459799            |
| duration | .0146644 | .0148195  | 0.99    | 0.322| -.0143812            |
|          |          |           |         |      | .04371               |
| durationsq| -.0000983| .0000735  | -1.34   | 0.181| -.0002423            |
|          |          |           |         |      | .0000458             |
| africa   | -1.818844| .7072448  | -2.57   | 0.010| -3.205018            |
|          |          |           |         |      | -.4326698            |
| ethnicity| .0033219 | .0105236  | 0.32    | 0.752| -.017304             |
|          |          |           |         |      | .0239478             |
| UN       | -2.28478 | .7895343  | -2.89   | 0.004| -3.832239            |
|          |          |           |         |      | -.7373209            |
| gini     | -.0623059| .0280779  | -2.22   | 0.026| -.1173376            |
|          |          |           |         |      | -.0072743            |
| milex    | -1.47e-08| 2.19e-08  | -0.67   | 0.502| -.5.75e-08            |
|          |          |           |         |      | 2.92e-08             |
| ttop     | 2.68e-07 | 2.53e-06  | 0.11    | 0.916| -4.69e-06            |
|          |          |           |         |      | 5.23e-06             |
| _cons    | 2.5466   | 1.188359  | 2.14    | 0.032| .2174599             |
|          |          |           |         |      | 4.875741             |
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Redefining Post-Conflict Peacekeeping Success in Regional and International Missions

by Alexander Bruens & Mirella Miranda, 2018 Best FPSA Undergraduate Paper Award, Florida Atlantic University–Boca Raton

ABSTRACT: The scholarly literature on post-conflict intervention focuses primarily on negative peace as a goal. In the post-conflict environment, however, many states ignore or are incapable of providing more practical externalities of peace or civilian access to basic needs. Post-conflict mediation with provisions that provide civilians access to basic needs are more likely to create a positive and durable peace. The authors conceptualize post-conflict success as a measure of civilian access to food, clean water, healthcare and electricity. Access to these needs is restricted or completely unavailable following many civil wars. The authors test our argument using quantitative analysis. The authors argue that this is because regional mediators and states have a shared cultural background and history, similar experiences and geographical connections between them, which facilitates vested interest. Our results are mixed, but at the least suggest further research is necessary. This research will hopefully compel third-party actors to give equal emphasis to reestablishing civilian access to basic needs, rather than simply focusing on a negative peace following civil wars.

Introduction

Peacekeeping missions lead to many different outcomes, for post-conflict states and for civilians caught in the crossfire. Traditional definitions of success for peacekeeping do not acknowledge that affected people need to also prosper in the post-conflict environment. Peacekeeping goals most often focus on ceasing violence, rather than ensuring civilian well-being. Ceasing violence should be one goal of peacekeeping missions, but providing civilians access to basic needs is essential. Access to basic necessities is of equal importance to ceasing violence and deprivation of such needs can lead to even more casualties than conflict. The authors theorize that peacekeeping mission facilitator type has an effect on whether or not states are able to provide civilians access to basic needs in the post-conflict period. As such, the authors ask which peacekeeping facilitator-type best grants civilians access to basic needs in the post-conflict period?

Former-U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon praised the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) as the most successful case of peacebuilding and peacekeeping in the history of the U.N. (Xinhua News Agency, 2014). A closer analysis of this peacekeeping mission, however, reveals a more complicated story than Ban Ki-Moon’s statements portray. After the mission most inhabitants had no access, very little access, or declining access to basic needs – including electricity, sanitary facilities and drinkable water (Pushak & Foster, 2011). Previous literature focuses on why third-party actors intervene, intervention processes and success rates of post-conflict intervention (see Fortna, 2004; Mullenbach, 2005; Hultman, 2010; Reid, 2017). Less literature focuses on the definition of success for that intervention (see Kim, 2017).

Drawing on extant literature, the authors theorize that different types of peacekeeping missions lead to varying levels of success. Mediator type plays a role in how peacekeepers are deployed, the goals of the mission, and the actions during the mission. Peacekeeping missions by regional actors should be most successful at assisting states in providing access to basic needs, as they have a greater level of investment in the well-being of citizens, as well as a better understanding of the region. Unilateral
missions by facilitators, like individual states and international by the United Nations do not have as much stake in the region.

The authors redefine success as access to clean drinking water, electricity, food and health care. These needs must be accessible by the majority of civilians for a mission to be successful. Redefining success would persuade missions to better address issues faced by civilians and by states in the post-conflict period. Less literature has explored the long-lasting impacts of interventions, especially in relation to our measures of success.

A state’s most important interest should be the well-being of its citizens – a goal peacekeeping intervention often ignores. Our research offers a new perspective on peacekeeping success that focuses on the well-being of civilians. The authors hope this research will compel third-party actors to give equal emphasis to reestablishing civilian access to basic needs as it does demilitarization. In countries devastated by civil wars, governments face many constraints when attempting to reestablish access to basic needs. Peacekeeping missions should focus on this issue of access – especially because conflict often happens in already poor countries.

**Literature Review**

There is a large body of literature on post-conflict intervention and peacekeeping – with much of it focusing on mediation tactics, bias and successes. Conversely, definitions of peacekeeping success have not been researched at large, and much of the extant literature on the topic accepts definitions of success that do not take into account well-being of civilians. The major goal of peacekeeping is often to create negative peace. While this focuses on reducing violence, it does not take into account the well-being of civilians. Building an argument qualitatively using cases in West Africa, we find success must be redefined to take civilian well-being into account through access to previously listed basic resources. From these cases, the authors believe access to basic necessities is of equal importance to ceasing violence, and deprivation of such needs can lead to more deaths than direct conflict can by itself.

**Mediator-Type Matters**

An important aspect of post-conflict intervention is mediator-type. While this study examines peacekeeping, the authors believe mediation literature allows us to draw a parallel to peacekeeping because it exists in the same real. There is a large body of research focused on describing outcomes, due to mediator-type (see Kydd, 2003; Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006; Svensson, 2007; Svensson, 2009). Kim (2017) categorizes mediator type as U.N./international mediator or unilateral mediator in third-party interventions. Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) conceptualize mediator-type as four distinct categories: individual, regional, international and state. The authors use a combination of these two classifications to explain post-conflict intervention as international, unilateral, or regional; and from the broad mediator classification we look at U.N. or regional peacekeeping missions. International peacekeeping is classified as missions facilitated by the United Nations, unilateral is state-led intervention and regional is inter-governmental organizations’ missions.

While the authors focus on peacekeeping missions, mediation is closely tied to peacekeeping. One way to categorize mediator type is by how much leverage they possess in the post-conflict period. Previous research has found that leverage comes in many forms, often tied to mediator type; Reid (2017) defines leverage "as a characteristic of mediators that enables them to influence the bargaining process". This definition takes into account non-material capital that regional and unilateral mediators possess – an aspect that is often overlooked in preference to material capital of large-scale international organizations. Leverage plays an important role in understanding mediators and the power they possess; which helps understand successes and failures of mediation efforts. The United Nations (U.N.) has high capability and
material support – two factors that lead to higher levels of short-term mediation successes insofar as establishing negative peace (Reid 2017).

Credibility is non-material leverage that forms the backbone of trust in mediation efforts. Kydd (2006) examined issues with building trust faced by all mediators in the post-conflict period. They argue that trust can only be built when mediators are invested in the outcome of the situation, are able to be unbiased, and believe continuing conflict is a viable option (Kydd, 2006). The U.N. might face issues in building trust due to their lack of connection to the region and their sole interest in promoting cooperation or agreements; regional mediators have more credibility leverage because they are more familiar with the actors and have ties to the area.

International Peacekeeping

Unlike most unilateral and regional facilitators, the United Nations represents interests of multiple groups, especially its member states. Kim (2017) sees the U.N. as a facilitator in pursuit of humanitarian interests that works toward a collective good rather than in self-interest. United Nations intervention often focuses on ceasing personal violence and is shown to be generally successful in creating durable peace (Fortna, 2004). That assumes success as reaching a peace agreement or ceasefire agreements – not providing civilian access to needs.

U.N. peacekeeping is different than other missions due to its specific international powers. However, it is at risk of being replaced by other types of mediation, specifically regional. Iji (2017) cites declining great power hegemony and overall decline of international mediation as reasons that smaller organizations and states participate in more mediation processes. U.N. power has declined since the end of the Cold War – meaning it must work harder to differentiate itself from other mediators and be a more successful mediator.

State-led Peacekeeping

Unilateral peacekeeping is conducted by one state. Kim (2017) and Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) find that mediators must be invested in conflict and have desire to be involved in order to cease personal violence. Kim (2017) argues that unilateral mediation is often used to further mediators’ self-interests rather than work toward the goal of a durable or institutional peace in the country. This means that unilateral intervention in post-conflict regions is more likely to result in decisions that are beneficial to the facilitator and not the post-conflict region. Unilateral actors have generally been successful in creating peace agreements or negotiated settlements (see Svensson 2007). There is a small body of literature that establishes a relationship between unilateral intervention and success. Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) provide a framework to define unilateral intervention as state mediation.

Regional Peacekeeping

Regional facilitators are local actors that can focus on specific issues in a conflict, or conduct peacekeeping overall. Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) define regional mediators as ad hoc groups of states. While this definition draws from unilateral mediator definitions, ad hoc groups of states are regional actors because multiple groups’ interests are represented and these states are local actors in the conflict or are close geographically to the conflict. This is important to note because regional mediators act differently than individual states or international mediators (see Kydd, 2003; Svensson, 2007 & 2009).
Organizations such as the European Union, African Union and Arab League are examples of regional actors (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006).

NGOs and other non-state regional actors also participate in peacekeeping missions and mediation efforts. Reid (2017) details a specific example of NGO-led mediation success in Aceh, Indonesia. NGOs act with locals and employ locals’ values. Previous research has shown that government-biased and opposition-biased mediators work for their own interests, rather than humanitarian reasons or best outcomes for both parties (Svensson, 2007 & 2009). No existing literature focuses on success as access to basic needs.

Peacekeeping mission type also makes a difference in outcomes – outcomes like negotiated settlements, peace agreements, or cessation of personal violence. Virtually all research on peacekeeping and mediation defines or observes success as an end of conflict or general lack of violence. Post-conflict peace research should not only focus on the absence of violence but also the well-being and quality of life (QOL) of citizens. As Kim (2017) has shown, QOL measurements of post-conflict intervention change success statistics. While there has been research on the United Nations Development Projects and its focus on building social capital (see Fred-Mensah, 2004), building social capital is not the same as providing access to basic needs. Building social capital does not address material concerns of affected citizens in post-conflict regions. U.N. Development Projects also often do not come with post-conflict intervention, rather they come as goals of separate missions.

Post-Conflict Peacekeeping Success

There is a large body of research that focuses on whether peacekeeping forces should be deployed, strategies missions should adopt and whether missions should be neutral or biased. This research relies on the traditional definition of success for third-party peacekeeping interventions as ceasing personal violence and, occasionally, reaching an agreement between opposing parties. Negative peace is defined as absence of violence.

Previous literature on post-conflict peacekeeping by third-party interveners provides examples of this so-called success. Mullenbach (2005) takes into consideration peacekeeping missions by intergovernmental organizations (such as NATO) or groups of states in intrastate conflicts without United Nations efforts. This article is part of the vast body of research that focuses on explaining motives of peacekeeping missions – defining success as ceasing violence and the creation of peace agreements after the conflict. Regan (2002) states that it is common belief that a third-party intervener could only shorten the expected duration of a civil conflict. He illustrates the process by which third-party intervention influences the expected duration of conflicts, sometimes even making those last longer. As evidenced by these examples, most extant research focuses on a number of measures that do not take into account the well-being of citizens after the conflict has ended – rather, they explain timing, siding and strategizing of missions. It takes into account the cost-benefit of deploying a mission given the variables above, but it does not account for the costs of reestablishing access to basic necessities that are essential to civilians in the post-conflict period. Regan (2002) states that 45% of conflict management takes a neutral position and this position makes conflicts last longer. This is in detriment to civilian well-being since longer conflicts tend to lead to more damage to basic vital civilian infrastructure. Civilians most likely do not have access to basic needs during conflict, as well.

Research discussing state formation in the post-conflict period made little or no mention of efforts to reestablish civilian access to basic needs. These articles focus on the politics in the aftermath of conflict that ended with third-party intervention. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) show how post-conflict intervention is politics-focused. The authors argue how power should be divided once a civil conflict is over. The presence of a third-party decreases the likelihood of failure during a settlement (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003). Existing literature consistently assumes success is the cessation of violence through peace agreements or
ceasefires (see Fortna, 2004). Abiding by the same traditional definition of success, Krause and Jütersoneke (2005) focused on politics in the aftermath of a civil conflict mediated by a third-party. The authors wrote about the process of state formation, which a number of third-party peacekeeping missions attempt to impose on nations. That hurts the peacemaking process because state formation should take place organically rather than through third party mediation (Krause & Jütersoneke, 2005). The authors argue that forcing that process might lead to the end of peace periods.

This article argues the traditional definition of success by peacekeeping missions should not be accepted. "If one adopts a larger understanding of peace operations, focusing on the attempt by peacebuilders ‘to bring war shattered states into conformity with the international system’s prevailing standards of domestic governance,’ the balance sheet is less positive" (Krause & Jütersoneke, 2005). This definition, although alternative to the traditional one, still does not take into account vital aspects of post-conflict peace: the well-being of civilians via their access to basic needs. While we do acknowledge politics, state building and the security of civilians are very relevant goals of countries emerging from civil conflict, we believe existing literature lacks emphasis on the well-being of civilians in the post-conflict period.

West African Peacekeeping

An area of interest that started this research was the Sierra Leone peacekeeping mission and the fact that it is widely considered a success. Former-U.N. Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, said this was the most successful peacekeeping mission in U.N. history (Xinhua News Agency, 2014). The mission achieved negative peace, however we do not consider it a true success; Pushak and Foster (2011) for the World Bank’s Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) provides evidence to support this argument. At the time of the article's publication, Sierra Leone had been conflict-free for nine years. The study shows access to power was extremely low, ranging from one to five percent in urban areas and virtually non-existent in rural areas – 60% of the population lives in rural areas. Despite this, Sierra Leoneans paid one of the highest tariffs for power in the entire African continent (Pushak & Foster, 2011). Water services were also shown to be unreliable in urban areas, and most importantly, "the lack of sanitary facilities is one of the major contributory factors to Sierra Leone’s exceptionally high maternal- and child-mortality rates" (Pushak & Foster, 2011, p.2). The study also details how road infrastructure is poor and the main airport in Freetown is only accessible by ferries. Sierra Leoneans were left in deplorable conditions after the U.N. peacekeeping mission.

In 2004, Côte d'Ivoire received a peacekeeping mission considered successful. Research shows there was a 98% reduction of medical doctors in the central region of Côte d'Ivoire between 2001 and 2004 (Betsi et al., 2006). This is just one figure, but the article also examined the number of working nurses, qualified mid-wives, nurse’s aides and laboratory technologists in the central, eastern and western regions of the country between 2001 and 2004 – all showed drastic reductions, due to the civil war. Functioning health facilities in the entire country had a reduction of 80% in the same period. "A comparison of the situation 19 months after the conflict began to that preceding it arrives at the conclusion that 75-88% of the health personnel left the [Forces Armées des Forces Nouvelles (FAFN)] controlled areas and that 72-90% of the health facilities ceased their operation" (Betsi et. al., 2006). The data illustrates how the country's health system was negatively affected by conflict and provides credence to the argument that peacekeeping missions should focus on civilian access to basic needs. This article shows that peacekeeping missions need to focus on granting civilians health care access in the post-conflict period, since human resources and health facilities are largely unavailable.

The health system itself is largely impacted by civil conflicts because access to drugs and health clinics is reduced and health professionals flee during conflicts. The Democratic Republic of Congo, a
recent post-conflict region, is a case where deaths due to diseases and malnutrition are higher than those related to conflict violence (Kruk et al., 2010). Kruk’s study (2010) finds:

High morbidity and mortality can persist long after the conflict ends. For example, the infant mortality rates in Angola, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, all war-affected countries, have remained stagnant for the past 15 years. This 'indirect' mortality is due to the disruption of livelihoods, inadequate food and water supplies, and the destruction of health systems, as well as to continued insecurity (p. 89).

This article supports our argument that peacekeeping missions need to focus on primary necessities such as health care, otherwise the civilian death toll will keep rising even after a conflict is over. Oyuke et al. (2016) studies 36 African countries’ access to electricity including Sierra Leone and Burundi, both considered success cases of peacekeeping by the U.N. Oyuke et al. (2016) shows that Sierra Leone has not made significant advances in providing access to electricity in the five years between Betsi et al.’s (2010) article and theirs. Oyuke et al. (2016) ranks countries’ access to power grids – the average between the African countries in the study is 66%. Among the lowest ranked are Sierra Leone (29%), and Burundi (17%) has the least access to power. Sierra Leone shows a 68% disparity between urban and rural areas access to power grids; in Burundi the gap is worse at 79%. In this study, Liberia, Sudan, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire are also mentioned.

Extant literature on post-conflict peacekeeping by third-parties is rich on so many topics such as politics, security and strategy. This body of research lacks focus on well-being of civilians – non-actors who are simply victims. Civilians are directly affected by conflict because infrastructure can be damaged or destroyed, which leads to less access to basic necessities, like food and water. As shown by this data on West African peacekeeping efforts, many missions goal is to end personal violence and not to support civilians. It seems counter intuitive to leave civilians malnourished, with little access to clean water, little access to healthcare, or electric power. Achieving peace and reestablishing basic necessities should come hand-in-hand. There is no purpose in ceasing violence when civilians are left in deplorable conditions that lead to more death.

**Theory and Hypothesis**

Peacekeeping success is often defined broadly as negative peace or building political institutions. Mullenbach (2005) shows how some peacekeeping by ad hoc groups of states attempts to achieve negative peace, while Hartzell and Hoddie (2003), as well as Krause and Jütersonke (2005) focus on political institution-building and state-building as successes.

More recent work demonstrates that during and after conflict, healthcare systems are often inaccessible to civilians (Kruk et al., 2010). Oyuke et al. (2016) provides evidence that electricity access is abysmal in many West African countries that have experienced peacekeeping. Kruk et al. (2010) demonstrates that civilians also have inadequate access to food, water and health care in post-conflict situations.

This juxtaposition between missions’ focus on state-building and negative violence and the well-being of civilians in the post-conflict period highlight the importance of focusing on our definition of success. State-building and after-the-fact missions do not ensure civilians have access to basic needs, rather missions with goals of negative violence leads to less access to electricity, water and food. Peacekeeping success is best defined as a measure of access to these needs in addition to lack of violence.

Using these definitions as a base, we focus on U.N. and regional peacekeeping missions. While Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) include ad hoc groups of states in their definition of regional mediators, we look at peacekeeping by inter-governmental organizations as regional peacekeeping missions, due to data limitations. Kim’s (2017) analysis of international mediators describes them as humanitarian-driven. Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) describe regional mediators as more able to address low-intensity disputes and cite that these organizations are suited to address day-to-day concerns of civilians. This is because they are often made up of members with a “common background, culture and experience” (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006, p.336).

In the post-conflict period, civilians still rely on institutions to provide day-to-day necessities. While there are many differences between post-conflict states and non-conflict states, civilians still rely on institutions during and after conflict. For example, healthcare is a necessity that many civilians are unable to access without government intervention and that reigns true in post-conflict states (Betsi et. al., 2006; Kruk et al., 2010). Electricity must be a service provided by an entity other than civilians, because much of the infrastructure is either government or privately owned – meaning that civilians still look to the government for that good. The same is true for other infrastructure like roads and airports, which are managed by local governments or private parties under supervision of the government.

Relationship between civilians and the state is based on accountability and trust, and a form of this holds true in post-conflict situations. We rely on the definition posed by Thomas (1998) of fiduciary trust: people trust the government to do what is right and act in their best interest and civilians have no way of measuring or analyzing if or how government officials are working in the interest of common good (p.171). This relationship is different from expectations – where there is a calculation of the probability the government would take certain a course of action instead of another (Thomas, 1998, p.169). Fiduciary trust exhibits an asymmetrical relationship between the citizens and their government and it is based on belief rather than expectations (Thomas, 1998). Fiduciary trust is exacerbated in a post-conflict situation since civilians are especially vulnerable and helpless and can see government as the only way out of deplorable conditions. For example, fiduciary trust is even stronger in the context of a post-civil war in West African countries due to high poverty rates and unreliable infrastructure.

Regional peacekeeping missions are directly, geographically or culturally, involved in conflict, and are often actors in the region. International peacekeeping missions often attempt to force or speed up the post-conflict peace process (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005). Speeding up the process does not create peace faster, but only hurts the process which should flow organically. Regional mediators are more entrenched in the conflict because they are actors in the region and/or directly involved in the conflict. Regional mediators and peacekeeping forces may have more credibility leverage – immaterial characteristics of a mediator based on “contextual knowledge, information, and connections” and can manifest through “historical ties and cultural ties” (Reid, 2017, p.1408-1409). Reid (2017) found that credibility leverage decreases likelihood that peace will fail – as per the traditional definition of success. Regional mediators are overall more likely to have better knowledge of the region and a more similar historical background, which means peacekeeping missions led by regional actors also have these characteristics.

Regional peacekeeping missions have more stake in the well-being of civilians, which could lead to their support for state-based access to basic needs. Regional missions are deployed by actors in the conflict region, and individual regional peacekeeping forces can have personal connections to the conflict. Looking toward mediation as an example, biased mediators are likely to fight for power for their own side (Svensson, 2009) – the same concept applies in states that have had regional peacekeepers. Because regional peacekeepers have connections to the conflict, they will fight for their own side.

Post-conflict states that have regional peacekeeping operations are more likely to provide access to basic needs to civilians because of shared cultural background/experiences and a shared history with
regional mediators, and regional missions’ geographical connection with states. The ties between regional peacekeeping missions and post-conflict civilian well-being shows the causal relationship between peacekeeping mission facilitator and civilian access to basic needs.

Hypothesis 1: In a comparison of states, those that have regional peacekeeping missions are more likely to provide civilians access to basic needs than those led by the U.N.

Because of their shared background, regional peacekeeping missions are more able to ensure states can provide civilians access to basic needs. We expect that states that have regional peacekeeping missions will be more likely to provide access to basic needs over states that have U.N.-led peacekeeping missions. Regional peacekeeping missions have more stake in the well-being of civilians because of their involvement in the conflict and region. Interactions between states and civilians still matter in post-conflict situations – even if that relationship is altered by the presence of conflict. Regional facilitators will be more likely to ensure that institutions will provide access to food, clean water, healthcare and electricity in post-conflict regions.

Our hypothesis examines the relationship between type of peacekeeping mission and ability of states to provide access to basic needs. Our research will be organized by post-conflict states with peacekeeping missions and with post-World War II data.

Research Design

Our unit of analysis is the post-conflict-state. The authors use post-conflict-state data because we are examining access to needs in post-conflict states that have undergone peacekeeping missions. Our sample population is post-conflict states with peacekeeping missions in the post-World War II environment. The relationship examine is peacekeeping facilitator type and how well states are able to provide access to basic needs. This relationship is examined at an aggregate level.

Change in access to basic needs is our dependent variable. This variable is comprised of civilian access to food, clean water, healthcare and electricity. Accounting for change allows us to control for states that initially had low access to these needs. The authors measure change in access to these basic needs starting the year a peacekeeping mission starts compared to when it ends. The authors created this variable instead of other quality of life (QOL) measures – for example, Morris details a now-widely cited QOL measure in his 1979 book “Measuring the Condition of the World’s Poor”, because we are measuring different concepts than previous measures have accounted for. Kim (2017) employs Morris’ measure of a combination of life expectancy, infant mortality rate and adult literacy rate, but we look at concepts in terms of access and will not be using these measures.

Civilian access to food is drawn from two data sets on undernourishment and depth of food deficit. Undernourishment data comes from the Food and Agriculture Organization and spans 2000-2015. The prevalence of undernourishment represents the percentage of the population whose food intake is insufficient to meet dietary energy requirements continuously. The aggregation method is weighted average and organized by country and year. Food deficit data is from the Food and Agriculture Organization and Food Security Statistics and spans 1992-2016. The depth of food deficit indicates how many kilocalories would be necessary to lift the undernourished to a sustainable position with all other factors constant. This is estimated as the difference between the average dietary energy requirement and the average dietary energy consumption of the undernourished population (World Bank, 2016). It is multiplied by the number of undernourished to provide an estimate of the total food deficit in the country, then normalized by the total population. The aggregation method for this dataset is weighted average.

Our measurement of access to clean water is from WHO/UNICEF, Water Supply and Sanitation through data for 1990-2015. The data represents the percentage of population with access to an improved
drinking water source. Examples of these water sources are piped water on households and public taps, tube wells, protected springs and rainwater collection. The aggregation method for this dataset is weighted average.

The data on access to healthcare is scarce, so as a proxy measurement we chose number of maternal deaths. The authors believe this measure, although imperfect, can give us a representation of access to healthcare as women assisted by medical personnel during pregnancy and after labor have significantly lower probability of dying – without access to medical personnel, the authors expect maternal deaths to rise. The authors have drawn this dataset from the WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, World Bank and U.N. population division and spans 1990-2015. The data account for the number of women who die from pregnancy-related causes while pregnant or within 42 days of the end of a pregnancy per 100,000 live births. A weighted average was the aggregation method for this dataset.

Percentage of population with access to electricity is sourced from the World Bank, Sustainable Energy for All Database and spans 1990-2014. The World Bank collects data from industries, national surveys and other international sources. This data was measured annually and by country.

Our key independent variable is type of peacekeeping mission facilitator. The authors use data from the University of Central Arkansas’ Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) Project. The authors employ the Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions Dataset spanning 1946-2014. The authors look specifically at international missions and regional missions. Type of mission will be coded using three dummy variables – each one indicating whether a specific mission is the United Nations, regional inter-governmental organizations, or state-led peacekeeping. This will allow us to test our dependent variable based on mission type.

One control variable is democracy level. Democratic countries are more like to provide civilians with better access to basic necessities, since civilians’ expectations of their government matters. People might vote out government officials in future elections or protest if they are dissatisfied with their access to basic necessities. Democratic governments tend to provide more access to basic needs for those reasons. The authors use Polity 2 as our measurement of democracy level and spans the period 1800-2016. Polity scores range from -10 to +10. Autocracies have scores ranging from -10 to -6; Anocracies have scores ranging from -5 and +5 (plus three special values: -66, -77 and -88). Democracies have scores ranging from +6 to +10.

Annual percentage growth in GDP per capita is another control. Kim (2017) used this variable as well, and the authors use it because economic development may influence how states are able to allocate resources to basic needs. If states are in economic decline before conflict, post-conflict access to needs will be affected. This control is necessary because economically poor countries are less able to provide basic needs in the first place – and that needs to be controlled if comparing to states that are better economically. The data related to percentage growth in GDP per capita is from the World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data and spans 1960-2016. It is based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. Dollars. It uses a weighted average as aggregation method.

Population is also an important control. A larger population might lead to less resource access overall, as states might not have the capacity to provide resources to larger populations. States with a lower population overall might have an easier time providing access. Population should be controlled because it can affect the measure of access to basic needs. We use aggregated population data from the World Bank, from sources including the United Nations Population Division, Census reports and other statistical publications from national offices, Eurostat, United Nations Statistical Division, U.S. Census Bureau and Secretariat of the Pacific Community. It accounts for all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship. The aggregation method for this dataset is sum and spans 1960-2016.
Percentage of population in rural communities is an important control as well. Rural areas often have less access to resources in general, which would impact the percent change in post-conflict states. States that have a lower percentage of their population in rural areas means that states are more able to provide access to clean water, food, healthcare and electricity. Urban areas also have more infrastructure before conflict, which would have an effect on infrastructure-based needs like healthcare in post-conflict states. We use data from the World Bank on the percentage of population living in rural areas as defined by national statistic offices. It is calculated as the difference between total population and urban population. The aggregation method for this dataset is weighted average and spans 1960-2016.

Results

Tables are organized by length of post-conflict-peace-spell, defined as 3 and 5 years after the end of peacekeeping missions and peacekeeping mission facilitator-type. Table 1 examines the change in access to water. Three and 5-years after both U.N. and regional peacekeeping missions, access to water experiences significant changes. States with U.N. missions significantly increase access to water after both time periods while regional missions significantly negatively impact access to water after both time periods. This is most likely due to the United Nations’ ability to support and provide water-related infrastructure to post-conflict states more so than regional missions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>3 Year</th>
<th>5 Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>3.093(0.457)***</td>
<td>2.798(0.705)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>-2.844(0.395)***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity2 Change</td>
<td>0.095(0.457)</td>
<td>0.084(0.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Population Change</td>
<td>0.0000000225(2.85e-08)</td>
<td>4.51e-08(2.87e-08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Population Change</td>
<td>-0.033(0.106)</td>
<td>-0.083(0.106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>0.088(0.018)***</td>
<td>0.094(0.021)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>0.220</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 analyzes change in access to electricity. While our results are not significant in the 3-year peace spell, there are significant changes electricity access 5 years after a both regional and U.N. missions exit a country. In states with U.N. missions, electricity access is significantly negatively impacted. Five years after regional peacekeeping missions end, more civilians have access to electricity. In the short-term, while not significant, the conclusions are opposite – after 3 years, regional missions have a negative effect and U.N. missions have a positive effect on electricity access.
Table 2. Change in Access to Electricity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>U.N.</th>
<th>Regional</th>
<th>U.N.</th>
<th>Regional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Year</td>
<td>5 Year</td>
<td>3 Year</td>
<td>5 Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>0.845(0.852)***</td>
<td>-2.232(0.572)***</td>
<td>2.307(0.715)***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>-0.934(0.811)</td>
<td>-0.089(0.0851)</td>
<td>2.307(0.715)***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity2 Change</td>
<td>0.163(0.135)**</td>
<td>0.167(0.1333)</td>
<td>-0.109(0.087)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Population Change</td>
<td>0.000000524(1.05e-07)***</td>
<td>0.000000529(1.05e-07)***</td>
<td>0.00000274(2.95e-08)***</td>
<td>0.00000265(2.77e-08)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Population Change</td>
<td>-1.212(0.235)***</td>
<td>-1.213(0.235)***</td>
<td>0.375(0.119)**</td>
<td>0.410(0.123)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>-0.064(0.251)***</td>
<td>-0.066(0.025)***</td>
<td>-0.068(0.014)***</td>
<td>-0.069(0.014)***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| n                         | 263             | 263      | 172             | 172      |
| R²                        | 0.3529          | 0.353    | 0.318           | 0.315    |

Table 3 examines the depth of food deficit. In states with U.N. missions, there is a negative change in the depth of food deficit indicating there is less difference between the average diet of undernourished civilians and a sustainable diet. After 3 years, this change is significant for states with U.N. missions. Regional missions have the opposite effect after 3 years – indicating they are less able to close the gap. The same holds true 5 years after both missions ended, but the results are not significant.

Table 3. Change in Depth of Food Deficit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>U.N.</th>
<th>Regional</th>
<th>U.N.</th>
<th>Regional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Year</td>
<td>5 Year</td>
<td>3 Year</td>
<td>5 Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>-80.166(21.639)***</td>
<td>-32.852(23.38)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>72.210(20.286)***</td>
<td>-32.852(23.38)</td>
<td>27.208(22.780)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity2 Change</td>
<td>6.153(2.620)***</td>
<td>3.364(2.512)</td>
<td>3.277(2.561)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Population Change</td>
<td>0.00000606(1.89e-06)***</td>
<td>0.00000389(2.06e-06)***</td>
<td>0.00000355(1.96e-06)***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Population Change</td>
<td>-3.192(3.020)***</td>
<td>-0.915(5.898)</td>
<td>-0.374(5.618)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>-3.903(0.988)***</td>
<td>-5.784(1.260)***</td>
<td>-5.968(1.288)***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| n                         | 165             | 157      | 157             | 157      |
| R²                        | 0.227           | 0.248    | 0.246           |         |

Table 4 describes the change in number of maternal deaths. The number of maternal deaths 3 years after a mission ends lowers significantly in states with U.N. missions. Regional missions have the opposite effect. Maternal deaths in states with regional missions increase significantly in the 3 years after the mission ends. While not significant, the trend holds true in the 5-year model.
Table 4. Change in Number of Maternal Deaths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>U.N.</th>
<th>Regional</th>
<th>U.N.</th>
<th>Regional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Population Change</td>
<td>0.00007(0.00001)***</td>
<td>0.00007(0.00001)***</td>
<td>0.00009(7.31e-06)***</td>
<td>0.00009(7.11e-06)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>8.768(2.092)***</td>
<td>8.250(1.957)***</td>
<td>14.741(2.652)***</td>
<td>14.364(2.515)***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>n</th>
<th>270</th>
<th>270</th>
<th>189</th>
<th>189</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.285</td>
<td>0.275</td>
<td>0.628</td>
<td>0.626</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 analyzes the change in percent of undernourished population. This measure is the most data scarce, with n=32 in the 5-years model. These cases show states with regional missions significantly decrease the percent of the undernourished population. U.N. missions increase the percentage 5 years after a mission ends. Due to the small number of cases, we cannot draw sweeping conclusions from this analysis.

Table 5. Change in Percent Undernourished Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>U.N.</th>
<th>Regional</th>
<th>U.N.</th>
<th>Regional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>0.180(1.331)</td>
<td>0.981(1.043)</td>
<td>14.398(4.547)***</td>
<td>-8.488(3.945)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity2 Change</td>
<td>0.0978(0.195)***</td>
<td>1.041(0.169)***</td>
<td>0.5111(0.258)*</td>
<td>-0.011(0.390)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Population Change</td>
<td>-2.44e-07 (8.63e-08)*</td>
<td>-1.99e-07(6.03e-08)***</td>
<td>-4.54e-06(1.38e-06)***</td>
<td>-6.18e-06(2.60e-06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Population Change</td>
<td>0.397(0.084)***</td>
<td>0.352(0.061)***</td>
<td>1.069(0.822)</td>
<td>-1.206(0.629)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>-0.214(0.037)***</td>
<td>-0.217(0.040)***</td>
<td>-0.419(0.061)***</td>
<td>-0.438(0.090)***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>n</th>
<th>89</th>
<th>89</th>
<th>32</th>
<th>32</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.438</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>0.635</td>
<td>0.493</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While this study did not find support for our hypothesis at-large, the authors do see trends that require more analysis. Data limitations did play a role in the analysis, but results like U.N. missions' negative impact on access to electricity and an increased number of maternal deaths with regional missions require
more research. In general, regional missions either negatively impact civilian well-being or have no significant effect. Opposite to our hypothesis, U.N. missions positively impact some of these measures. United Nations’ capacity should have a similar effect on all infrastructure-related measures, like it does with the increase in water access, but that is not reflected in electricity access. For this example, it calls into question the differences between providing access to water and access to electricity. Also, the drastic difference in number of maternal deaths between facilitator-type requires more research. Due to the mixed results, the authors cannot conclude whether regional missions, or U.N. missions better provide civilians access to these basic needs in the post-conflict period, and thus cannot conclude which mission facilitator-type is more successful.

Conclusion

This paper set out to describe the relationship between peacekeeping mission facilitator type and civilian access to basic needs in the post-conflict period. Definitions of peacekeeping success has been largely neglected in extant peacekeeping literature. Post-conflict state-building and social capital building has been researched, but we believe those do not explain civilians’ position in the post-conflict period. Redefining success as access to basic needs questions the intentions and motivations of peacekeeping missions, and shifts focus onto individuals instead of simply societal level goals. Post-conflict quality of life matters for civilians exiting conflicts, and peacekeeping plays a major role in many of those exits. The authors theorize that regional missions were better able to push states to provide access to these needs, due to their shared history, cultural experiences, and geographical proximity. Regional missions have more connection to the conflict and investment in the well-being of civilians. The authors do not find strong support for our hypothesis, but rather our results are mixed. The results, however, do demonstrate the need for future research to further consider the ways in which peacekeeping impacts individuals. The authors believe that better and more complete data will facilitate this continued exploration. Further, other initial analysis reveals that the number and duration of peacekeeping troops present are likely better indicators than observing the mere presence of a mission.

Our research offers an argument for peacekeeping missions to place equal emphasis on civilians as it does on ceasing violence. While peacekeeping goals differ from mission to mission, civilians always experience life in the post-conflict period. The authors hope this research will compel interveners to give equal emphasis to reestablishing civilian access to basic needs as it does ceasing violence. Although this study did not find strong support for our hypotheses regarding peacekeeping facilitator type, the authors found that mission duration and number of peacekeeping troops have a significant effect on some of our quality of life measures. This paper builds a framework for future research on civilian well-being in the post-conflict period and questions current notions of peacekeeping success.

Pursuing this research served as a learning process for us, as the authors completed it through their undergraduate senior year. As part of this learning process, the authors encountered problems that had to be worked through. The authors are very invested in this topic of research and became even more motivated, as research proceeded. The biggest weakness in this project is the availability of data and ability to process that data. The authors had data limitations because the authors use measures that are not collected often or were not collected before the 1990s, which affects our data analysis and consequently our possibility of significant results. For example, as part of our dependent variable the authors set out to measure access to healthcare. Currently, the U.N. has data for a measure called “Access to Healthcare,” but only for 2015. Due to the lack of data, this study found as alternative measure the number of maternal deaths. This does not provide a complete picture of access to healthcare, but there are no other data available related to this concept. Even without this measure, our research fills a gap in the extant literature that we believe needs attention.
The authors plan on continuing this research to explore our unexpected findings that correlate duration of peacekeeping mission with all measures of quality of life proposed and our findings that number of peacekeeping troops has a significant effect on access to some of these measures. In our future research, the study could assess quality of life with different measures that were not studied in this research. Additionally, a variety of data sources could fill the gap in our data. The authors hope scholars will use our framework as a starting point for similar research. The authors believe there will be more comprehensive data collection and availability in the future, making it possible to draw conclusions from our current research question.

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World Bank, Maternal Mortality Ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births) [Data file 2015], from: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT

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ABSTRACT: Why do some countries develop nuclear capability and become latent and others do not? Nuclear latency describes the situation in which a state has the technical capability to produce nuclear weapons, but has not acquired nuclear weapons. However, states with the capability to produce nuclear weapons often stop at this stage of nuclear development. That provides a puzzle that is worthy of scholarly analysis because it can lead to new insights about nonproliferation and opens-up the horizons to understand proliferation. However, a first puzzle that must be explored is the path to nuclear latent capability. Given that improved manufacturing technology and construction of enrichment, or reprocessing facilities transforms states into near-nuclear states, why do states manage to become so advanced in their nuclear capabilities? This work argues that national power, military expenditures and military personnel are the three key variables that explain why some countries develop a nuclear latency capability and others do not. Understanding why some are further along in the stages of developing a nuclear weapon, provides implications for non-proliferation and counter-proliferation policy. This quantitative study uses as statistical method a cross-sectional time series regression model of country data observed annually.

1. Introduction

Nuclear latency describes the situation in which a state has the technical capability to produce nuclear weapons but has not acquired nuclear weapons. Hence, latent nuclear countries have the ability to “quickly” proliferate with enrichment or reprocessing (ENR) facilities. They are close to becoming a nuclear power because they have “fissile material—weapons-grade highly enriched uranium or plutonium—and acquiring this material is the most difficult step in making nuclear bombs.”¹ Hence the most important step towards producing nuclear warheads has been taken. States with the capability to produce nuclear weapons often stop at this stage of nuclear development. That provides a puzzle that is worthy of scholarly analysis because it can lead to new insights about proliferation and nonproliferation. However, a puzzle that must be explored first is the path to nuclear latency capability. This work examines why some countries develop nuclear capability and become latent and others do not? Given that improved manufacturing technology and construction of enrichment or reprocessing facilities transforms states into near-nuclear states, why do states manage to become so advanced in their nuclear capabilities? This work argues that national power, military expenditures, and military personnel are the three key variables that explain why some countries develop a nuclear latency capability and other do not.

Understanding why some countries are further in the stages of developing a nuclear weapon, provides implications for non-proliferation and counter-proliferation policy. To move towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, it is beneficial to understand not only why countries proliferate and not proliferate, but also what the roots of fundamental proliferation capabilities are. Understanding states’ decision-making on nuclear proliferation, non-proliferation and latency advances for the international community to create incentives to stay non-nuclear.

2. Literature

Most of the literature on nuclear proliferation has focused on the current nuclear Powers: United States (U.S.), Russia, China, United Kingdom (U.K.), France, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea (DPRK). Scholars have extensively written on factors that account for proliferation in these countries. Such factors are explained by security models: military security (Epstein 1977) and insecurity (Thayer 1995), leader psychology (Hymans 2006), military strikes against nuclear facilities (Kreaps & Fuhrmann 2011), political economy (Solingen 2007), norms (Tannenwald 2007), bureaucratic politics (Walsh 2001), proliferation decisions of other states (Miller 2014) and regime type (Way & Weeks 2014, Hymans 2012).

The literature on nuclear latent countries is not as extensive. Surprisingly much research has been done on proliferation, even if nuclear latency is empirically more common in the international system. That is because according to Matthew Fuhrmann, 31 countries developed latent nuclear capabilities in the past years, while there are only nine nuclear Powers (five official and the others unofficial).

According to Scott Sagan “nuclear latency is exceedingly important and poorly understood;” what is more, there is “poverty of political science on nuclear latency.” The role of nuclear latency needs to be discussed more thoroughly. Modern scholars Matthew Fuhrman and Benjamin Tkach look at nuclear latency and its effect on international conflict. They argue that “latency reduces the likelihood of being targeted in militarized disputes.” Another branch of the nuclear latency literature analyzes the military behavior of latent countries. Michael Horowitz finds that countries with commercial nuclear power programs (as opposed to active nuclear programs) are less likely to act aggressively towards neighbors. Fuhrman and Tkach argue that “political scientists have yet to devote much attention to the causes and political effects of nuclear latency.” Two scholars, Rupal Mehta and Rachel Whitlark, are currently conducting research on the international causes and consequences of nuclear latency and analyze the benefits and burdens of nuclear latency.

A last branch of research examines the bargaining power that nuclear latent countries have with their advanced capability. Tristan Volpe argues for the advantage of coercive diplomacy and a bargaining posture that comes with latency. Ariel E. Levite reinforces this argument of benefits to a state’s coercive diplomacy strategy. It seems then that being a nuclear latent country is a favorable category to be situated in. Why then do some countries pursue it while others do not? What are the prerequisites that are crucial to nuclear latency?

Studying nuclear latency more in-depth can provide a greater understanding of international security in a second nuclear age. There is a gap in the literature on the causal capabilities of nuclear latent countries and why they become latent. The question about which variables are most important in latent countries’ is an area that needs more attention. Understanding motivations and rationales of nations’ foreign policy decisions clarifies behavior in the international community where nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation remain the preeminent concern.

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1 This list is not complete, but only an extract of the vast literature on why countries proliferate.
3. Theoretical Significance and Deriving Hypotheses

The paper draws upon Tristan Volpe’s modern theory on nuclear latency. Volpe argues that “countries leverage nuclear latency to practice coercive diplomacy.”¹ Hence, nuclear latent countries’ advanced nuclear technology increases their bargaining power. This can be an incentive for countries to acquire the stage of latency. Volpe introduces a compelling theory of bargaining leverage and compellence strategy, depending on a country’s stage of development. Nuclear latent countries then have a sweet spot of the optimal extraction of coercive benefits. This Sweet-Spot Hypotheses, offers an explanation of a stage that is most likely to result in an optimal bargaining chip. This work adopts Volpe’s theoretical framework of latency that is countries have good reasons to become latent. While the theory provides an incentive to go near-nuclear, it disregards other explanations of causal inference on becoming latent.

This work attempts to provide a framework of relevant variables that may explain near-nuclear capability and the effects of alternative explanations of developing latent capability. National power is one of the variables that may have an effect on a country’s development. National power, identified by the material capabilities as a result of military, demographic, and economic strength, can benefit the path towards latency. Having national power can provide the necessary recourses that a country needs. Demographic, military and industrial developments are important for a country’s capability and power.

National power can be a key variable for developing nuclear weapons for several reasons. First, national power means a country has a strong conventional (land, sea and air military) capability. That brings the country militarily closer to acquiring nuclear weapons. All current nuclear countries have a strong conventional capability, meaning there is a positive relationship between conventional and nuclear capability. The better the conventional capability, the closer a country to nuclear capability. Some of the same technologies and resources are used for conventional power and nuclear power. The factors that drive conventional capability are the similar to the ones that drive near-nuclear weapon capability.

Second, a country that is interconnected with the international market and has trade relations that can provide necessary resources for nuclear capability. For example, it can provide the knowledge and materials for ENR facilities through exchange of information. Third, national power means a country can exercise and resist diplomatic and political influence, being able to decide on its path with nuclear energy. The most powerful countries have a significant voice in international politics and can sue it to establish latency while assuring the international community that they would not step over the threshold to acquire nuclear weapons. There is an incentive to keep this influence and voice instead of facing backlash from the international community – losing its voice. Fourth, latent countries are dependent on trust of the international community (in order to keep international and regional status and investor and trade relations). A country can only hold latent capability it is has the power in the community to assure other countries of the intentions of non-proliferation. Fifth, the material capabilities, embedded in its definition, provide economic and financial capabilities and resources to build ENR and nuclear research facilities.

In the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) dataset from Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, power is “defined as the ability of a nation to exercise and resist influence – [it] is a function of many factors, among them the nation’s material capabilities.”² This leads to a first hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 1:** In a comparison of countries, those having strong national power are more likely to have latent nuclear capability than will those having weak national power.

¹ Volpe “Atomic Leverage: Compellence with Nuclear Latency,” p.517.
The CINC “aggregates the six individual measured components of national material capabilities into a single value per state-year.”¹ The calculated index has “selected demographic, industrial and military indicators as the most effective measures of a nation’s material capabilities. These three indicators reflect the breadth and depth of the resources that a nation could bring to bear in instances of militarized disputes.”² The first hypothesis will be tested by using the general CINC score, a country’s complete national power. In an attempt to isolate the effect of the strength of a country’s financial resources for latency (in order to afford ENR and research facilities), a second hypothesis is tested using the CINC’s score military expenditure as measurement. A strong conventional military is generally associated with large spending on armed forces. In another attempt to isolate the effect of country’s size of conventional forces, this study tests a third hypothesis, using the CINC’s score military personnel as measurement. More people in a country’s conventional forces can lead a country to nuclear latency. That is because military personnel is not only needed to protect ENR and research facilities, but develop the technological know-how necessary to quickly develop nuclear weapons. Military does not only include soldiers and ground forces but scientists and technicians. In addition, the higher military spending the more likely is the availability of financial resources to develop nuclear weapons.

**Hypothesis 1a:** In a comparison of countries, those having large military expenditures will be more likely to have latent nuclear capability than will those having small military expenditures.

**Hypothesis 1b:** In a comparison of countries, those having large military personnel will be more likely to have latent nuclear capability than will those having small military personnel.

National power, military expenditures and military personnel can play a role to become nuclear latent, but they can also differ from country to country. The regression might show significant result, but caution should be given to generalize the claim for all latent countries. The regression could also show insignificant results with which we could not reject the null hypothesis (while effects could still hold true for single cases). If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, a qualitative study of selected cases could identify casual inference of single latent countries.

### 3. Methodology

According to Mark S. Bell, the use of quantitative methods to study proliferation has three benefits. Unlike a qualitative approach, quantitative analysis avoids the risks of generating misleading inferences from cases that are singed out.³ Second, it “allows for the modeling of probabilistic processes and estimation of the average effects of independent variables and, thus, explicitly models the probabilistic and multi-causal processes that likely cause proliferation.”⁴ Lastly, quantitative methods provide a consistent measurement across the cases and allow for replication by other scholars.⁵

The statistical method used in this work is a cross-sectional time series regression model of country data observed annually to measure panel data. The author can determine the effects of my key independent variables national power, military expenditures and military personnel on nuclear latency. The time period of the analysis is between 1991 and 2012. The time frame was chosen for two reasons. First, it covers the second nuclear age after the Cold War only and thus inference than can be made about current and not historical latency. Second, most variables used in this work do not provide data beyond 2012 and this study therefore is limited to that year. Going forward, it would be beneficial to expand the data to 2017.

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¹ Ibid., p.6.
² Ibid., p.4.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid.
4. Operationalization and Datasets

5.1 Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis of the paper will be country by year. All countries will be coded by their respective Correlates of Wars’ (COW) country code ("Ccode").\(^1\) South Korea for example is coded 732, Japan 740 and Egypt 651. The COW country codes are widely used among scholars of security studies, specifically nuclear security.

5.2 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is nuclear latency. A nuclear latent country will be coded = 1, a nuclear non-latent country will be coded = 0. To code this variable, this work uses the Fuhrmann Dataset (2015). To identify latent and non-latent countries for all units of analysis, this study used his Nuclear Latency Dataset.\(^2\) Fuhrmann uses latency_lab to describe laboratory-scale enrichment or reprocessing plants in operation in a given year. This essay ran the regression models with this identifier (Table 3).

Before deciding on the use of Fuhrmann’s dataset, the author of this essay researched and considered others, such as the Gartzke-Jo Dataset (2006). The author of this essay considered using a second model to identify nuclear latent countries. Erik Gartzke uses the variable N-CAP7t to compose an index of latent countries that have nuclear weapons production capability, including several indicators of technology and material to manufacture nuclear weapons.\(^3\) It summarizes five resource and two production capabilities into a score of nuclear latency.\(^4\) Only countries with a score of 7 are considered nuclear latent. Gartzke and Jo provide “n_cap7” which identifies that countries are no longer producing technological and materialistic capabilities. “N_cap7t” measures states that still produce the items.

While the dataset is more complex than the Fuhrmann dataset in identifying nuclear latency, its weakness is the time frame that ends in 2002 (few conclusions can be drawn to the 21st Century) and that the dataset codes nuclear weapon countries as latent countries. Using nuclear countries would introduce a random error. A country can no longer be nuclear latent if it already has nuclear weapons. These countries are neither nuclear latent, nor can they be put in the same category with non-latent countries because they differ with their past proliferation. Hence, this work uses Fuhrmann’s dataset.

5.3 Main Independent Variable and Control Variables

This work uses a multivariate regression to estimate the effects of each independent variable on the reasons of countries becoming near-nuclear. As noted earlier, key variables in this analysis are national power; military expenditures and size of military personnel. The control variables the author of this essay incorporated in the statistical model include extended deterrence, economic openness and adherence to norms. They are operationalized as follows (See Table 1).

**Main Independent Variables**

- **National Power:** To identify national power the work uses the CINC index. The score identifies the average of a state’s share of the system total. The CINC always ranges between 0 and 1. “0.0” would indicate that a state had 0% of the total global capabilities. A “1.0” would indicate that the state had 100% of global capabilities. The variable name is “cinc.”

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\(^2\) Fuhrman & Tkach, “Almost Nuclear.”


\(^4\) The seven capabilities are domestic nuclear deposits, metallurgists, chemical engineers, nuclear engineers, electronic/explosive specialists, nitric acid production capabilities and electricity production capabilities.
Military Expenditures: Nuclear latency requires large military spending. The independent variable is measured by a country’s military expenditures. The variable “milex,” military expenditures is singled out from the CINC dataset. Between 1816 and 1913 it is measured by thousands of current year British Pounds and from 1914 on in thousands of current year U.S. Dollars. Here, everything will be measured in US Dollars since the dataset is ranges from 1991-2012.

Military Personnel: This independent variable is measured by a country’s military personnel. The variable is singled out from the CINC index; “milper,” which is a measure in thousands.

Control Variables

Extended Deterrence: Countries possibly develop a near-nuclear capability because their alliance with a nuclear power (hence nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence) provides them with support, exchange, and knowledge on nuclear material and resources. Fuhrman and Todd S. Sechser used a dataset that identified defense pacts with nuclear countries (defense_pact). Countries under a formal or informal nuclear umbrella are coded as 1, those under no formal or informal nuclear umbrella as 0.

Economic Interdependence: The more a country trades and is open to the international economy, the more likely it is to acquire necessary capabilities to become nuclear latent. Two different measurements can be used. First, Dr. Michael Mousseau’s Contract Intensity of National Economies (CINE) Index identifies economies that engage in intense levels of mutual cooperation and promote each other’s material welfare. A contractualist economy is coded 1, a clientelist economy is coded 0. Second, the variable can also be measured by countries’ GDP. Having a higher GDP means more trade and interdependence on the international market. The measure for GDP (current U.S.$) 1960-2016 is based on the World Bank’s dataset.

Table 1
Summary of Operationalization of Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Power</td>
<td>CINC Index % of total global capabilities on scale 0-1</td>
<td>Singer, Bremer &amp; Stuckey, 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditure</td>
<td>Country’s military spending (milex) in thousand U.S. $</td>
<td>Singer, Bremer &amp; Stuckey, 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
<td>Country’s military personnel (milper) in thousands</td>
<td>Singer, Bremer &amp; Stuckey, 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended Deterrence</td>
<td>Defense pacts with nuclear countries (defense_pact)</td>
<td>Sechser &amp; Fuhrman, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Interdependence</td>
<td>CINE Index Contract Intensive Economy in 2005 international $/person</td>
<td>Mousseau, 2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Findings


Figure 1 shows a histogram of the key independent variable national power, displaying the distribution graphically. The overall pattern shows a distribution skewed to the right. Most countries fall below 0.04 points on the index. One could say the countries with a high CINC score are outliers.

![Figure 1: Histogram of National Power (CINC)](image)

It is crucial and important to look at the data and variables at hand before interpreting the results of the multivariate regression. Table 2 provides a summary of the summary statistics. There are two dummy variables, the dependent variable latency and control variable extended deterrence. All other variables are interval variables. For the dependent variable and key independent variables there are complete 4,001 observations. For Extended Deterrence there are many missing observations. That is likely due to difficulty in coding informal nuclear umbrellas. That means the regression results of this variable should be interpreted with caution. There are some observations missing for both different measurements of economic openness. However, that is not as significant as for the extended variables and should not significantly alter the results.
Table 2: Summary of Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latency</td>
<td>latency_lab</td>
<td>4,001</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.238</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Power</td>
<td>Cinc</td>
<td>4,001</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>2.44e-07</td>
<td>.218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditure</td>
<td>Milex</td>
<td>4,001</td>
<td>2428827</td>
<td>7161468</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>1.03e+08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
<td>milper</td>
<td>4,001</td>
<td>82.098</td>
<td>219.49</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>3200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended Deterrence</td>
<td>defense_pact</td>
<td>1,770</td>
<td>0.358</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Interdependence</td>
<td>CIE</td>
<td>3,036</td>
<td>3.349</td>
<td>1.894</td>
<td>.0469</td>
<td>8.886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Interdependence</td>
<td>gdp_cap</td>
<td>3,815</td>
<td>9313.097</td>
<td>17301.6</td>
<td>65.012</td>
<td>192989.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With an understanding of the data and variables, a cross-sectional regression analysis can be interpreted. Table 3 presents the results of the cross-sectional time series regression model. The regression is run as a fixed effect model. That is because the Hausman test provides a p-value of 0.0102 and therefore significant. Hence, there is a systematic difference in the coefficients and the null (which implies that the difference in coefficients is not systematic) can be rejected.

The expected relationships between the key independent variables and nuclear latent countries were positive. Model 1 was run with national power. It shows that countries with strong national power countries are more likely to be nuclear latent than those with weak national power, supporting Hypothesis 1. Every point increase in national power is associated with on average a 153.082 point increase in national power. Military expenditure and military personnel could not be run in the same model because they are a fraction of the CINC Index. If they would be run together, it would create a problem of multicollinearity. Hence, this study estimates four different models.

In all four models, extended deterrence has no significant effect on nuclear latency. That means the variable has either no effect on latency or the measurement for the variable in ineffective. The latter could be the case because many observations of the variable are missing (as identified in the summary table). Going forward, it would be appropriate to create a new dataset to ensure the result is not a measurement error but truly has no effect on the independent variable.

The difference between Model 1 and 2 is the indicator for economic interdependence. Model 1 is run with CINE dataset from Mousseau and Model 2 is run with GDP from the World Bank dataset. Both measurements show a significant effect of economic interdependence on nuclear latent countries, though the coefficient for the CINE dataset is larger. In Model 1, one point-increase in economic openness is associated with on average a 0.797 increase in nuclear latency. In Model 2, every point-increase in economic openness is associated with on average a 0.00007 increase in nuclear latency. Because the CINE dataset has the larger coefficient, Models 3 and 4 are run with this measurement instead of the World Bank’s GDP.
Model 3 was run with the second key independent variable, military expenditures. Both variables have a highly significant effect on the dependent variable. Every unit-increase in military expenditure is associated with an average 4.77 increase in nuclear latency. Hence, latent countries are more likely to have large military spending than non-latent countries, supporting Hypothesis 1a. Model 4 was run with the third key independent variable, military personnel. Every unit-increase in military personnel is associated with an average 0.004 point unit increase in nuclear latency. Thus, latent countries are more likely to have large military personnel than non-latent countries, supporting Hypothesis 1b. Since all key independent variables are highly significant (p<0.01), the null hypothesis can be rejected.

In all four Models, the adherence to norms shows a significant negative correlation with nuclear latency. This means that latent countries are less likely to adhere to norms and have signed the NPT. This control variable then does not have an effect on nuclear latency. However, once has to be careful in interpreting this result because of the proxy-measurement of NPT signature. The NPT signature ends up being the same for almost all countries and year. Most countries, whether non-latent or latent have signed the NPT. The analysis would need a better measurement to make credible claims.

### Table 3

**Summary of Logistic Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis for Nuclear Latency**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Power (cinc)</td>
<td>153.082***</td>
<td>183.593***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(19.228)</td>
<td>(17.027)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditure (milex)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.77e-07***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(7.18e-08)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel (milper)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.004***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended Deterrence (defense_pact)</td>
<td>-0.492</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>-0.845</td>
<td>-0.472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.074)</td>
<td>(0.934)</td>
<td>(1.306)</td>
<td>(1.073)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Openness (CINE)</td>
<td>0.797**</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.748**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.378)</td>
<td>(0.401)</td>
<td>(0.292)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Openness (Gdp_cap)</td>
<td>0.00007**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>4,057</td>
<td>4,057</td>
<td>4,057</td>
<td>4,057</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_Notes: Statistically significant parameter estimators are denoted by *(p<0.10), **(p<0.05), ****(p<0.01) |

With the results from the logistic cross-sectional regression, this study conducted a margins plot of the key independent variable national power of nuclear latency. The aim was it to get a better understanding of the probability of latency for national power, while holding other variables at their mean. Generally, as the value of national power increases, the probability of being a latent country increases from 0.05 to 0.97. The margins plot shows that the development is not linear. There is a greater incline at national power of 0.06-0.13 and smaller incline at 0.18 and 0.21.
6. Conclusion and Further Research

The regression results were helpful in identifying which variables are associated with nuclear latency. National power, military expenditure, and military personnel all correlate with nuclear latency. This provides important implications for policy. Understanding why some countries are further in the stages of developing a nuclear weapon can benefit nonproliferation policies and motivate preliminary action in the international community to keep latent countries within the regulations of producing nuclear energy. Policymakers can keep an eye on countries that are progressing towards a nuclear latent capability and work closely with them to implement necessary safeguarding standards under IAEA regulations and oversight. This can assure that potential latent countries and latent countries are heading in the right direction and follow civilian nuclear program standards.

The findings of this research provide groundwork to address further questions within the framework of nuclear latency. Now that we know which countries are likely to become latent, it would be interesting to understand why these countries do no cross the threshold to become a nuclear military power. What prevents these countries from proliferation? This will be interesting for further research. I.R. scholarship has mostly explored why countries go nuclear and not why they would not. In addition, after the examination of the results of the study, it would be helpful to engage in a multimethod research approach to look at specific case studies on nuclear latency to triangulate the research. For example, South Korea as part of a balance of power in East Asia or Egypt as a major power in the Middle East would qualify as interesting case-studies to look at the causal inferences of nuclear latency.¹

¹ These two case-studies were part of a Qualitative Advanced Methodology course at the University of Central Florida-Orlando.
**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


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BOOK-REVIEW

World War Trump: Risks of America’s New Nationalism

by Editor Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D., Saint Leo University & Florida Political Chronicle

Hall Gardner, *World War Trump: Risks of America’s New Nationalism* (New York: Prometheus Books, Summer 2018, ISBN 978-1-63388-395-6), is an intriguing book. It is certainly a timely must read for both Political Scientists and common readers interested in the international and domestic repercussions of the most controversial and hated U.S. President since Richard Nixon, and whose maverick policies are revolutionizing America’s global impact despite critics.

Dr. Hall Gardner is Chairman (25+ years in-a-row) and Full Professor at the Department of International & Comparative Politics of the American University of Paris, France. More than that, he is a true “sage” who in countless books has analyzed thoroughly the intricacies of international geo-politics through time, from their historical origins to current events and plausible foreseeable near-future scenarios. Hall Gardner thinks and breathes in the mold of the great geo-political Realist thinkers of our times (Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Hans J. Morgenthau, Robert E. Osgood and especially his former mentor George Liska). Dr. Gardner gives the reader a thoughtful and disturbing global panorama of the dilemmas and decline of contemporary American power, due to domestic political divisiveness, lack of a unifying vision of U.S. strategic goals, eroding military expenditures and multiplying challenges from opportunistic new regional Powers (Russia, China, Iran, Saudi Arabia and North Korea) seeking to expand their respective regional influence.

Dr. Gardner’s book is a compelling geo-political panorama of recent and current international events portraying the rise of anti-Western challenges from multiple regional areas of conflict (Middle East/Gulf, Ukraine, Afghanistan, North Asia and South Asia) where local actors clash to undermine the weakening post-Cold War world order. From an economically-militarily weak Russia (compared to the SuperPower status of her earlier historical incarnation as the USSR), but still aggressive and strategically-astute undermining of U.S. and NATO international security interests, to the equally dangerous silent economico-militarily rise of China in seeking to replace by crook, steel or force the U.S. as the world’s leading Power, to the equally destabilizing and naked aggression by Islamic Iran in the Middle East to support Syria’s murderous régime as its regional ally and Russia as protector against Israel, Saudi Arabia and U.S., to the ubiquitous dangerous threat of Islamic terrorism (Al-Qaeda, ISIL/ISIS, Taliban) in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and globally. Dr. Gardner also bemoans the rapid erosion since 2011 of Pax Americana as a calming global influence for good (“peace”) and economic growth (Globalization and free-trade). For this he equally blames the rise of these new regional threats against America’s post-Cold War Uni-Multipolar hegemony, and sharp domestic polarization between Democrats and Republicans from politics, to cultural wars, to legal issues, to economics and even more worrisome in the loss of broad bi-partisan support for any active globalist military intervention policies, which undermined the effective long-term international reach of U.S. Presidents George W. Bush “Jr.”, Barack Obama and Donald Trump, while weakening especially during these current tumultuous Trump years both historical TransAtlantic security bonds (NATO) and U.S.-led trade cooperation (European Union, NAFTA and East Asia). But despite the eager eloquence and depth of research, Dr. Gardner’s easy-to-read book is not as easy to accept politically, and his recommendations to return the U.S. to the old Liberal world order of yore appear today already hollow and controversial in the wake of the rising wave of President Trump’s “unilateralist” historical reshaping of America’s role in the world.
Thus, like many people living “States-side” in the old “U.S. of A.”, this reviewer is forced to disagree with the underlying assumptions in Dr. Gardner’s dire opening warning that: “The U.S. will not only need to formulate its foreign and defense policy, but also radically reform its system of governance and its domestic political-economy—if it is to both achieve peace abroad and work to mitigate tendencies toward even deeper social, economic and political polarization within the U.S. itself.” America today, like several of its European Allies, is deeply divided to the core politically and culturally (just as it was earlier in the tumultuous 1960s-1970s), and Dr. Gardner rightly points out the flaws in the U.S. system, but he assumes as a sincere loving “Expat” that the U.S. has a nationally-agreed and semi-mythical global mission to fulfill in saving the world from evil and the nation from itself, regardless of which party alternates in power. Both are unfortunately by now unreasonable assumptions, given the recent collapse of even minimal bi-partisan political cooperation in foreign policy and security, or lack of any agreement on broad definitions of what the “national interest” should be vs. Russia. For Realists practitioners, the national interest based on all forms of power and national security, as well as vital military alliances, are fundamental in any country’s ability to influence the world at-large. But in democracies it is the electorate that either influences or punishes elected executives, where leaders either routinely continue established national policies, or fail to achieve success, or start radical course changes. As much as President Trump is universally vilified at home by critics and abroad as an ingénue (if not secretly implying him being a “Manchurian Candidate”) for his desire to reestablish good relations with Russia, despite Putin’s brazen destabilizing strategy of seeking to influence Western parties and elections in the U.S. and key European Allies. Yet, remember also how much open opposition from both Left (Democrats and European leftists) and within the Right (and NATO) did President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger face in pursuing Realist East-West arms control and trade openings (Détenue) with both America’s twin enemies Soviet Union (USSR) and China, as well as the disquiet suspicions around President John F. Kennedy’s relaxation of tensions with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchëv after their near-nuclear 1962 Cuban Missiles Crisis.

RUSSIA: Dr. Gardner’s analysis confirms that the most troublesome and “open” challenger to the U.S. fragile post-Cold War Uni-multipolar word order is post-communist Russia since at least 2008 (if not since 2003 during the joint Russo-Franco-Chinese-German failed attempt at the U.N. to prevent the U.S.-led Coalition Second Gulf War against Saddam’s Iraq) under its increasingly autocratic Premier Vladimir Putin. Russia has increasingly opposed U.S. and NATO roles in stabilizing the post-Cold War peace and arms control in both Europe and especially in the tricky post-Soviet “Near-Abroad” that today’s post-communist Moscow still seeks to continue to dominate. Dr. Gardner explains in an almost sympathetic way how Russia’s fundamental opposition to the four NATO Enlargements in the post-Cold War (three new Allies in 1999, seven in 2002-04, two in 2008 and another in 2017) is rooted in the hurt pride of her national humiliating collapse from the old Cold War status as “equal” SuperPower to a weaker post-communist federation struggling to influence most post-Soviet “Near-Abroad” states, while accusing the TransAtlantic Alliance of expanding Eastwards to encompass all eager ex-Soviet satellites of Eastern Europe and three Baltic ex-Soviet states to bring U.S.-led Western influence to Russia’s borders, despite an alleged secret promise by U.S. President George H. W. Bush “Sr.” to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachëv never to do so. Although on the surface this holds some truth, the U.S. and NATO did scrupulously respect the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty radically cutting all East-West forces and retaining all NATO forces deployed along the extinct old Cold War “Inter-German border” (only new Eastern Allies were allowed to have part of their forces along their old ex-Soviet borders with now independent Belarus’, Moldova and Ukraine, not Russia) until Moscow violated CFE arms control since 2014 by moving forces near the Baltic Allies. Indeed, Russia weaved over decades a propaganda blame-game to justify its national interest in obstructing U.S. global leadership and blame alternatively both the NATO Alliance as America’s strategic outreach tool and the European Union (E.U.) as a virtual “Trojan Horse” of NATO and America! This is a traditional Russian matrochka nightmare tale of hollow dolls hiding within themselves multiple dolls, hiding other smaller dolls, and hiding even tinier dolls, with no real end in sight if you are a professional conspiracy-peddler hiding in the shadows of the Kremlin...
Dr. Gardner here and in his earlier books has consistently built a long list of logical counter-arguments against NATO’s Enlargements—seen as too provocative of Russia’s wounded pride and a trigger for a new Cold War—his anti-enlargement views still represent today a minority opinion, fully rejected in an increasingly rare show of bi-partisan support by both the Republican and Democratic parties at the time of each enlargement confirmation in Congress by alternating Democratic (Bill Clinton; Barack Obama) and Republican Administrations (George H. Bush “Jr.”). The paradox is that the author’s great depth of geopolitical and historical knowledge, and earnest desire that Realism-based logics might sway international affairs towards a more rational and predictable balance of contrasting national political interests vs. possible areas of cooperation for both the U.S. and Russia does instead clash against the reality of long-term historical resentment (Russia vs. West), unpredictable leadership personality animosity (Obama vs. Putin), or fundamental misjudgements of respective characters between rival leaders pursuing fundamentally contrasting national interests (Bush “Jr.” infamous peek into Putin’s soul vs. Obama’s and Putin’s palpable mutual dislike; or Putin’s own geo-strategic trade-offs with the U.S. and NATO on anti-terrorist cooperation in Afghanistan vs. his opposition since 2006 to any possible future NATO enlargement to Georgia and Ukraine; or Trump’s exaggerated bilateral friendliness vs. Putin’s uncertain wait and see; or Xi Jinping and Trump open official friendliness vs. their parallel tough trade-war arms-wrestling).

Indeed, even had NATO and the E.U. never enlarged to the very willing Eastern European and Baltic ex-communist states (the Vilnius-13 Group), Moscow under Putin would have still always blamed NATO as a convenient domestic political scapegoat of “foreign aggressiveness”, knowing that no serious military repercussions would ever threaten Russia from a crossed Western Alliance. The argument by Dr. Gardner and few others that had NATO not enlarged Eastwards it would not have provoked Russia’s anti-Western subversions is questioned by events (and not shared by the reviewer):

- the ex-communist East Europeans and Baltic states have direct knowledge of life under Soviet/communist rule for 3 generations and their first reaction as free states was to demand dual NATO-E.U. enlargements to become “Westerners” and as security protection against any resurgent Russia;
- although allegedly President Bush “Sr.” had promised Soviet President Gorbachëv not to move NATO Eastwards, this decision was undertaken slowly by all his successors (Clinton, Bush “Jr.”, Obama) within the triple policy of integrating Russia, the “Self-Limitation Approach” of holding reduced NATO forces in Germany, and allowing Partners to possibly become full Allies through the “Open Door”:
  - first by forging NATO’s voluntary bilateral regional security and training as a Partnership network for all Western “neutrals” and ex-Soviet communist states (North Atlantic Cooperation Council/ NACC in 1990, then as Partnership for Peace/PFP in 1994, and now evolved into the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council/EAPC by 1999), with Russia always prominently included in both the bilateral NACC and Partnership (as Joint Russian Partnership Council) at the exclusive level of “NATO+1” on common NATO/Russian security threats (Islamic terrorism);
  - by 1999 all Partners were (“theoretically”) allowed to apply in future for full NATO membership through the “Open Door” policy on TransAtlantic security cooperation, democratic values, peacekeeping and defense transformation, provided none of the existing Allies casted a veto;
  - all four NATO Eastward Enlargements entailed massive military cut-backs for new Allies to integrate into NATO at lower force-levels, while not allowing any movement to their eastern borders near Russia of the massive NATO forces traditionally deployed on the “Inter-German border” during the Cold War and still kept in place during decades of regional East-West arms control reductions (1990 Conventional Forces in Europe/CFE). This policy was defined as NATO’s “Self-Limitation Approach” since President Clinton, and has been only abandoned from Fall 2015 to today in response to Putin’s sponsored Russian secessionist guerrilla in Eastern Ukraine and Russian military manoeuvres to intimidate NATO’s Baltic Allies.
Dr. Gardner has courageously stressed in his books the vital need to rebalance Russian-Western security concerns offering probing advice and hoping for calmer minds in both camps to pursue areas of peaceful cooperation. Essential for the author, has always been the vital need for a new comprehensive European Security Treaty system inclusive of the U.S., Russia, NATO and E.U., as well as U.N. diplomatic cooperation with China and India, not isolating Russia. Alas, to no avail! Instead, on one hand today Dr. Gardner bemoans that the U.S. has never seriously discussed with Russia her proposal for a new European Security system that would confer back to Russia an equal SuperPower status and helped forget the humiliating collapse of the USSR, while helping consolidate Moscow in a constructive and cooperative role with the West and U.N. to help address many global hot-spots. He also rightly bemoans that President Clinton had not worked any possible joint diplomatic solution with Russia over Kosovo before NATO’s defeat of Serbia in the 1999 Kosovo War, or has engaged also in parallel NATO Enlargements eastwards since 1999 without conceding to Moscow’s dread that NATO’s “Open Door” would eventually all but guarantee future Atlantic membership also to Ukraine and other ex-Soviet states (Russia’s “Near-Abroad”). Indeed, NATO’s four Eastern Enlargements and several broad Partnerships, in combination with parallel E.U. Eastwards Enlargements and trade associations with ex-Soviet successor states and Ukraine have precipitated Russian paranoia of becoming “encircled” by a hostile U.S.-NATO-E.U. “Western front” working together to draw under its Liberal democratic umbrella all ex-Soviet successor states still coveted for assimilation by Moscow.

The author has consistently condemned these “strategic mistakes” of the Clinton Administration, which have all but ensured Putin’s long-term anti-Western enmity. Putin’s anti-Western backlash has been felt through several domestic and international destabilizing strategies: blind nationalist threats; kleptocratic corruption and secret financing of business and political figures (from Western “facilitators” of Russian oil/gas export projects to pro-Russian leaders in the “Near-Abroad”); the brief 2008 Russo-Georgian War to annex secessionists South Ossetia and Abkhazia; illicit financing of anti-E.U. right-wing European political parties (Hungary, France, Italy, plus pre-2014 Ukraine and Turkey); cyber-terrorist attacks and Russian troops mobilizations against Estonia and Ukraine; pro-Russian secessionist movements in Crimea and East Ukraine; cyber-hacking of confidential U.S. political e-mails and their anonymous dissemination on Wikileaks; failed cyber-security attempts to breach U.S. electoral systems; brazen covert assassinations in Western countries of Russian dissidents and defected ex-spies (like all too often in Great Britain). In addition, Dr. Gardner bemoans that Russia’s covert secessionist insurgency in Crimea and East Ukraine is not being solved by any existing joint U.S.-Russian-European accord (like Minsk I & II), nor is there an international push (as the author advocates) to de-militarize and de-centralize Ukraine in a semi-federal recognition of pro-Russian secessionist rebels (this is Russia’s fig-leaf offer since Summer 2014, despite violating Kiev’s equally virulent anti-Russian nationalist opposition to lose more lands), in exchange for getting Russian forces out of Eastern Ukraine (fat chance as they claim to be locals!) and ending its military maneuvers against NATO Baltic Allies.

Instead, due to Russia’s continuous support of brazen cease-fire violations by local Russian secessionists, NATO/U.S./E.U. sanctions have mounted against Moscow and her NATO Partnership has been suspended, while the U.S. Presidents Obama and Trump have each slowly increased support for Kiev through sales of sophisticated anti-tank defense weapons to nullify local Russian secessionists military advantage. Yet paradoxically, only Trump might have a chance to implement a U.S. open policy of cooperation with Putin’s Russia (loudly condemned by Obama’s Democratic Party and many skeptics among both the Republican Party and NATO Allies as foolish if not even “traitorous”), all-the-while holding firm on keeping Western sanctions until a full end to all Russian regional destabilization activities in the Ukraine. This is most likely a “fat chance”, as Putin knows well that the moment he stops undercover military support for pro-Russian secessionists, then Ukraine will likely redouble efforts to reconquer her own lost national lands and even possibly threaten Russia’s re-annexation of Crimea, just as Croatia succeeded in crushing in 1994 its secessionist Serb insurgents, or Georgia had disastrously failed its ill-conceived 2008 drive to reconquer her lost secessionist pro-Russian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
NATO & EUROPE: Dr. Gardner (like myself) is quite justified in lamenting President Trump’s unheard-of cavalier treatment of America’s 70-years-long NATO and European Allies, and “sacred” TransAtlantic values:

a. Art. 5 automatic defense of NATO Allies from foreign aggression (Trump’s silence on the ritual praise of Art. 5, compared to its single use after the 2001 “9/11” Terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda that led NATO peacekeepers fight along the U.S. in Afghanistan against the Taliban and international terrorism);

b. the symbolical equality in importance of all Allies, regardless of size (it did not sit well, image-wise, that Trump physically shoved aside at the 2017 Summit its newest NATO Ally, Montenegro’s President, and later even questioned to the media why the U.S. and NATO should ever risk any war for “tiny” Ally Montenegro)?

c. NATO Allies’ national defense spending for the Alliance to up-held its long-accepted 2% GDP average goal (not respected by many Allies or even Germany at 1.9%), compared to the U.S.’ massive military budget;

d. America’s steady leadership and inclusion of the Alliance in international geo-strategic calculations (Trump’s earlier mocking of NATO as probably “obsolete” and his non-consultation with Alliance leaders during any important crisis, except when NATO’s Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg pays frequent visit to Trump in the U.S. to mollify personally the President);

e. TransAtlantic firmness against Russia from diplomatic warnings to economic sanctions and suspension of her most privileged Partnership status (as “NATO + 1”) after Putin’s betrayal of TransAtlantic values by destabilizing Ukraine and annexing Crimea (under the cloak of manipulated local pro-Russian secessionism);

f. U.S. historical support for European politico-economic integration dates to President Harry Truman’s 1948 Marshall Plan and has bolstered the regional creation of the 1950 European Coal & Steel Community/ ECSC, that became the 1957 European Community/E.C. and 1992 European Union/E.U., growing to 28-members by 2018. Despite trade rivalries between both sides of the Atlantic, the U.S. rarely waivered in its support of European politico-economic integration (notoriously, Secretary of State Kissinger quipped in 1973 over which phone number to dial for “Europe”, and U.S. economic angst under Reagan and Bush “Sr.” exploded in 1989 that Europe’s looming complete economic integration would challenge the U.S. for global leadership). Yet, recently both Presidents Obama and Trump have also openly interfered in E.U. integration issues over the same critical BREXIT referendum (“British Exit”) for Great Britain to secede from the E.U.: Obama very controversially interfered in the internal affairs of a vital Ally by appealing directly to the British public to support remaining in the E.U. and threatening otherwise to deemphasize their historical bilateral “Special Relation” should BREXIT happen, while Trump equally controversially interfered in the internal affairs of the same vital Ally by openly supporting BREXIT as the right of anti-E.U. populist protesters to secede. Together with Trump’s frequent criticism of E.U. “unfair” trade towards the U.S. this bodes ill for vital Euro-Atlantic relations.

On the other hand, Dr. Gardner vehemently criticizes Trump’s new unpredictable foreign and security policies rashly championed in the name of “unilateralist” strength and “jingoist” American nationalist resurgence, paralleled also by unprecedented glaring U.S. criticism of Allied cooperation on TransAtlantic security, plus clashes with most of its allies and partners over reshaping Western regional free-trade areas (from infamously criticizing Canada and Mexico over disadvantageous trade terms against the U.S. in the old North American Free Trade Accord/NAFTA, to the European Union-E.U. over trade contrasts limiting U.S. exports, to the 2016 scuttling of both the controversial Trans-Pacific Trade Partnership/TPP with Asian partners to contain a rising China, and the TransAtlantic Trade & Investment Partnership/T-TPI with all European Allies and E.U.), as well as challenging rival China (with a brief 2018 trade-war against Beijing over its infamous record of anti-Western unfair trade practices). But to no avail!! President Trump’s operational signature is to both attack rivals and “double-down” against all criticism to his most controversial ultra-conservative policies that now break with both past U.S. traditions of leading a Western world order (based on NATO, European integration, NAFTA, U.N. human rights values and free-trade Globalization) and with many of his predecessor Obama’s liberal initiatives that remined unratified by a hostile-leaning U.S. Senate (Paris-Montreal voluntary Climate Accord, TPP and T-TPI).
Trump unfortunately, as a gilded billionaire-entrepreneur is no modern “Prince” willing to listen with realistic calculation to either the prudent counsel of past Republican advisors, or to Dr. Gardner’s earnest, but futile advocacy of a return to America’s past commitments of leadership over a Western-led global free-trade order (after all it was U.S. leadership under President Franklin D. Roosevelt that forged the post-1944 Bretton Woods international economic system, plus regionally under Presidents Bush “Sr.” and Clinton who created the 1990s NAFTA, as well as Obama’s ill-fated TTP and T-TPI). Instead, Trump is an unconventional masterful “bruiser” and wheeler-dealer, who together with his protectionist economic advisors single-handedly terminated both TTP and T-TPI, while bulldozing with threats, trade sanctions and “zero-sum-game” diplomacy the successfully re-negotiation in 2018 under their own terms of NAFTA as the new U.S.-Mexico-Canada accord, or the 2018 brief trade-war with China against its notoriously bad record of anti-Western trade practices, or slowly escalating economic sanctions to punish Russia’s annexation of Crimea and electoral interference in the U.S., instead of pursuing Dr. Gardner’s open wish for a fifth strategic U.S.-Russian arms cuts (since President Obama’s START IV accord which cut both arsenals to the absolute bottom level of their respective assured nuclear balance). Again to no avail, given Putin’s recent strides to modernize his nuclear arsenal and taunting the U.S. with media-savvy propaganda displays of futuristic nuclear-tipped Russian weapons with global reach at a time of prolonged U.S. military cuts under a Congressional-mandated “Sequester” (the domestic political clash between Republicans and Democrats under Obama, and resulting inability to pass any Federal budget, led Congress unwisely to mandate 30% across-the-board annual budget cuts of all bureaucratic spending, which savaged the Pentagon’s force-readiness), while the last counter-salvo was National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. “Nuclear” Bolton’s declaration that Russian violations have forced the U.S. to terminate the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) disarming all U.S.-Soviet/Russian ballistic missiles with 500-5,000 Kilometers-range.

Consequently, it comes to no surprise that Trump’s Republicans, once briefly able to control both Houses of Congress in 2016-2018, approved two massive annual military budget increases, inclusive also of a planned U.S. nuclear modernization and open discussion with NATO to reverse Obama’s freezing of the anti-Iranian Missile Defense installations in Poland and Czech Republic (which Russian propaganda always disingenuously condemns as threatening her nuclear arsenal, despite NATO’s repeated offers to open its command center to Russian officers). Yet, Dr. Gardner criticizes any new U.S. military build-up, because in his eyes America already has military expenditures as high as the combined total of Russia, China, Japan, Great Britain, France, Saudi Arabia, Iran and India, while still fearing the greed of a mythical industrial-military complex that haunts the corridors of power since the Eisenhower Administration (despite the reality of post-Cold War massive defense cuts from Bush “Sr.” to Obama).

Like most seasoned observers and practitioners of international politics and security, Dr. Gardner is now left behind in this maddening Trumpian new political rush, futilely advocating caution against future risks that U.S. unilateralism would spark unexpected anti-Western escalations of international tensions, or regional wars, which in-turn might forge a hostile anti-Western Russo-Sino-Iranian-Syria-N. Korean military alliance (or even possibly linking the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization/CSTO military alliance and China-led Shanghai-7 Cooperation Organization/SCO, while adding as new members Iran, Syria and North Korea). Thus, Trump’s controversial foreign and trade policies could unwittingly push all these rival Powers into a fatidic misstep sparking open conflicts over some regional hot-spots, or escalate step-by-step through alliance-aggregation, automatic arms-races and military build-ups (reminiscent of those that precipitated World War I exactly a century ago) into a much feared unexpected wider “World War Trump”?

Alas once again, are Professor Gardner’s unwelcome dire warnings the future omens from a modern-age Cassandra??
CHINA: Certainly, the second most entrenched geo-political issue for the U.S. to manage in the West’s favour is how to counter the semi-covert attempt to overtake economically and politically America’s global leadership in the post-Cold War by a rising semi-communist China under the careful, quiet strides of President Xi Jinping. Dr. Gardner, like most analysts of international affairs, was horrified by newly-elected President Trump’s veiled threat to China to reverse the long-standing U.S. acceptance of the “One-China Policy” and seek closer ties with capitalist pro-Western Taiwan, which Beijing insists is a rebel province. By needlessly provoking China over Taiwan, Trump was keen in showing world-wide his utter disregard for any past convention, or “sacred cows” standing in the way of his overarching drive to renegotiate international trade ties that he sees as unfavourable to America. Dr. Gardner warns Trump that while countering a rising China the U.S. must keep a quiet status quo on Taiwan as the only policy worth any weight to preserve peace. But, once again, to the surprise of Dr. Gardner and most other cautious observers, Trump has quickly and unexpectedly pushed U.S. foreign policy goal-post far away from the historically unsolvable and intractable Taiwan issue with a quick about-face to reassure China that the U.S. still respects the “One-China Policy” and continues to reject Taiwan’s possible future bid for full independence. Conversely, President Xi Jinping’s visit in early-2017 to Trump’s Florida Mar-a-Largo “home-away-from-home” showed that the two sides could be quickly reconciled over spirited libations and mutual economic ties. The clear result of this bilateral effort to stay on each other’s best behaviour has allowed Trump to briefly enlist China’s help in pressuring North Korea into stopping its regionally destabilizing missiles tests.

However, Trump’s subsequent trade-war with China (pushed by nationalist-protectionist economic Advisor Peter Navarro and National Security Advisor “Nuclear” Bolton) to correct Beijing’s decades-old anti-Western predatory commercial practices, rigged exchange rate and patent piracy, has led to a mutual arms-wrestling trade stand-off: on one hand, China has targeted U.S. exports from regions that strongly voted in 2016 for President Trump, but this has had marginal impact on the 2018 Mid-term Elections on behalf of the anti-Trump Democrats, while Trump’s Republicans have increased their strategic hold on the U.S. Senate which ultimately controls foreign trade and diplomacy; on the other hand, the U.S. completed largely on Trump’s own terms the renegotiation of NAFTA as U.S.M.CA (U.S.-Mexico-Canada) trade accord, strengthening him diplomatically to continue changing long-existing negative trade flows along the new administration’s “unilateralism”. Here Dr. Gardner fears that any Trump initiated trade-war would be self-defeating in the long-run for the U.S. because China’s economy is fast catching-up with the U.S. to the top global leadership position and a more serious bilateral clash could even use the “nuclear option” of selling its vast savings in U.S. Treasury bonds to crash the U.S.-led international financial market. Yet, Trump’s current trade-war with China reflects the administration’s notorious embrace of U.S. “exceptionalism” and complete disregard of Dr. Gardner’s and others’ warnings. Trump, Navarro and Bolton clearly feel confident that the trade-war in the long-run will hurt China more than the U.S., by dramatically slowing-down its already fast weakening national rate-of-growth by denying it access to the vast American markets (given China’s vaster exports levels to the U.S. and E.U. vs. lower U.S. exports levels to China), while forcing U.S.-Western trade to refocus on U.S. domestic economic power-house and boost domestic wealth and Republicans’ political base. Once a U.S.-China trade is finally attained by 2019, all political and media talking-heads will roll around once again unable to explain why Trump is still winning at his own controversial pool-game...

On the thornier issue of China’s prevarication in annexing other Asian countries’ uninhabited strategic atolls deep in the South and East China Seas to turn them into Chinese military outposts within international sea-lanes-of-communications (“Nine-Dash-Line”), Trump is continuing earlier U.S. containment efforts by both Bush “Jr.” and Obama to oppose these disputed Chinese islands annexations. The goal is to step-up U.S. air and naval patrols within these international waters and steadily bring back U.S. forces to support its allies in the Asia-Pacific region (“Pivot to Asia”) after their earlier unwise draw-down by Clinton in the post-Cold War. Here too, Dr. Gardner advocates mutual restraint and opposes as “equally provocative” any U.S. build-up in the contested South and East China Seas, which he fears might draw both Powers into an uncontrollable clash, like the 1954-to-1958 Quemoy and Matsu twin nuclear Crises under President Dwight Eisenhower to prevent China from invading Taiwan. Eventually China under U.S.-Soviet pressures pulled-back then, while today such “Brinkmanship” success is pursued anew by Trump who stresses that Beijing is not ready yet to negotiate honestly, but will soon...
NORTH KOREA: Dr. Gardner and most international commentators were drawn in a frenzy of fear and calls for immediate regional de-escalation over the brazen flurry of North Korean nuclear and ballistic missiles tests, matched by Trump’s renewed sanctions and cat-calls which most warned would lead to a regional nuclear war, possibly precipitating uncontrollable reactions also from China and Russia. Yet once again, Trump’s unorthodox bilateral diplomacy by violating decades-long non-engagement rules with the North Korean dictator has surprisingly de-escalated tensions and restarted U.S.-North Korea-South Korea regional de-nuclearization negotiations, despite their still apparently slow and uncertain progress. As Trump declares his unconditional diplomatic victory (and indeed none of his predecessors has ever succeeded in “taming” the North Korean wily tiger), let us hope that mutual common ground can be truly reached, while preserving the U.S. security guarantee for South Korea. Here Dr. Gardner and all international observers remain aghast in fear that an inexperienced Trump, who is all too eager for any symbolical diplomatic triumph, might inadvertently throw-out the laundry’s dirty wash with the baby still inside…! Fortunately, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis and NSC Advisor Bolton remain always vigilant and aligned with Trump, while coordinating to a degree parallel policies with South Korea and Japan in confronting the North Korean threat. However, as always in the past it is the “Hermit Kingdom” that really “calls the shots” and although taken aback by Trump’s unorthodox new diplomacy, still Pyongyang’s diplomacy continuously dodges and cartwheels at will in the unending effort to squeeze the most concessions from the U.S. and South Korea with only the most limited return concessions in reducing ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. The key geo-strategic problem remains unchanged: Kim Jong-On sees nuclear weapons as the key to the long-term survival of his dictatorship and the dual diplomatic trump cards to sign a bilateral peace treaty and force the U.S. military to withdraw from South Korea. The other problem is mostly Trump-made, where he consistently pursues multiple attacks on trade and diplomacy that instead of being mutually reinforcing tend to nullify his strongest push: as long as the U.S. pushes sanctions against both Russia and China over bilateral issues (for Russia her U.S. elections meddling and attempted assassination in NATO Ally Great Britain of Russian opponents vs. the unprecedented current U.S.-China trade-war), then both Moscow and Beijing will (pretend to) support U.S./U.N. sanctions against North Korea in hope of being rewarded with future reduced U.S. bilateral sanctions against them, while secretly loosenig the nose around Pyongyang… Here author and reviewer see eye-to-eye with increasing pessimism, as Trump does not believe in traditional “linkage” trade-offs, but in doubling-down on the roaring U.S. economic growth and trade-offs from strength, however cosmetic such success might appear to his critics and old diplomatic hands… And yet, Trump is an unpredictable “force of nature” that often bulldozes its way through to many opponents’ peril if dismissed.

ISRAEL, IRAN & SAUDI ARABIA: The Greater Middle East has long been since the 1980s the virtual exclusive province of U.S. diplomatic efforts to stabilize the region (unsuccessfully), stop “rogue” states (Saddam’s Iraq, Ghaddafi’s Libya, Assad’s Syria, Islamic Iran), sponsor a Two-States peace solution between Israel and the Palestinians, and protect both Israel and Saudi Arabia from regional Iraqi (then) and Iranian (now) security threats. Yet, to Trump (more than any other U.S. President before), Israeli interests and maximalist borders (as well as finally moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem) remain paramount over the Palestinians’ isolation and fury, while Islamic Iran is now condemned as the source of all evils in the region, due to its funding and arming of pro-Iranian terrorists and militias (Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis) in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Trump’s foreign policy has implemented most campaign elections promises, eliminating the controversial U.S.-U.N.-Iran nuclear demilitarization secured by Obama as his own regional success, while supporting politically and militarily Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, as well as supporting their own bilateral security cooperation. Despite sporadic U.S. bipartisan criticism over the years against Riyadh on secret private Saudi funds and the extreme Wahabi religious ideology that inspired Al-Qaeda terrorists’ “9/11” attacks in 2001, or U.S. Leftist/Progressist support of Palestinians against Israel over the Gaza daily clashes, these three U.S. allies now actively cooperate with America against Iran and Syria, while sideling Hamas and Palestinians, as well as joining with Jordan, most Gulf states, Kurds, Iraq and NATO in a U.S.-led Coalition in 2016-2019 to demolish (with partial help from even Iran and Russia) the extreme evil of the terrorist Islamic State of Iraq & Levant (ISIL/ISIS). And we should never forget the strategic role of global oil production and prices dominated by Saudi Arabia, and since 2018 also by the U.S. now leading after few years of its “Fracking” revolution in liquid gas outputs.
This is why the U.S. under Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo unwaveringly support historically close strategic ties with Saudi Arabia against Iran (even making Riyadh the unprecedented first foreign capital visited by President-elect Trump in 2017, instead of any traditional tour of Europe) by privileging exclusively current U.S. national security interests, despite the international and media fire-storm over Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin-Salman’s “allegedly”-mandated assassination in Turkey of *Washington Post* Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. For both Trump and Pompeo, applying the strictest non-moralist Realpolitik remains paramount, given the Middle-East regional nasty realities and widespread human rights violations by all local Powers (over 500,000 dead in Syria; hundreds of journalists imprisoned in Turkey, Syria and Iran; dozens of journalists and opponents killed secretly in Russia and abroad) and the strategic role of Riyadh in helping keep low global oil prices, even if the moral cost is to openly reverse historical U.S. values on human rights cherished until the last-President Obama and now cast aside by Trump.

**TRUMP & U.S. POLITICS:** Professor Hall Gardner is a prolific geo-strategic thinker and like all his past works, also this latest book is well-thought and abundantly researched, doing an incredible job of matching current and past views of U.S. diplomacy and its global power-projection with a step-by-step criticism of President Trump’s revolutionary up-ending of both these old policies in an effort to replace the much cherished post-World War II bipartisan traditionalist U.S./Western interventionist world order with a novel “America First” semi-Isolationist vision of limited engagements and systematic trade pacts renegotiations. Trump indeed seems keen to blend old historical patterns of American “exceptionalism”, “Isolationism” and “unilateralism” (following in part his idols: 1829-37 U.S. President Andrew “Old Hickory” Jackson’s “Manifest Destiny” and 1909-13 William Howard Taft’s “Dollar Diplomacy”) with his own past career in strong-arm commercial negotiating-style seeking “winner-take-all” end-goals in both international crises and trade-wars. Yet, although Dr. Gardner’s analysis of the rising woes for U.S. international leadership is well-written and earnest in denouncing both the domestic and global causes of the current illnesses, his matching prescriptions for a cure are imaginative, but unexpectedly fall short of the very Realpolitik prescriptions that the author so rightly champions, because his cure invariably harkens back to the past U.S. Liberal world order of 1945-2016 and cooperative Western involvement in attempting to redress global woes.

Dr. Gardner is a brilliant “sage” of all international geo-strategic issues (past, present and most likely), but as an “expat” who has lived away from the U.S. of A. for over 30 years he has lost touch with the most radical domestic political changes of the last 10 years at least. Most international analysts and this reviewer likely embrace many of Dr. Gardner’s analysis and vision, but today half of the American political actors and population (namely those aligned with the Republican Party, although there is a creeping ideological cross-over of blind criticism shared by younger Democrats of the Progressivist/Socialist wing) strongly reject most of the author’s remedies and traditionalist vision of a U.S.-led moralist world order steeped in TransAtlantic security with Europe, free-trade Globalization and support of U.N.-sponsored human rights and peacekeeping in global troubled spots. The hope by anti-Trump domestic political forces (Democrats, Progressists/Socialists and “Never-Trumpers” Republicans) to reverse the “nightmare” of having lost national power to Trump in 2016 has been dashed by the 2018 U.S. Mid-Term Elections, where despite its unprecedented rise in voters to Presidential Election years levels, it still reached only 49% of national voters vs. the regular 37% in 2014. Thus, Democrats only took-over the U.S. House, but not the Senate, and cannot really reverse any of Trump’s policies.

1. While Democrats see their waning “Blue Wave” as a temporary propaganda faux-pas and keepouting their taking-over of the U.S. House of Representatives from the Republicans, less-ideological analysts see the much expected Democratic “Blue Wave” giving them only half the number of seats hoped to win in Mid-Term Elections (38 House seats compared to the average of 65 in previous Presidencies for Republicans in similar circumstances), or tout their “historical rise in Democratic women” elected to Congress (rising only to 88 among 111 Congresswomen from 107 earlier), or have their conquest of key State Governors dashed in strategic Georgia and Florida (that remain Republican and are vital to win future Presidential Elections), and see their hopes to seize also the U.S. Senate dashed by the Republicans’ increase from 50/51 to 53 seats.1
2. In the U.S. Constitution it is only the U.S. Senate that holds the strategic control on top governmental officials and all judicial appointments, and any policy and law passed by the house needs the support of the majority of the Senate to pass or remains null and void.

3. Hysterical attempts in 2017 by the most extreme Democrats/Progressists to vote an early impeachment of President Trump (even without any official indictment by Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s Investigation on presumed Russia-Trump interference in the 2016 U.S. elections) will never be passed by Congress: in the 435-members House, its own Judicial Committee requires a simple majority to start voting articles of impeachment (provided all Democrats agree to vote), which then require a simple majority of 218/221 to pass the whole House (although Democrats have just regained the majority, likely a third vote on impeachment will not pass again, given party divisiveness and leadership opposition to another ideological battle impossible to win), while in the Senate 67% of votes are required out of 100) but 53% of Senators are Republicans and will vote overwhelmingly against it.

4. Finally, after much national support for two-terms Democrat President Obama (a first Black U.S. President) the rival Republican Party of 2015-17 which was divided between “Bushite” establishment vs. Tea Party grass-roots ultra-conservatives saw Trump unprecedentedly cut-down to size 17 party rivals and then defeat a semi-united Democratic Party behind Senator and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (touted as “Obama III”). Now in the 2018 Mid-Term Elections, Trump’s galvanizing ideological appeal to the party grass-roots has eliminated all internal oppositions to his full control of the party, and despite losing large sections of the general population and educated suburban women, plus control of the House, this outcome still strengthens Trump for the next 2020 Presidential Elections against a Democratic Party left in disarray after their 2018 Blue Wave: over 40+ Democrat hopefuls already vie for the future nomination of a party still deeply split between Centrist vs. Liberals and Progressists/Socialists, plus urban/bi-coastal split vs. country/rural voters. Thus, it is more likely than not that a combative Trump might succeed in rallying once again all his grass-root and party voters to win a very contested 2020 Presidential Election, despite his flaws and even any potential failed impeachment process against him.

Unfortunately, in his book’s last two prescriptive chapters, Dr. Gardner falls on his face as a flat soufflé over the most basic principles of any POL-101 “American Government” course by calling for radical reforms of the U.S. Constitution (including eliminating the uninominal electoral single-college voting system also used in Great Britain and France, in favour of a politically suicidal popular/proportional voting system, long rejected also in Italy), or by even copying constitutional procedures used in France and Great Britain, or by calling for a Constitutional elimination of the most peculiar American institution which is Amendment 2 guaranteeing all citizens’ (not the original territorial militia envisaged in the 1780s) the right to bear arms for self-defence (as reinterpreted in such way by the U.S. Supreme Court). Although in theory it would be a great policy-change to reduce the horrendous gun-violence permeating America, such political calls are mostly supported by Democrat-controlled urban areas, while the rest of the country embraces their guns (even stalwart Socialist/Democrat Senator Bernie Sanders has long supported his state’s support of gun rights). Thus, any national Federal law to impose widespread major gun-controls has always failed even under Democratic Presidents, despite the partisan “cultural war” dimension of this hopeless debate.

But by far the most important obstacle to Dr. Gardner’s dreams of setting the country back to its traditional and moral past is not just the extremely controversial and popular President Trump (who was elected in 2016 by half the country and might very likely be re-elected in 2020 if precedent serves right), but the cold legal fact that any amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires two-thirds of both the U.S. House and Senate, followed by a three-fourths vote of the 50 U.S. States. It is not surprising that in a very politically-divided society since the 1960s (that saw side-by-side Civil Rights legislation, the Hippies’ Flower Power sexual/music revolution, the bloody 2,500 U.S. Leftist terrorism bombings by the Weather Underground and Symbionese Liberation Army among others, plus the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy, Black leader Martin Luther King Jr. and Presidential candidate Robert Kennedy), only two U.S. Constitutional Amendments passed ever since: the 26th in 1971 lowered the voting age to 18 and the 27th in 1992 reset Congressional salaries (which is totally inconsequential in the hope of radically changing the U.S. institutional structure), compared to the dramatic failure of the pro-women Equal Rights Amendment of 1979-1982! Thus, in such sharply divided U.S. society, the Democratic Party will never...
succeed in changing by constitutional amendments either gun laws, or the voting procedure of America’s single-college system (although this same party in recent years has stated in specific states to officially reapportion Presidential votes in a proportional way when convenient to it), while with a highly nationalist and down-to-earth U.S. public the surest way to quickly kill any voting amendment is to tout it as a legalistic-intellectual “bequest” from “wiser” foreign constitutions... 

In the end, Dr. Gardner’s book is always a great read and tantalizing in his predictions of doom over Trump’s policies and lack of strategic wisdom (despite the President’s pseudo-Realist utterances), although the author is also always fair to take great pains to show how the current decay of the U.S.-led world system started as early as Clinton’s failed policy towards Russia over NATO’s Enlargements and Kosovo War, followed by Bush “Jr.” in the Second Gulf War and triple open-ended interventionist quagmires (the bloody peacekeeping in Afghanistan and Iraq, plus the global War against Islamist Terrorism). It is not Dr. Gardner’s fault that despite the depth of his scholarly knowledge and keen analysis as a wise “expat” living abroad in Paris, France, he does not understand anymore his own compatriots from Paris, Texas and the heartland. He is not alone! Unfortunately to many here and abroad, as President Trump remains solidly in power he confirms being the living embodiment of a new “permanent” populist revolution redrawing the political Right into Trump’s “own image”, always “doubling-down” on his controversial policies and “America First” nationalist rhetoric, regardless of all futile protest marches and hate from the opposition in such bitter evenly divided society (a situation that Trump’s loud critics have major pains to accept as an uncomfortable new norm also within many key European Allies: Great Britain, Italy, Germany, France, Spain, Greece, Hungary and Poland). Nor it is now abundantly evident that the President shall be swayed by any rational book like Dr. Gardner’s one, that bravely, but vainly seeks “to teach old tricks to a new dog”! Indeed, what all forget is that it is President Trump who was elected as the U.S.’ new leader and it is his constitutional right to change with a domestic political majority any U.S. policy at home or abroad, although thankfully his nationalist/Isolationist rhetoric until now has not precipitated any feared new war, once proclaimed as unavoidable by sanctimonious pundits, activists and scholars too. I for one, am planning to stay out of this dual domestic and global political fray by sipping piña coladas at the beach, waiting for the bombs to fall or not..., as the Trump Revolution keeps unfolding ever unpredictably towards either feared doom or gilded symbolic success...

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